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Partnerships are now established as a dominant governance tool in global and 
public health. In the UK, successive governments have viewed partnership with 
the food industry as a legitimate and effective tool in obesity policy. This model 
of governance appeals to the notion of decision making between public and 
private actors as interactive and collaborative. However, while this governance 
approach is framed as a more open and accommodative form of policy making 
to state-centric authority, empirical research of partnerships with unhealthy 
commodity industries is surprisingly limited in both political science and public 
health literatures. Taking this gap in the theoretical and empirical literature as 
the starting point, this thesis set out to explore the ‘black box’ of partnerships 
tasked with encouraging food industry self-regulation to address obesity policy 




The thesis is based on an analysis of documents released under the Freedom 
of Information Act, partnership documents (e.g. steering group minutes), 
relevant policy statements, and 50 qualitative interviews with individuals 
involved in public health debates. Interviews include UK and Scottish policy 
makers that had experience of partnerships in food policy, in addition to 
individuals involved in advocacy, food industry representatives, and academic 
researchers. It adopts a practice-based interpretive framework that understands 
governance as sets of rules and procedures, using the analytical frameworks of 
public accountability, multi-level and network governance to explore decision 










The thesis is divided into four empirical chapters that explore governance using 
various combinations of this analytical framework. Chapters 1, 2, 3 develop this 
approach in England, and Chapter 4 considers partnerships in Scotland. 
Chapter 1 examines the operationalization of partnership at the UK level, 
making the case that policy statements framed this mode of governance as 
increasing the problem-solving capacity of government. Chapter 2 draws on an 
empirical case study of accountability practices, and considers how a lack of 
formal mechanisms of accountability seemed to create opportunities for 
commercial sector actors to circumvent being held to account within partnership 
arrangements. Chapter 3 extends the focus to decision-making processes in 
partnership, illustrating the tension between collaborative modes of governance 
and the political strategies of food industry actors. Chapter 4 then explores 
partnership arrangements in Scotland, combining an analytical focus on 
accountability, multi-level and network governance to consider how policy 
divergence from partnership arrangements at the UK level was constrained 





The findings problematise the suggestion that partnership arrangements 
improve the governance and policy effectiveness of interventions to address 
diet-related ill health. This research draws upon contemporary theories of 
governance, in combination with a wide range of empirical data, to highlight how 
commercial sector actors exercise policy influence in partnership arrangements. 
In contrast with a tendency within public health studies to assume a conflict 
between the interests of commercial sector actors and public health aims, this 
research makes a distinctive contribution in exploring the micro-political 
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The theoretical, empirical, and normative focus of this research has been 
shaped by the ideational and institutional context of the School of Social and 
Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. During an MSc in comparative 
public policy, I became interested in theories of governance, which I applied to 
understanding political and policy processes in health policy-focused modules 
of this degree. The flexibility of this part-time degree helped to create space to 
focus on different theories of policy change. I became interested in empirically-
informed theories that explore the interplay between ideas, interests and 
institutions (Béland 2005; Blyth 2003; Schmidt 2011), and, in this context, the 
work of Katherine Smith (2013b) on the relationship between research and 
policy. This literature was formative in the theoretical and empirical focus of this 
research on issues of institutional design and political contexts. Moreover, the 
conceptual basis of the research was immeasurably improved by having 
Professor Smith as a supervisor. The focus of this research was equally 
influenced by my co-supervisor Professor Jeff Collin, whose work on global 
health governance and tobacco industry interference in public health policy 
making was instrumental in conceptualising corporate strategies. Indeed, it was 
an editorial on the Responsibility Deal co-authored by Professor Collin that 
convinced me that this partnership would be a worthwhile object of empirical 
research. Hence, the dissertation component of the MSc degree explored the 
Responsibility Deal, as part of a comparative case study of partnerships 
implemented by the UK coalition government and the SNP government at the 
devolved level. This research builds further on the analysis presented in the 
MSc dissertation to examine the ‘black box’ of partnership arrangements, 
drawing on governance theories developed within the political sciences. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The ‘puzzle’ underpinning this research is the enduring policy commitment of 
UK and devolved administrations to partnerships with commercial sector actors 
on obesity policy, despite limited evidence that this mode of governance can 
achieve the public health policies that governments claim. This ‘puzzle’ was 
identified during an earlier piece of work on comparative policy approaches to 
obesity in the devolved administrations, which this thesis builds on. The 
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research began in September 2014, when it appeared that partnerships 
between the food industry and UK and Scottish governments were relatively 
stable institutional features of obesity policy. Yet, in the four years spent 
researching and writing the thesis, initial enthusiasm for partnerships had 
waned, ultimately leading to their informal disbandment. The Responsibility 
Deal (RD) was formally replaced in the UK with the publication of the Childhood 
Obesity Plan (HM Government 2016). Moreover, the delayed publication of 
(Buck 2016) of the plan was pre-empted by the announcement in the March 
budget of a planned levy on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), formulated 
and implemented by the Treasury. This legislation, implemented in April 2018, 
was framed by the Treasury as incentivising the reformulation of soft drinks to 
fall below higher (8 grams or more per 100ml) and lower thresholds (5-8 grams 
per 100ml of sugar content). In Scotland, the Supporting Healthy Choices (SHC) 
partnership announced in June 2014 did not achieve the level of industry 
engagement that policy makers expected. Indeed, a recent consultation 
document, A Healthier Future: Action and Ambitions on Diet, Activity and 
Healthy Weight (Scottish Government 2017: 4), stated that the partnership had 
not ‘delivered sufficient commitment to action, particularly in relation to 
promotions’. This document set out a policy commitment to restrict the 
promotion of processed food and beverages, which, at the time of writing, was 
open for public consultation. All this suggests that current obesity policy is 
markedly different from 2014. Yet, while the policy landscape has shifted, 
notably with the introduction of a soft drinks levy that has been unambiguously 
welcomed by the public health community (UK Health Forum 2016; Obesity 
Health Alliance 2018), it is important not to understate continued political 
commitment to partnership with the food industry. For example, A Healthier 
Future (Scottish Government 2017: 4) emphasises that ‘the food and drink 
industry has a pivotal role in leading, enabling, and supporting healthier 
purchasing’. This image of constructive engagement with food industry actors 
is institutionalised in the UK government childhood obesity plain, in which Public 
Health England (an executive agency of the Department of Health) has worked 
with food companies to reformulate products that are high in fat, sugar and salt 
(HFSS). This program aims to reduce the sugar content of key foods by 20% 
by 2020 (HM Government 2016). Moreover, an evaluation published by Public 
Health England in May 2018, revealed that an interim 5% target had not been 
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achieved (Public Health England 2018). Overall, governments appear to be 
committed to partnership, despite limited evidence to support the policy 
effectiveness of this approach. This suggests that partnership is embedded 
within a policy paradigm underpinned by normative discourses about shared 
state and market responsibility for public goods. It is therefore important to 
understand the normative underpinnings of partnership arrangements, reflected 
in the first research question of the thesis: 
 
How have partnerships been constructed and operationalized by UK 
and Scottish governments? 
 
The second dimension of this puzzle relates to the comparatively limited 
engagement of public health researchers with theories developed within political 
science, despite the likely added value of such theories in conceptualising public 
health governance. As Barbazza and Tello (2014) identify in their review of the 
literature on health governance, the concept of governance is often taken for 
granted by health researchers and practitioners. In focusing on multiple theories 
of governance, the thesis seeks to use insights from political science to examine 
the institutional design and decision-making processes of partnerships. 
Reflecting this, the second question asks: 
 
What do partnerships with the food industry reveal about theories of 
governance networks? 
 
The aim of this question is to focus on the added value of governance theories 
in developing a theoretically informed empirical study of partnerships. This 
question reflects an identified overlap in the political science literature and 
government policy documents about the assumed effectiveness of 
partnerships. Thus, second aim of this research is to critically assess the 
normative assumptions that underpin this mode of governance in relation to an 
empirical case study of UK and Scottish obesity policy. In addition, the second 
research question was also structured by an identified lack of scholarly attention 
on the political dimensions of partnership, with the public health literature largely 
focused on health-oriented evaluations (Knai et al. 2015; Durand et al. 2015; 
Petticrew et al. 2016). Moreover, detailed consideration of this case study is 
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particularly important, given the positioning of the responsibility Deal as an 
exemplar of voluntary approaches between government and industry. For 
example, an influential paper by Moodie et al (2013) in The Lancet cites the UK 
approach as symbolic of policy solutions that favour voluntary agreements with 
food industry actors (Swinburn et al 2015). Yet, while this paper argues that 
‘industry-operated, voluntary self-regulation is the default approach’ (Moodie et 
al. 2013), how partnership is governed remains empirically and theoretically 
under-researched by the public health community. This thesis marks a first step 
in responding to this gap in the literature. 
 
 
1.2 The political context of the thesis 
 
The formation of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government following the 
2010 general election resulted in processes of institutional change that affected 
obesity policy at both the UK and devolved level. Before moving on to consider 
the operationalization of partnerships in the post-2010 political context, this 
section starts by describing the wider landscape in obesity policy under previous 
Labour administrations between 1997 – 2010. 
 
The publication of the Labour government’s Public Health White Paper, 
Choosing Health (Secretary of State for Health) in 2004, marked an important 
shift in the political construction of obesity as a policy issue that government 
should be committed to address. It is important to note that this White Paper 
located responsibility with individuals for lifestyle behaviour, which Smith et al 
(2009) argue embodied a shift towards an increasing emphasis in health policy 
statements on the importance of individual responsibility. For example, the 
foreword to Choosing Health: 
 
‘We are clear that government cannot – and should not – pretend that it 
can ‘make’ the population healthy. But it can – and should – support 
people in making better choices for their health and the health of their 
families’ 
 
(Secretary of State for Health 2004: 4) 
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This emphasis on lifestyle behaviours is evident in many of the policies 
implemented by Labour governments over this period, which focused on 
encouraging personal responsibility for healthier choices. For example, the 
introduction of a 5 A DAY programme to encourage fruit and vegetable 
consumption, and the introduction of a voluntary ‘traffic light’ labelling system 
(corresponding to high, medium or low levels of nutrients) by the Food 
Standards Agency (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4). In the Labour 
government’s third term, it launched Change4Life - a social marketing campaign 
to raise awareness about healthy lifestyles. This program embodies the ‘lifestyle 
drift’ (Whitehead and Popay 2010) towards policy solutions focused on 
individual risk factors (Graham 2009). The electoral dominance of Labour 
across UK and Scottish political administrations between 1997 – 2007, meant 
that policy divergence from this ‘lifestyle choice’ paradigm across devolved 
regions was limited.  
 
While it is important to note that scheduling restrictions on television advertising 
to children were introduced in 2007 by the UK-wide broadcast regulator 
(Ofcom), in addition to a program of salt reduction (discussed in Chapter 4), 
policies under Labour governments focused on individual responsibility. This is 
a critical point, as personal responsibility narratives have helped to frame the 
food industry as potential partners in health policy making, rather than structural 
drivers of unhealthy diets (Naghavi et al. 2017). The idea that government ought 
to partner with the food industry in the formulation and implementation of obesity 
policy was a consistent trend in the discourse and assumptions of policy 
statements under Labour governments (see Chapter 4). Despite this framing of 
food industry actors as ‘partners’, reports on obesity by the House of Commons 
Health Committee and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recommended that a 
more interventionist report might be required in regulating industry marketing 
practices. For example, the 2006 PAC report, Tackling Child Obesity, observed 
that ‘despite working alongside the food industry for a number of years, 
departments have yet to demonstrate much concrete action to change the way 
foods that are high in fat, salt, and sugar are marketed’ (PAC 2006: 14). Overall, 
this suggests that partnership had become institutionalised as a policy idea 
under Labour governments between 1997 – 2010. 
 
 6 
It is in this political context that the Conservative party transformed this policy 
idea to fits its preferred discourse of ‘rolling back the state’ (Foster, Kerr, and 
Byrne 2014). This was framed by the party leader David Cameron, in his 2009 
Hugo Young
1
 lecture as renewing the state-society relationship, replacing the 
‘synthetic bonds’ of the state with the ‘rolling forward’ of society. Following the 
2010 general election, the Conservative-Liberal Coalition’s Programme for 
Government emphasised this government would be ‘shunning the bureaucratic 
levers of the past and finding intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable 
people to make better choices for themselves’ (HM Government 2010: 7). For 
health policy making, this meant framing behavioural economics as an 
alternative to traditional forms of regulation. Heavily influenced by the idea of 
‘choice architecture’ developed by Thaler
2
 and Sunstein (2009) in their 
bestseller Nudge, behavioural insights were framed as a governing tool to 
increase personal responsibility and roll back the state. In his Hugo Young 
lecture, Cameron argues that nudge could lead to cultural change that ‘needn’t 
even involve government doing anything’. This was described as a ‘post-
bureaucratic approach to regulation’ in a working paper published by the 
Conservatives in 2009, in which nudge is framed as a real third way between 
statism and market. 
 
This political context is important in understanding discourses that depict 
partnership with the food industry as an intrinsically more effective approach to 
health policy than traditional forms of regulation. This is summarised in the 
foreword of a paper on behavioural insights produced by the Cabinet Office 
(2010: 2) that describes it as a ‘new approach, which is as much about 
government working in partnership with others as about announcing new 
policies from Whitehall’. Unsurprisingly, these discourses are reproduced in the 
launch paper for the RD, which justified working with food and alcohol 
companies on the basis that partnership working ‘can agree practical actions to 
secure more progress, more quickly, with less cost than legislation’ (Department 
of Health 2011a: 2). It continues: 
 
                                                
1
 The Hugo Young lecture series was organized by The Guardian delivered by political figures, 
such as Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband 
2
 Richard Thaler acted an unpaid adviser to Cameron (Leggett 2014) 
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‘The idea that businesses can contribute to public health goals is not 
new. For instance, the UK is currently seen as an international leader on 
salt reduction, not because Government imposed legislation but 
because businesses, Government, and public health groups have 
worked together for many years to bring about changes that will prevent 
thousands of premature deaths. The Responsibility Deal takes this 
insight and radically scales up the ambition. It seeks to derive similar 
benefits in a much broader range of challenging areas’. 
 
(Department of Health 2011a: 4) 
 
Partnership was therefore framed as a legitimate policy response to obesity, 
consistent with the Coalition government’s rejection of the need for central 
government action. In other words, the RD was substitutive of legislation, rather 
than mutually reinforcing. This policy claim is used to assess (notably in 
Chapters 5 – 6) partnership working, based on the explicit claim that the 
negotiation of voluntary commitments with food companies would produce more 
effective and efficient policies than traditional forms of regulation. In summary, 
the Responsibility Deal was the key pillar of the Coalition government’s 
approach to obesity policy, constitutive of an ideological commitment to ‘roll 
back the state’. 
 
This emphasis on nudge and personal responsibility in England was noticeably 
absent from discourses in Scotland, with a Scottish National Party (SNP) 
government having taken control following the Scottish Parliament election in 
2007. While the Coalition government emphasised that it would not promote 
‘Whitehall diktat and nannying’ (Secretary of State for Health 2010: 2), the SNP 
government made strong rhetorical commitments to addressing wider social 
and economic determinants of ill health. This was reflected in the Route Map 
documents, which set out the SNP government first strategy on obesity: 
 
‘Overweight and obesity cannot be tackled by just relying on individuals 
to change their behaviour as the factors that contribute to gaining weight 
have been interwoven into the very fabric of our lifestyles to such an 
extent that weight gain is almost inevitable in today’s society’. 
 
(Scottish Government 2010a: foreword) 
 
This emphasis on structural determinants of health provided the rationale for a 
Scottish approach to partnership. As the launch paper for the Supporting 
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Healthy Choices framework stated, ‘Scotland benefits from the Responsibility 
Deal [sic], but our poor dietary health warrants further action’ (Scottish 
Government 2014: 5). Overall, this implies that the policy landscape might be 
likely to diverge in this period, with policy discourses accepting the need for 
greater intervention to address structural drivers of obesity. 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
 
The structure of this thesis reflects the interpretive policy analysis of partnership 
working, in which three findings chapters (4 – 6) explores the RD, and the final 
empirical chapter focuses on partnership working in Scotland. This decision was 
informed by issues of research design and data generated from fieldwork. In 
relation to the former, the aim was to produce in-depth case studies of 
partnership working that interpreted governance processes in concrete political 
contexts. As such, the research was designed to include comparative 
dimensions without this imposing a methodological rigidity that might constrain 
the flexibility required of interpretive research. In the case of the latter, the focus 
of three chapters on the RD relates to partnership working over a period of 4 
years between 2011 – 2015. This produced a large volume of documents, 
generated over meetings of the Responsibility Deal Food Network (RDFN) and 
meetings of the Plenary Group (PG), while a fewer number of meetings were 
held between the Scottish government and food industry actors. In addition, the 
thesis is structured based on process tracing of political decision making and 
policy discussions, in which the UK government was the ‘first mover’ in 
operationalizing partnership. Thus, the findings chapters are structured to 
capture temporal dimensions of policy making. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
provides a narrative literature review of partnerships as a preferred governance 
tool in health governance. It begins by examining the public health literature, 
before moving on to describe how the concept of unhealthy commodity 
industries has been used to problematise the presumption of policy makers for 
partnership with commercial sector actors (notably the food and alcohol 
industries). In the second part of the chapter, I argue that theories developed 
within the political sciences have added value in enhancing understandings of 
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the challenges in contemporary health governance. The chapter focuses on 
three inter-related meso-level theories: (1) network governance, and specifically 
the concepts of metagovernance and multi-level governance; (2) accountability; 
(3) and deliberative policy analysis. This section outlines normative claims 
made by political scientists in the ‘first wave’ of governance networks research 
that overlap with the assumptions in policy statements about what partnerships 
could attain in public health. However, it also identifies concepts used in this 
literature that offer analytical insight in understanding the institutional design 
and practice of partnership as a mode of governance.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach. It begins with an overview of 
interpretive policy analysis as an established research program within the 
political sciences, and outlines the rationale for the methodological approach 
taken in this research project. This explains the use of interviewing and 
documents, and provides a reflexive account of my approach to data analysis. 
 
Chapters 4 – 7 combine an analysis of the institutional design and decision-
making processes of the RD. The following three chapters are structured 
chronologically, tracing the construction of partnership as a policy idea and its 
subsequent operationalization. Chapter 4 explores the role of ideas in policy 
making, tracing the institutionalisation of partnership as a preferred governance 
tool for UK governments over the past two decades. In order to contextualise 
the political decision-making that underpins this discursive process, this chapter 
contrasts approaches to industry self-regulation under New Labour 
administrations with the market-driven logic that informed policy ideas promoted 
by the Conservatives. The chapter then describes the operationalization of this 
policy idea under the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government that was 
formed following the general election in 2010. The analysis developed in 
Chapter 4 represents a crucial stage in the thesis. It argues that the malleability 
of partnership was used by the Conservatives (as an opposition party before 
2010) to construct a policy idea that displaced responsibility from government, 
and framed obesity as an issue that should be displaced to the market. This 
analysis identifies the discourses and assumptions that underpin this policy 
idea, which I argue are key to understanding the institutional design and 
discursive practices of partnership. The added value of focusing on the role of 
 10 
ideas in policy is that it uncovers the politically contingent nature of governance. 
This analysis shows the importance of analysing political context and how ideas 
are translated as they move between actors. 
 
Chapter 5 explores accountability within the RD. The substantive focus of this 
chapter is on the gap between the institutional design and operationalization of 
accountability mechanisms in the RDFN. Drawing on analysis developed in 
Chapter 4 relating to partnership as a policy idea, this chapter employs the 
concepts of depoliticization as a bridging concept between theories of 
metagovernance and accountability mechanisms, focusing on governmental 
strategies to displace responsibility to the market. It argues that the framing and 
institutional design of the Responsibility Deal were used to depoliticise 
accountability. Yet, this account demonstrates that a market logic of 
accountability was not operationalized, challenging the assumption that the 
partnership constituted an effective substitute for traditional forms of regulation. 
In terms of governance theories, this chapter demonstrates the added value of 
metagovernance by providing a framework to examine how governments use 
tools of institutional design and framing to reconfigure the role of the state. In 
addition, the data presented here shows the importance of analysing 
accountability as a process, rather than discrete mechanisms which assume 
that it can be operationalized. 
 
Chapter 6 draws on two empirical case studies of decision-making in the RDFN 
to examine accountability in a broader sense. It uses the notion of multiple 
accountabilities (Koppell 2005) to conceptualise food industry actors as co-
producers of the rules and norms of partnership working. In this chapter, I argue 
that industry actors used their position to shape the ‘rules of the game’. In 
contrast to the framing of partnership as a deliberative process in policy 
statements, the empirical data reveal that key decisions relating to voluntary 
industry commitments and performance standards were made in a ‘back stage’ 
of negotiations between industry actors and Department of Health officials. This 
is demonstrated using two in-depth empirical case studies of decision-making 
in the Responsibility Deal ‘Food Network’. The findings suggest that the framing 
of partnerships as discursive and consensus-oriented was undermined by an 
over-reliance on back stage deals with industry to secure their continued 
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participation. The implications for partnership working was that negotiations 
drifted towards lowest common denominator collective agreements that 
contradicted and subverted the stated policy objectives of the Responsibility 
Deal. Empirically, this chapter illustrates how commercial sector actors can 
exploit informal spaces of governance to shape the rules of the game to align 
with their economic interests. Conceptually, it demonstrates the importance of 
inductively tracing institutional practices, and the added value of the concept of 
informal governance in describing and analysing actors’ engagement with their 
institutional context 
 
The final empirical findings chapter explores the institutionalisation of 
partnership at the devolved level in Scotland, focusing on how the SNP 
government responded to institutional change at the UK level following the 2010 
general election. This analysis uses the lens of multi-level governance to 
analyse how industry actors exploited temporal opportunities to transfer rules 
and norms across jurisdictional levels. In addition, this chapter uses a case 
study of the failure to negotiate a voluntary standard on responsible marketing 
as illustrative of the limits of partnership in achieving public health aims. It 
argues that, despite the apparent enthusiasm of the government to diverge from 
the Responsibility Deal approach, industry actors collectively acted to subvert 
this process. I argue that the failure to negotiate an external standard on 
marketing underlines the limit of consensus-oriented approaches with food 
industry actors whose economic interests diverge from public health claims 













Chapter 2. Literature review: conceptualising partnerships in public 
health governance 
 
2.1. Introduction: political science-informed approaches to researching 
partnership with unhealthy commodity industries 
 
Partnership between governmental and non-governmental actors is an idea 
synonymous with networks and governance as paradigmatic of contemporary 
policy making (Bache 2010). It has become a preferred governance tool of 
subnational, national and transnational institutions and actors, and is 
synonymous with the emergence of governance as the central organising 
principle of contemporary public policy making. In the context of global health, 
partnership has been framed by its supporters as a powerful mechanism to 
address complex issues by leveraging the resources, expertise and ideas of 
non-government actors (Reich 2002; Reinicke and Deng 2000). More 
specifically, the emergence of global health partnerships from the late 1990s (K. 
Buse and Walt 2000a) is an expression of a broader shift in political decision 
making characterised by the inclusion of commercial sector actors in the 
formulation and implementation of policy (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). As a 
result, the number of partnerships has risen precipitously over the past two 
decades in global (Carlson 2004; Richter 2003) and national health contexts 
(Royo-Bordonada 2014; Baggott 2013; Gilmore et al. 2011). However, while 
partnership has become an established instrument of health governance (Kent 
Buse and Harmer 2007), it has remained surprisingly under-theorised in the 
public health literature (Ruckert and Labonte 2014). 
 
Theoretically this research integrates three inter-related meso level theories 
developed within the fields and sub-fields of political science: (1) theories of 
governance networks, including the sub-fields of meta-governance and its focus 
on the governance of governance, and multi-level governance as an approach 
that points to the dispersal of political decision making across sub-national, 
national and transnational jurisdictions, marked by interdependencies between 
state and non-state actors (Bache and Flinders 2004); (2) public accountability 
as an über-concept in the field of public administration (Flinders 2014) that 
refers to a relationship between different actors in which one gives account and 
the other has the authority to impose consequences (Black 2008); (3) 
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interpretivist approaches to policy analysis that theorise language and practice 
as mutually constitutive of policy making. More specifically, this research draws 
on deliberative approaches that understand political decision making as 
inherently performative (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
 
This theoretical approach helps to explore the dilemmas that partnerships 
present to addressing diet-related ill health and obesity. To study this central 
challenge, this research asks a series of pressing questions about: (1) the 
discursive construction and operationalization of partnership; (2) the roles and 
responsibilities of state and non-state actors (notably the food industry) in 
shaping policy processes and outcomes; (3) the formal and informal interactions 
through which actors negotiate the institutional conditions of partnership. These 
questions are underpinned by meso level theories of policy making that share 
a focus on the role of different actors in the development, reproduction and 
adherence to the ‘rules of the game’ of governance arrangements.  
 
First, the concepts of meta-governance and accountability provide a lens to 
compare the framing of partnership as innovative governance arrangements for 
the provision of public goods (Schäferhoff, 2009), with the actual practices and 
discourses of negotiated interaction among actors. In contrast to input and 
output dimensions of policy analysis, this takes a further step in assessing the 
‘throughput’ of partnership (Risse and Kleine 2010). In other words, an 
analytical framework that emphasises processes can shed light on the ‘black 
box’ of political decision making (Schmidt 2013) and help trace the development 
of frameworks of norms, rules and procedures (Sorensen and Torfing 2009). 
Second, the concept of multi-level governance focuses attention on partnership 
as part of a constitutional ‘patchwork’ (Marks and Hooghe 2004). This helps to 
redress a tendency towards ‘methodological nationalism’ (Stone 2004) in 
empirical studies of partnership between governments and food industry actors 
that fail to adequately conceptualise multi-level lobbying strategies and venue 
shopping (Baumgartner 2007). Finally, an interpretivist approach provides an 
analytical framework that helps make sense of the unfolding practices of 
partnership (Cook and Wagenaar 2012). 
 
 14 
It is important to acknowledge that the analysis presented in this chapter is not 
a systematic review (Young et al. 2002). It does not adhere to a protocol of 
replicable search terms, or aim to synthesise empirical studies based on clear 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. Rather, this chapter brings together public 
health and political science approaches to thinking about the shift towards 
governance that could more accurately be described as a meta-narrative 
review. This approach draws on the work of Trisha Greenhalgh and colleagues 
(Greenhalgh et al. 2009), who employ Kuhnian ideas to argue that the 
methodological rigours of systematic literature reviews present a challenge for 
thinking about policy areas characterised by multiple types of evidence. In other 
words, the authors make the case that identifying studies using tightly defined 
key terms may often miss studies that are empirically and/or theoretically 
relevant. In contrast, a meta-narrative approach emphasises developing 
storylines (Feldman et al. 2004) that make sense of different research fields 
(Greenhalgh et al. 2005). This chapter presents a meta-narrative that brings 
together political science and public health approaches to thinking about 
partnership as a model of governance. As such this research attempts to make 
a distinctive contribution to the existing literature, weaving together different 
approaches to understanding public health policy making. 
 
Taken together, this literature review emphasises that public health and political 
science literatures have much to gain from each other, both empirically and 
theoretically. First, the chapter argues that public health research has given 
limited attention to theories developed in the political sciences. This draws 
attention to the implicit use of input participation and output effectiveness 
(Scharpf 1999) as a means to evaluate partnerships with food industry actors, 
highlighting the relatively unexplored dimension of ‘throughput’ (Schmidt 2013). 
Second, the chapter highlights the theoretical relevance of empirical studies of 
commercial sector partnerships (notably food and alcohol) that constitute ‘hard 
cases’ for the idea that partnership can produce effective and legitimate policy 
solutions (Börzel 2011). 
 
To substantiate these arguments, the chapter is divided into two sections. The 
first section assesses key accounts of corporate impact on public health 
developed within the academic community. It begins by introducing the 
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concepts of global health governance and industrial epidemics (Jahiel 2008), 
before moving on to consider influential definitions of partnership within global 
health. It then assesses recent studies of food industry self-regulatory schemes. 
The remaining sections of the chapter provide a more detailed overview of the 
theoretical foundations of this research, providing a review of the literatures on 
network governance, public accountability, and deliberative policy analysis. 
 
2.2 Researching commercial sector interaction in global health 
governance  
 
2.2.1 The emergence of global health governance 
 
The notion of global health governance (GHG) emerged in the 1990s as an 
analytical tool developed by public health scholars to conceptualise the 
transition from the state-centric multilateral system of international health 
governance (IHG) to a polycentric (Ostrom 2010) system of GHG (Ng and 
Ruger 2011). This term provided a conceptual clarity that began to be used by 
public health scholars to map the proliferation of actors with remits and goals 
related to global health issues. For example, the growing number of hybrid 
institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS (Global Fund) and Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), in addition to the creation of 
private philanthropic foundations (notably the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF). Reflecting this, the GHG literature focuses on the 
proliferation of political actors (Haas 2004) and diffusion of governance 
functions in global health (Buse and Lee 2005). The use of GHG as a lens to 
theorise the shift towards new spaces of political decision making (Fidler 2007) 
can arguably be traced to a conceptual review by Richard Dodgson and 
colleagues (Dodgson et al. 2002), as part of a project on GHG commissioned 
by the World Health Organization in 2002. In this report, the authors 
conceptualise GHG as defined by at least three normative and empirical 
dimensions: (1) the deterritorialisation of health issues; (2) recognition of the 
need for greater policy coherence between trade and health; (3) and the 
involvement of a broader range of actors and interests in health governance. 
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In the years since Dodgson et al (2002) articulated the notion of GHG, the term 
has become embedded in the vocabulary of public health scholars. Indeed, the 
rapid growth in the GHG literature was highlighted in a recent scoping review 
(Lee and Kamradt-Scott 2014), which found that over one thousand works had 
been published in the past two decades. This body of literature covers a vast 
amount of conceptual and empirical ground, exploring areas such as the 
continued role for the WHO in GHG (Sridhar and Gostin 2011; Ng and Ruger 
2011; Richter 2012; Brown et al. 2006), philanthropic foundations (Moran and 
Stone 2016; Stuckler et al. 2011; McCoy et al. 2009), and the functions and 
authority of actors, such as multilateral financial institutions, involved in the 
governance of global health issues (Ruckert and Labonte 2014; Brown 2010; 
Ruger 2005). Given this ever-expanding body of literature relevant to GHG, the 
following sub-section focuses more specifically on GHG and tobacco control. It 
provides an overview of research in relation to the negotiation of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), contrasting this with related literatures 
on the role of food and alcohol corporations in public health policy making. It 
argues that this literature is useful in highlighting shared corporate strategies 
across unhealthy commodity industries (Jahiel 2008), and the implications of 
such an understanding for researching the food industry. Despite the analytical 
usefulness of this lens in improving our understanding of how corporations 
contribute to non-communicable disease, this narrative review highlights the 
limited body of research that weaves together a focus on commercial sector 
engagement in public health policy with governance theories. 
 
2.2.2 Corporations and GHG 
 
As an analytical tool, the concept of GHG emerged in parallel with a recognition 
of the acceleration of globalisation in economic, social and cultural spheres 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Held 2003; Lechner and Boli 2011). In this 
context, scholars working within the emerging paradigm of GHG increasingly 
concentrated on the challenges of globalisation for tobacco control. Notably, 
academics such as Kelley Lee, Kent Buse, and Jeff Collin, used GHG as a lens 
to explore the transnational nature of the tobacco epidemic and transborder 
activities of the tobacco industry (Buse and Lee 2005; Lee 2001; Collin et al. 
2002). Commissioned by the WHO Department of Health and Development, it 
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is also evident that senior officials at the WHO’s Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) 
recognised the strategic importance of GHG in framing the tobacco industry as 
a threat to global health (Yach and Bettcher 2000). What this research agenda 
achieved, was to highlight two key dimensions of GHG. First, the extent to which 
tobacco issues have become transnational. As Collin et al (2005) observed over 
a decade ago:  
 
‘In a world where many health risks and opportunities are becoming 
increasingly globalised, influencing health determinants, status and 
outcomes cannot be achieved through actions taken at the national level 
alone. The intensification of transborder flows of people, ideas, goods 
and services necessitates a reassessment of the rules and institutions 
that govern health policy and practice’. 
 
This literature underlined the global nature of tobacco control, illustrating the 
trend for the tobacco industry to target selected global populations through 
marketing and marketing activities (Sargent et al. 2001) in ways that potentially 
circumvented national regulatory authorities (Collin et al. 2002). Second, this 
research identified how the tobacco industry had been able to exploit 
commercial opportunities provided by increasing market liberalisation (Jha and 
Chaloupka 2000). Moreover, the distinction between IHG and GHG used by 
public health academics (Lee and Collin 2005) to highlight the global 
dimensions of tobacco control, was part of proliferating body of literature that 
used the release of internal tobacco industry documents (Lee et al. 2004; Bero 
2003; Balbach et al. 2002) to highlight the scale and apparent success of 
industry attempts to influence and undermine tobacco control efforts (Collin, et 
al. 2004; Gilmore and McKee 2004; Muggli and Hurt 2003; Glantz 1998). 
Indeed, analysis of internal industry documents provided a crucial underpinning 
for negotiations of the FCTC (Lee et al. 2016), providing an evidence base of 
persistent industry misconduct (Collin 2004). This recognition of the inherent 
conflicts between tobacco industry and public health objectives was 
represented in the text of the FCTC. As exemplified by Article 5.3, the FCTC 
was intended to protect decision makers from tobacco industry interference, 
requiring that ‘in setting and implementing their public health policies with 
respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from 
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance 
with national law’ (World Health Organization 2003). In summary, public health 
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research exposing tobacco industry strategies performed a critical function in 
legitimately enabling the negotiation of a model of governance that explicitly 
rejects the possibility of collaboration with the tobacco industry. 
 
Yet, while the FCTC embodies the principle that tobacco industry actors should 
be excluded from policy formulation, this contrasts with the widespread 
preference for partnerships with the food and alcohol industry at national and 
global levels of governance (Moodie et al. 2013; Stuckler and Nestle 2012). This 
underlines an apparent lack of policy coherence in the regulatory approaches 
taken towards the tobacco, alcohol, and food industries (Collin 2012), despite 
comparable contributions to the rising global burden of non-communicable 
diseases (Allen et al. 2017; Baum et al. 2016). 
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that public health scholars have responded to the 
contrasting regulatory approaches taken to tobacco, alcohol, and food, through 
comparative research that calls into question the presumption of tobacco 
exceptionalism. While acknowledging the discursive power of tobacco 
exceptionalist imagery in negotiating the FCTC (Collin 2012), recent scholarship 
has challenged the idea of tobacco exceptionalism. There is an increasing 
recognition of the similarities across industries, with an emerging literature 
mapping the harms associated with other ‘unhealthy commodities’ such as 
alcohol and processed foods (Hawkins et al. 2016; Collin et al. 2015; Moodie et 
al. 2013; Brownell and Warner 2009; Wiist 2006). This literature critically 
assesses the rationale for contemporary regulatory and governing approaches 
to alcohol and processed food industries, centred on the idea of corporations 
as vectors of disease. The vector analogy, which draws on epidemiological 
constructs of vector-mediated transmission, depicts unhealthy commodity 
industries (notably tobacco, alcohol and food) as vectors of ‘industrial 
epidemics’ through political and market strategies. Market strategies include 
activities such as branding, advertising, and pricing that drives global expansion 
in developed and emerging markets (Moodie et al. 2013). Political strategies 
relate to the ability of industry actors to influence policies relating to the industry 
taking place within a particular polity (Sørensen and Torfing 2017). Having been 
first described in relation to tobacco (Slade 1989), René Jahiel and Thomas 
Babor (2007) later extended the idea of an industrial epidemic to wider 
 19 
commercial drivers of NCDs (Jahiel 2008). Consequently, the idea of industrial 
epidemics has been used by public health scholars to explore the impact of 
tobacco (Gilmore 2012), alcohol (Jernigan 2011), and processed food industries 
(Stuckler and Nestle 2012; Stuckler et al. 2012) as important structural drivers 
of NCDs (Collin et al. 2015). For example, recent academic publications have 
explored comparisons between the corporate strategies (Hillman and Hitt 1999) 
of the tobacco industry and soft drink companies (Aaron and Siegel 2016; 
Nestle 2015; Pomeranz 2014; Dorfman et al. 2012) and the global alcohol 
industry (Savell, Fooks, and Gilmore 2016; Casswell 2013; Yoon and Lam 2013; 
Daube et al. 2008). As Hawkins et al (2016) argue, cross-industry comparative 
research of the political economy of the tobacco and alcohol industries 
challenges the rationale for diverging regulatory approaches; an assessment 
that could equally be applied to policy engagement with the processed food 
industry (Smith et al. 2016). 
 
Yet while the vector analogy provides a useful conceptual lens to critically 
assess the logic of tobacco exceptionalism, it is important to highlight that 
detailed empirical study of corporations and contemporary models of 
governance is limited (Lee and Hawkins 2017). This is a critical point. Although 
the emerging literature on industrial epidemics has helped reframe food and 
alcohol industries as important vectors of disease, a great deal less research 
has been undertaken on partnerships as the preferred model of interaction 
between governments and commercial sector actors. With some recent 
exceptions, for example: analysis of alcohol industry opposition to minimum unit 
pricing in Scotland (Holden et al. 2012); and food industry influence in the 
drafting of commitments within the Responsibility Deal (Panjwani and Caraher 
2014), there exist few theoretically-informed empirical studies of industry 
engagement in partnerships. As the following sub-section examines, the limited 
attention given to the actual practices of partnership is reflected in the restricted 
engagement of food policy-oriented public health scholars in theoretical and 





2.2.3 Defining partnership 
 
The legitimacy and accountability of partnerships underpinned a series of 
papers authored by Buse and various co-authors, which provided a workable 
definition of partnerships and explored their implications for GHG. In particular, 
papers co-authored with Gill Walt (2000a, 2000b) distinguished between 
different types, forms, and functions of GHPs, demarcating a shift from the 
state-centric UN system to a pluricentric system of global governance 
symbolised by the growth of GHPs. In these papers, Buse and Walt 
conceptualise GHPs as a particular model of governance that brings together 
intergovernmental and private sector actors ‘so as to achieve a shared health-
creating goal on the basis of a mutually agreed division of labour’ (Buse and 
Walt 2000a: 550). Through an overview of high-profile GHPs involving the World 
Bank, WHO, UNICEF, and transnational pharmaceutical companies, the 
authors demarcate representative legitimacy, accountability, and competence 
as governing processes in GHPs. This conceptual framework was later 
developed by Buse and Harmer in analyses of the discursive power (Buse and 
Harmer 2004), and ‘unhealthy habits’ (2007) of GHPs, defined as ‘relatively 
institutionalised initiatives, established to address global health problems, in 
which public and for-profit private sector organisations have a voice in collective 
decision-making’ (Buse and Harmer 2007: 259). This definition reflected a 
broad understanding within the global governance literature, that partnerships 
as a model of governance referred to institutionalised interaction among private 
and public actors in making or implementing policy functions (Schäferhoff et al. 
2009; Börzel and Risse 2005). In other words, GHPs involve collective decision 
processes among public and private actors that ‘make them a unique unit of 
analysis’ in GHG (Buse 2004). Building on earlier papers with Walt (above), 
these analyses reiterate concerns about institutionalised conflicts of interest 
between public and private actors. Indeed, it is argued that ‘many GHPs have 
slipped into poor governance habits’ characterised by ‘lax attitudes towards 
scrutiny’, and a ‘lack of specificity on partner roles and responsibilities’ (Buse 
and Harmer 2007: 264). 
 
The influence of this definition in public health research is reflected in the citation 
metrics of this work on GHPs, with Buse and Harmer’s (2007) paper on the 
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‘unhealthy habits’ of partnership cited hundreds of times across a wide body of 
public health literature (Clinton and Sridhar 2017; Knai et al. 2015; McInnes and 
Lee 2012; Kraak et al. 2011; McCoy et al. 2009). However, while its lasting 
relevance underlines the conceptual clarity of this work, it also points to the 
relative lack of contributions from public health scholars to the literature on 
governance. 
 
It is important not to understate the significance of this definition as an analytical 
lens through which to capture central dimensions of partnerships, since there 
appears to have been relatively few attempts to build on this intellectual 
foundation over the past decade. Consequently, the conceptual work of Buse 
and Harmer (2007) often appears to act as a definitional shorthand for the 
complexity of interaction between public and private actors (Ng and Ruger 
2011). Thus, while the early literature on GHPs incorporated insights from 
political theorists such as James Rosenau (cf. Buse and Walt 2000b), Börzel, 
and Risse (cf. Buse & Harmer 2004), this level of theoretical engagement has 
not been sustained. Yet, as Chapter 1 highlighted, theoretical and conceptual 
developments within the political science literature on governance provide an 
analytical toolkit that is useful in exploring contemporary forms of policy making. 
Although the governance literature has shifted from the idea of networks as 
‘something new and exotic’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2007) towards a second 
generation of research focused on issues such as metagovernance in an 
empirical context (Bailey and Wood 2017; Bell and Park 2006), this has not 
translated into research exploring GHG. For instance, empirical studies of public 
health-related partnerships have neglected to integrate theories of meta-
governance, despite its emphasis on the changing role and capacity of 
governmental actors (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). This is puzzling, given its 
use in related fields, such as environmental politics (Hysing 2013) and public 
administration (Dommett and Flinders 2015), but also its clear relevance to 
central dimensions of GHPs, such as the implications of private sector hosting 
arrangements and issues of legitimacy around stakeholder representation 
(Buse & Harmer 2004). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess 
the factors that might help explain the limited influence on analyses of public 
health partnerships of recent developments in governance theories, a narrative 
review of public health research in food and obesity-related partnerships 
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suggests that scholars have predominately focused on ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
dimensions of governance processes, as described in the following section. 
 
2.2.4 Recent academic approaches to partnership in food and obesity 
policy 
 
Having provided a brief overview of key concepts within research on 
corporations and global health, the final section exploring the public health 
literature contrasts these perspectives with academic approaches to 
researching partnerships in food and obesity policy. This section begins by 
introducing the concepts of input and output-oriented research, contrasting this 
with the ‘throughput’ of political decision making (Schmidt 2013). It then 
provides a narrative review of more recent studies of partnership using this 
analytical lens. Finally, the section considers how governance theories 
developed within the political sciences might inform the public health 
scholarship. 
 
The theorization of political processes as having input and output dimensions 
has its origins in the work of Scharpf (1999; 1997) on the democratic legitimacy 
of EU institutions. For Scharpf, input legitimacy related to models of 
representative democracy and the quality of participatory processes in rule 
making (Risse and Kleine 2007). Output legitimacy concerns the problem-
solving capacity and effectiveness of policy making (Schmidt 2013). Throughput 
legitimacy concentrates on the ‘black box’ of governance that takes place 
between the political input and policy output. The focus here is on the practice 
and decision processes that are constitutive of policy making (Schmidt 2006). 
Following Scharpf, a wide range of scholars take this approach to exploring EU 
legitimacy (Hix 2008; Majone 1999), in addition to the focus of social scientists 
on corporate inputs into policy making (Miller and Harkins 2010; Farnsworth and 
Holden 2006; Farnsworth 2004). In this section, these concepts are borrowed 
to review the focus of the public health literature on input and output dimensions. 
 
First, recent public health research on the practices of the food industry has 
tended to focus on examining the legitimacy of corporate inputs in the making 
and implementation of policy making. This approach to research is apparent in 
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the 2012 PLoS Medicine series on Big Food that explores the tension between 
the role of unhealthy commodity industries in ‘manufacturing epidemics’ 
(Stuckler et al. 2012) and implications of partnerships with the food industry 
(Brownell 2012; Monteiro and Cannon 2012; Dorfman et al. 2012). As part of 
their contribution to this collection, David Stuckler and Marion Nestle outline the 
‘inherent conflict of interest between corporations that profit from unhealthy 
foods and public health collaborations’ that they present as precluding 
partnership between governmental and food industry actors (Stuckler and 
Nestle 2012). The legitimacy of corporate inputs into political decisions was 
subsequently explored in the 2013 Lancet NCD series. As part of this series, 
Rob Moodie et al argue that ‘there is little objective evidence that public-private 
partnerships deliver health benefits, and many in the public health field argue 
that they are just a delaying tactic of the unhealthy commodity industries’ 
(Moodie et al. 2013). The findings of these research series are also reflected in 
the critical view put forward by public health scholars regarding the legitimacy 
of the food industry as stakeholders in food and obesity policy making (Buse, 
Tanaka, and Hawkes 2017; Marks 2014; Richter 2012; Brownell and Koplan 
2011; Lincoln et al. 2011; Buse and Tanaka 2011; Stuckler and Siegel 2011; 
Stuckler et al. 2012; Wiist 2006; Sharma et al. 2010; Ludwig and Nestle 2008). 
This includes US-focused work, such as Marion Nestle’s influential publications 
on the political power and market strategies of food (Nestle 2002) and soft drink 
companies (Nestle 2015), Judith Richter’s critical view of partnerships between 
UN agencies and the private sector (Richter 2003), and Nicholas Freudenberg’s 
analysis of corporate power across six unhealthy commodity industries 
(Freudenberg 2012, 2014). In the UK context, scholars have focused on the 
Responsibility Deal between food and alcohol industries and the Coalition 
government as demonstrative of the significant tensions between corporate 
vectors and public health aims (Gornall 2015; Mindell et al. 2012; Hastings 
2012; Gilmore at al. 2011; Rayner and Lang 2011). This perspective is captured 
in an editorial by Hawkes and Buse, who reflect that: 
 
‘[…] by giving the impression to the private sector that it is a real 
‘partner’, the public sector is, like it or not, inviting for-profit actors to use 
the arrangement to serve their own private sector interests […] An 
apparent tension thereby surfaces among different aspects of good 
governance of ‘partnerships’ - participation and representation in 
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decision-making on the one hand and upholding legitimacy and 
accountability on the other’  
 
(Corinna Hawkes and Buse 2011: 401). 
 
Overall, this illustrates an increasing focus within the literature on corporations 
and global health - with the notable exception of researchers with financial and 
institutional links to the food industry (Alexander, Yach, and Mensah 2011; 
Hancock, Kingo, and Raynaud 2011; Yach et al. 2010; Yach 2008) – that 
challenges the input legitimacy of partnerships with key food industry actors. 
 
Second, the public health literature has focused on the output effectiveness of 
partnerships, which aim to delineate the characteristics of regulatory 
instruments, and assess the alignment of food industry actors with stated policy 
aims. While scholars evaluating policy outputs often frame empirical data in 
terms of input legitimacy, this literature seeks to examine, at a more fine-grained 
level, the flow of information between stakeholders and an accountability forum 
and the actual outcome of industry activities (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). In other 
words, scholars are interested in how regulatory rules link to standards that 
stipulate attainment of explicit performance standards (Behn 2001), or require 
taking a specific action. This literature can be demarcated between evaluations 
of ‘self-regulation’ and empirical research that focus on interaction between 
government regulation and self-regulation (or meta-regulation). First, the term 
‘self-regulation’ is defined here as a regulatory framework that is implemented 
by individual companies or sectors in the absence of oversight from 
governmental actors (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Although there are no 
universally agreed upon definitions (Coglianese and Mendelson 2010), self-
regulation may be proactively introduced in response to perceived reputational 
risk (Koenig-Archibugi 2004) and/or as a strategy to prevent the introduction of 
more stringent regulation (Héritier & Eckert 2008). By contrast, meta-regulation 
refers to processes in which governments initiate and stimulate negotiated self-
regulation (Baldwin et al. 2010; Hutter 2011; Sørensen and Torfing 2009) 
Gunningham and Rees (1997) differentiate ‘mandated self-regulation’ from the 
limited to no state involvement in ‘voluntary self-regulation’. This model of 
regulation is closely related the concept of meta-governance, and the role of the 
state in coordinating partnerships. 
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Over the last two decades, scholars have focused on the effectiveness of 
voluntary marketing codes at multiple levels of governance (Kraak et al. 2016; 
Lloyd-Williams et al. 2014; Kelly et al. 2011; Raine et al. 2013; Rayner et al. 
2006; Hawkes 2007; Yach et al. 2003). While the vast quantity of literature into 
self-regulatory codes make it impossible to comprehensively review this 
empirical data, for the purposes of this section it is useful to highlight recent 
studies that have evaluated the effectiveness of the EU pledge. Announced in 
response to the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the 
pledge consists of voluntary performance standards around marketing food and 
beverages to children. Governed by the European regional trade body, Food 
and Drink Europe, the pledge commits signatories to develop voluntary 
commitments that align with this framework. However, the findings of recent 
evaluations highlight significant variations in definitional criteria, scope and lack 
of transparency in corporate commitments (Ronit and Jensen 2014; 
Scarborough et al. 2013; Effertz and Wilcke 2012; Monteiro et al. 2010). For 
example, Jensen and Ronit (2015) highlight the interpretive flexibility of the 
pledge, making it ‘practically impossible for the consumer to verify whether the 
companies’ stated commitments are in in line with their expectations’ (Jensen 
& Ronit 2015: 900). In addition, academic reviews of the International Food and 
Beverage Alliance (IFBA) global code on marketing also find limited evidence 
that voluntary industry commitments have reduced children’s exposure to 
promotion of unhealthy commodities (Galbraith-Emami and Lobstein 2013; 
Hawkes and Harris 2011; Hawkes and Lobstein 2011). Overall, there appears 
to exist broad consensus among scholars that the output effectiveness of self-
regulatory schemes, implemented in response to legislative and/or reputational 
risk to transnational food companies (Hawkes and Harris 2011), is restricted. 
 
In addition to the large quantities of research that evaluate voluntary marketing 
codes, recent studies have focused on the effectiveness of meta-regulation 
(Kraak et al 2014). In the UK context, the Policy Innovation Research Unit 
(PIRU) was commissioned by the Department of Health (DH) to conduct an 
evaluation of Responsibility Deal (Bryden et al. 2013). Published over a series 
of papers, this evaluation found limited evidence that negotiated agreements 
between industry actors and the UK government were effective in reducing 
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processed food or alcohol consumption (Knai et al. 2017; Petticrew et al. 2016; 
Knai et al. 2015; Knai et al. 2015; Durand et al. 2015). 
 
While input and output-focused research have demonstrable relevance to 
understanding corporations and global health, what is arguably missing in the 
public health literature is a focus on the ‘throughput’ of partnership as a set of 
concrete practices of political decision making (Bernier and Clavier 2011). In 
contrast to the tobacco industry, which has been systematically studied with the 
help of internal tobacco industry documents over the past three decades (Smith 
et al. 2016; Gilmore et al. 2011), interaction between government and the food 
industry remains a comparative ‘black box’ (Schmidt 2013). Thus, while the 
policy recommendations made by public health researchers identify the need 
for formal accountability mechanisms (Swinburn et al. 2015; Magnusson and 
Reeve 2015; Kraak et al. 2014), this assumes a willingness of governments to 
effectively meta-govern partnerships with commercial sector actors. As the 
following chapters of this research aim to demonstrate, these idealistic accounts 
of policy making (Katikireddi et al. 2013) tend to preclude the detailed 
exploration of governance processes that can help explain the limited policy 
effectiveness of partnerships. Before we move on to this empirical analysis, it is 
necessary to consider different theoretical lenses that draw upon the insights of 
political science. 
 
2.3 The political science literature on governance 
 
2.3.1 Theorising governance: networks, multi-level, and discursive  
 
Over the past three decades, the concept of partnership has come to represent 
a signifier for good governance in the political discourses of various 
supranational organizations, transnational policy actors, and governments at 
national and sub-national levels. Partnership has become a central organising 
principle in areas as diverse as EU structural funds (Bache and Olsson 2001), 
global health governance (Harmer 2011), climate change (Broadwater and Kaul 
2005) and development (Bull and McNeill 2007; Bäckstrand 2010). Partnerships 
have also been implemented in a wide range of policy areas at multiple levels 
of government (Mörth 2007; Flinders 2005; Teisman and Klijn 2002). 
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Partnerships have been conceptualised as paradigmatic (Bache 2010) of 
contemporary public governance and policy making. The chapter attempts to 
locate partnership within the context of literatures about governance, 
connecting these theoretical and conceptual debates to deliberative methods of 
policy analysis (Hajer 2005) as a tool to make sense of meanings of partnership 
in policy practice (Yanow 2000). 
 
This section is structured into four sub-sections. The first sub-section provides 
an overview of the network paradigm, which conceptualises governance as a 
shift towards new forms of decision-making in contemporary policy making. It 
describes first and second generations of network governance literature 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007) highlighting the analytical toolkit that can help to 
explore the ‘black box’ of partnership. The section begins by examining the 
claims and assumptions of first generation theorists about the contribution of 
networks to democratic and effective decision-making, before moving on to 
describe the focus of the second generation of scholarship. More specifically, 
this focuses on the concept of metagovernance (the governance of governance) 
as a tool to understand the role of government in partnership (see Chapters 5 
and 7). The second section draws on the concept of multi-level governance 
(MLG) as a lens to understand policy making at different administrative levels. 
This conceptualises MLG as fluid networked forms of governance that overlap 
territorial boundaries (Marks and Hooghe 2004). This concept is used to explore 
institutional divergence in Scotland, and the role of certain food industry actors 
as boundary spanners across partnerships at UK and devolved levels (see 
Chapter 7). With this theoretical framework in place, the third section engages 
with the scholarship on accountability as a ‘fundamental norm in public 
administration’ (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015). This provides a definition of 
accountability as a three-stage process based on information provision, 
debating, and the possibility of sanctions (Bovens 2007) and reflects on the 
interplay between different types of accountability and the concept of 
metagovernance (Chapters 5 and 7). The fourth section draws on the work of 
Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) on the performative and interactive dimensions of 
governance. This section identifies key concepts of this framework, such the 
notion that contemporary policy making is characterised by informal 
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governance, and the emphasis on discourse as produced and reproduced in 
policy practices (see Chapters 4 – 7).  
 
2.3.2 Beyond markets and hierarchy: public governance through 
networks 
 
The emergence of governance network research 
 
In the past three decades, the terms ‘network’ and ‘governance’ have become 
catch-words in both political and policy studies, but has also become 
fashionable among elected representatives and decision makers as a response 
to the perceived failures of state and market regulation (Sørensen & Torfing 
2006). This section does not attempt to provide an exhaustive overview of the 
diverse applications of the network concept within different research traditions 
(Börzel 1998) but follows Torfing and Sørensen (2014) in drawing a 
demarcation between first and second waves of governance network research. 
The aim of this section is to review the theoretical foundations of this literature 
and subsequent directions in empirical and conceptual analyses of network 
governance. 
 
The first generation of network governance research can be traced to the 
problematisation of traditional forms of government and the sense among 
influential scholars that it was possible to identify a ‘shift from government to 
governance’ in Rod Rhodes’ (1997) characterization. In parallel with the view 
promoted by international relations scholars, such as Rosenau and Czempiel 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), that political action focused increasingly on 
‘governance without government’, Rhodes conceptualized governance as 
marking a shift toward new forms of decision making in which the state is just 
one of many actors responsible for public policy making (Rhodes 2007). As 
Börzel (2011) points out, this characterization functioned as a bridging concept 
with researchers working at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Both share the assumption of governance networks as non-
hierarchical forms of negotiated interaction between multiple public and private 
actors. For example, in their influential works, Scharpf (1997) and Mayntz 
(1993) draw a distinction between hierarchy (government) and horizontal 
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modes of interaction among a plurality of actors (governance). While the 
‘Rhodes’ and Max Planck models of governance networks (Börzel 2011) share 
the view that decision making processes have become more interactive, the 
German literature views networks as a distinctive mode of social order that is 
functionally distinct from markets and hierarchies (Börzel & Panke 2006). 
Moreover, researchers in this tradition also tend to frame networks as the 
solution to intractable policy problems that are perceived to have become more 
complex (Mayntz 1993). The simple argument that characterises much of the 
literature on governance networks is that non-hierarchical coordination between 
government and non-governmental actors is necessary to formulate and 
implement effective policy responses to complex problems that no single actor 
has the knowledge or capacity to address (Kooiman 2003). Put simply, the first 
generation of literature framed networks as a functional response to policy 
problems, a narrative that overlaps with claims made in policy statements that 
food industry actors should be part of the solution to the issue of obesity (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
This narrative can be disaggregated into three claims that are often explicit in 
the rationale for governance networks put forward by researchers. The first 
claim is that the participation of non-governmental actors in policy making 
enhances the capacity of the state through resource mobilization in terms of 
knowledge and expertise (Jessop 1998; Kooiman 1993). Second, it is claimed 
that the inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy formulation will enhance 
the legitimacy and authority of collectively binding rules and norms. As a result, 
decision processes are expected to induce compliance and avoid non-
governmental actors exercising veto power (Risse 2004). The third claim of 
network governance research is that non-governmental actors involved in co-
production are assumed to approach decision-making with a commitment to 
negotiated solutions through compromise and concession and avoid conflictual 
relations (Papadopoulos & Warin 2007; Börzel & Panke 2006). Indeed, a central 
assumption of network theory is that this mode of governance may transform 
communicative interaction in ways that embed deliberative and consensus-
oriented dialogue among actors (Ansell & Gash 2008). In other words, it is 
assumed that non-governmental actors will demonstrate a credible commitment 
to negotiation processes and seek reasoned consensus (Risse 2004). In 
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summary, the first wave of governance network research tends to blur 
descriptive accounts of the rise of networks and prescriptive accounts that frame 
network governance as a response to policy complexity (Passoth and Rowland 
2016). In this view, the involvement of non-governmental actors in the 
formulation and implementation of collectively binding decisions (Mayntz 2002) 
allows government to improve policy making through: (i) enhanced coordination 
of resources; (ii) the expectation of negotiated solutions based on consensus-
seeking models of decision making; (iii) effective policy implementation induced 
through voluntary compliance with logics of appropriateness. 
 
Torfing and Sørensen (2014) argue that the second generation of governance 
network research has shifted away from the idea that networks constitute a 
distinctive mode of social order to draw attention to normative questions about 
democratic representation (Hendriks 2009; Papadopoulos 2007; Klijn and 
Skelcher 2007; Peters and Pierre 2004; Marcussen and Torfing 2007) and 
empirical analysis of key concepts such as metagovernance (Stark 2015; Bell 
and Park 2006; Davies 2005). This focus on the democratic and procedural 
legitimacy of networks coupled with empirical studies that assess their 
effectiveness, have problematised the assumption that governance networks 
are a panacea to intractable policy problems (Börzel 2011). Overall, this second 
generation of research has focused on theoretically informed empirical studies 
that situate governance networks within political and social contexts. For 
example, Hendriks (2009) explores how political representation is symbolically 
enacted in a Dutch sustainable energy network; Griggs and Howarth (Griggs 
and Howarth 2007) analyse the dynamics of UK airport governance, illustrating 
the irreconcilable interests and differences between networks of actors; and 
Sørensen (2006) examine the role of elected politicians and administrators in 
metagovernance processes in the Danish municipality of Skanderborg. This is 
illustrative of a second generation of research that has begun to explore 
mechanisms and concepts of governance networks in empirical context and 




This section offers a brief account of meta-governance as a theory utilised by 
scholars to explore the changing role and capacity of the state in governance 
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networks. The concept of meta-governance emphasises the ‘governance of 
governance’ (Jessop 2002) that points to the ‘various mechanisms that public 
authority and other resourceful actors can use to initiate and stimulate 
negotiated self-governance among relevant stakeholders and/or guide them in 
a certain direction’ (Pederson et al. 2011). Although the notion of 
metagovernance is relatively new, it has become an important tool of political 
analysis for scholars in contexts such as the governance of arm’s length bodies 
(Dommett and Flinders 2015); devolution (Bailey and Wood 2017); and agri-
food networks (Botterill and Daugbjerg 2015).  
 
The idea of meta-governance refers to the notion that the state continues to 
have an important role in the process of coordination and steering that has 
typically associated with the concept of governance (Torfing et al. 2012; 
Meuleman 2008; Stoker 1998; Rosenau 2004). As Dommett and Flinders 
(2015) summarise, a straightforward way of thinking about meta-governance 
depicts the literature as differentiated according to the role of the state in ‘the 
governance of governance’. For scholars in the state-centric tradition, such as 
Bell and Hindmoor (2009) and Hysing (2009), the ‘hollowed-out’ state 
hypothesis underdetermines the prevalence of governing with government, in 
which states remain central actors in governance arrangements and retain 
considerable authority. Correspondingly, the relational school of meta-
governance, and particularly the Danish school of network governance 
associated with scholars such as Sørensen and Torfing (2009), similarly believe 
that the state has an important role in contemporary governance. What 
differentiates this literature, is its theoretical and empirical interest in defining 
and researching strategies for metagoverning (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). 
Overall, this research utilises many of the concepts of the relational (or 
pluricentric) school, which are discussed in greater depth below. 
 
For the relational school, meta-governance is a way of thinking about how 
elected politicians and public officials facilitate and manage complex 
governance networks. In this understanding, meta-governance is ‘a way of 
enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political system based on 
a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and 
institutions’ (Sørensen 2006: 100).  Reduced to its simplest form, this 
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literature explores the toolkit available to meta-governors to set the rules for 
governance (Jessop 2004). As mentioned above, Sørensen and Torfing are 
among the scholars who have published multiple papers detailing the tools of 
meta-governance. This theory of meta-governance is built around a definition 
of governance networks as ‘relatively stable constellations of public and private 
actors engaged in negotiated interaction, which ‘takes place within a regulative, 
normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework’ (Sørensen & Torfing 2007: 9). 
This conceives of governance networks as constituted by relatively 
institutionalised frameworks shaped by ideas about the ‘politics of politics’ (Beck 
1994: 35). Meta-governance can be exercised through structuring these 
institutional processes to produce effective policy outcomes. Sørensen and 
Torfing distinguish between ‘hands-on’ and ‘hands-off’ tools of 
metagovernance, a useful analytical framework that is discussed in greater 
detail in a later section of the chapter. This research explores a key argument 
made by Sørensen and Torfing (2009) that there is no guarantee that politicians 
and public officials will take the responsibility of metagoverning seriously. 
Conversely, we should be careful not be to presuppose that metagovernance is 
a panacea (Börzel 2011), especially concerning policy issues in which there 
exists the potential for conflict between actors with irreconcilable political 
preferences. This is a point argued by Griggs and Howarth (2007) in their study 
of airport governance networks that highlights that, far from rational negotiation, 
the policy making process was characterised by irreconcilable conflict. Despite 
this recognition of the negative aspects of governance networks from scholars 
such as Sørensen and Torfing (2017) and others (Benz and Papadopoulos 
2006), it remains an under-researched dimension of network governance 
research. As Börzel (2011) argues, there is a discernible selection bias in the 
literature towards empirical research that focuses on successful instances of 
network governance. 
 
2.3.2 Multi-level governance 
 
‘Unravelling the state’: Type I and Type II governance 
 
The term MLG was first used by Gary Marks in the early 1990s as an organising 
concept to understand the participation of state actors at multiple territorial 
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levels in European Union (EU) regional policy. In his seminal paper, Marks 
(1993) described how EU decision making and policy processes were being 
transformed through interaction between sub-national and supra-national 
authorities that created trans-national networks of actors (Börzel 2002; Hix 
1998; Rhodes 1995). In the twenty-five years since the first use of this term, 
multi-level approaches on EU policy instruments have expanded in various 
directions, such as structural funds policy (Heinelt et al. 2003), regional 
partnerships (Bache 2010; Bache and Olsson 2001) and open method of co-
ordination (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). Furthermore, MLG has formed a core 
organising framework for scholars working in devolution and federalism studies 
(Flinders 2011; Keating 2010; Mitchell 2010; Keating et al. 2003), with studies 
highlighting the impact of territorial devolution on decision making authority and 
the potential for policy divergence in the new political space created following 
devolution in the UK context. 
 
In addition to the development of these distinctive research agendas, MLG has 
been developed and refined in response to criticisms that this framework 
represented little more than a ‘proto-theory’ awaiting theoretical refinement 
(Jordan 2001). Bache et al (2015) suggest that criticisms of MLG galvanised 
attempts to develop a more theoretically robust tool of political analysis, 
strengthened by Hooghe and Marks’ demarcation between two contrasting 
types of MLG that they argue has resulted in the ‘unravelling’ of the state 
(Hooghe & Marks 2003). Type I MLG in this framework describes governance 
in which decision-making authority is restricted to a limited number of non-
overlapping jurisdictions. It refers to jurisdictions that tend to have durable 
responsibilities and undertake a wide range of policy functions (Bache et al. 
2016). Type I MLG therefore captures state-focused dimension of governance 
This is contrasted with Type II MLG that describes governance arrangements 
which are task-specific and have a flexible institutional design (Skelcher 2005). 
Type II MLG has been adopted to capture the ‘unbundling’ of the state to arms-
length bodies, such as public-private partnerships, quangos, commissions, and 
executive agencies (Pollitt and Talbot 2003). The concept of Type II institutions 
resonates with conceptions of networks as flexible governing arrangements in 
which roles and responsibilities are dispersed between state and non-state 
actors (Black 2008). 
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Following on from this, the conceptual dichotomy of Type I and Type II 
governance developed by Hooghe and Marks (2003), implies a shift away from 
established democratic institutions towards governing arrangements in which 
the government learns to metagovern networks and coordinate the sphere of 
delegated governance (Dommett & Flinders 2015b). As Marks (1996) argues, 
MLG denotes an actor-centred approach that calls attention to the different 
types of actors that are engaged in Type II bodies at multiple levels of 
government: 
  
The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach 
is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of 
governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels 
[…] The presumption of multi-level governance is that these actors 
participate in diverse policy networks and this may involve subnational 
actors – interest groups and subnational governments – dealing directly 
with supranational actors (Marks et al 1996: 167). 
 
MLG thus raises empirical, theoretical, and normative questions (Piattoni 2009) 
about the informal interconnections between Type II bodies and the creation of 
transnational networks of actors (Bache and Flinders 2004). Skelcher observes 
how boundary-spanning actors involved in governing processes at multiple 
levels may be able to ‘challenge and recast the existing patterns of 
governmental authority’ (2005: 96). For example, Woll and Jacquot (2010) 
observe that corporate actors move between different levels of the EU political 
system in pursuit of their political and economic objectives, which can lead to 
actors shaping the rules of the game. 
 
Multi-level governance as actor-centred  
 
All this suggests that MLG theory is geared towards not just multi-level 
processes, but also multi-actor approaches that explore how governance 
networks involve actors that move across traditional spheres of political 
authority. The actor-centredness of MLG approaches emphasises the blurring 
of boundaries between public and private, drawing attention to the complexities 
of multi-level advocacy (Baumgartner 2007) and venue-shopping (Coen 2007) 
between different institutional settings. In this sense, MLG approaches invite 
reflection on how the boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors 
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creates functional overlaps between Type II bodies, leading to governance 
networks that are ‘superimposed in a disorderly fashion to one another and to 
Type I jurisdictions’ (Piattoni 2009: 171). 
 
Furthermore, Marks and Hooghe’s (2004: 15) understanding of MLG as 
denoting a shift towards ‘a complex, fluid, patchwork’ of governance, suggests 
an increasing role for non-governmental actors in collective decision making. A 
defining characteristic of Type II MLG is the flexible design of institutions, 
drawing on the notion of governance as synonymous with an accommodative 
approach to negotiated interaction between government and non-governmental 
actors (Peters and Pierre 2004). As Piattoni (2009) observes, MLG is itself a 
multi-level concept that raises different normative and theoretical questions. It 
is both a theory of polity structuring, and at the same time a theory of policy 
making. All this suggests that to study partnerships through the lens of 
governance theory, it is also necessary to explore how industry actors operate 
across Type II jurisdictions and what the implications are for governing obesity 
policy. With this in mind, the following section examines the concept of 




Accountability as a concept 
 
The notion that accountability is the unfortunate victim of conceptual stretching 
(Sartori 1970) has become a something of a trope in the increasingly dense 
literature exploring its scope and meaning. The simple argument of many 
academic researchers is that the analytical leverage of this concept is inversely 
proportionate to its use in contemporary political discourses (Bovens 2007; 
Mulgan 2000). Variously, the academic literature refers to accountability as a 
chameleonic concept (Mulgan 2000), synonymous with feel good standards of 
good governance, such as participation and transparency (Busuioc 2013; 
Lodge 2008; Bovens 2007). It is against this backdrop that Pollitt argues that 
accountability has become ‘a Good Thing, of which it seems we cannot have 
enough’ (Pollitt 2003: 89). This critique is echoed in one of the most widely cited 
papers in this literature, which suggests that ‘the concept has become less 
 36 
useful for analytical purposes, and today resembles a dustbin filled with good 
intentions, loosely defined concepts and vague images of good governance’ 
(Bovens 2007: 449). 
 
However, this framing of accountability, as having become decoupled from its 
core function, underplays the symbolic dimensions of the concept. For instance, 
in her study of UK targets on asylum, Boswell (2015) demonstrates that 
performance targets performed an important symbolic function in signalling a 
commitment to immigration policy reform. However, there are perhaps 
legitimate reasons for accountability scholars to define this concept in narrow 
terms. As Dubnick (2011) argues, the pervasive role of the ‘accountability 
space’ in contemporary frameworks of network and multi-level governance, 
demands that priority is given to the nature of accountability regimes. In this 
view, the promises of accountability (Dubnick and Frederickson 2010) have 
become embedded in discourses of good governance framed in terms of 
greater effectiveness and improved performance. The potential consequence 
of this narrative, is that chameleon-like understandings of accountability as 
synonymous with feel good concepts (Busuioc 2013) undermine a focus on its 
primacy in frameworks of contemporary governance.  
 
Three stages of accountability 
 
The response of scholars, such as Mark Bovens and Madalina Busuioc, has 
been to explicitly define accountability in narrow terms as a means of assessing 
social relations that constitute the ‘accountability space’. This narrow 
conceptualisation starts from an understanding of accountability as a 
relationship between different actors in which one gives account, and others 
have the authority to impose consequences (Mashaw 2006; Bovens 2007). 
While the precise nature of accountability is envisaged differently by scholars, 
there is broad agreement upon a minimal understanding of accountability as a 
communicative interaction between an accountability forum and actor in which 
the latter gives an account and provides reasons for their actions against the 
backdrop of possible sanctions (Day and Klein 1987; Romzek and Dubnick 
1987; Mulgan 2000). In other words, a minimal definition of accountability 
presupposes relatively formalised social relations in which an actor has a duty 
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to provide information and another actor has the authority to demand relevant 
information and pass judgement (Bovens 2007). 
 
This research adopts the analytical framework developed by Bovens, who 
defines accountability as a three-stage process: (i) informing (ii) explaining (iii) 
possibility of consequences. The first stage is the ex post provision of 
information to the accountability forum(s) by the account giver. The form, 
content and timing of information are key factors that shape conceptions of 
accountability (Black 2008). As Busuioc (2013) observes, the provision of 
information is an indispensable, though not sufficient element of accountability. 
In order to theoretically and empirically refine our understanding of what it 
means to give an account it is important to recognise that the provision of 
information is not a neutral or technical process (Lastra and Shams 2001). 
Conversely, an interpretive approach to understanding account-giving involves 
making sense of informing as narratives (Radaelli et al. 2013) that are rationally 
constructed in order to enhance an organization’s legitimacy (Black 2008). The 
second stage of the process involves the accountability forum asking questions, 
demanding answers or additional information (Busuioc 2013). In other words, 
the forum can ask (or require) conduct or reporting standards to be explained, 
which enables the forum to assess actors’ behaviour. At this point, it is important 
to emphasise the relation between accountability and transparency. While 
transparency is a key element across all three stages of accountability, it is not 
sufficient to constitute accountability (Bovens 2007). For influential researchers 
of accountability, such as Mulgan and Dubnick, communicative interaction 
between the forum and actor is a central process of accountability. In the words 
of Mulgan (2003: 9), ‘forcing people to explain what they have done is perhaps 
the essential component of making them accountable. In this sense, the core of 
accountability becomes a dialogue between accountors and account-holders’. 
Or, put slightly differently, a central assumption at the core of accountability is 
that account-giving is a discursive process that enables and promotes 
exchange and assessment of information – communicative interaction is 
dialogical. The third stage in accountability is the possibility of consequences 
that is widely perceived as a necessary precondition of being held to account. 
Bovens (2007) theorises this stage as constituted by informal and formal 
mechanisms of accountability that have potentially negative (or positive) 
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consequences. Formal sanctions vary from fines, disciplinary measures, or 
even the ‘nuclear weapon’ of liquidation. Following the work of Scharpf (1997) 
and others, scholars such as Börzel & Risse (Börzel and Risse 2005) and 
Héritier (2002), emphasise the degree to which non-hierarchical modes of 
negotiation take place under a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the threat of command 
regulation. This implicit or explicit threat to impose binding rules provides a 
strong incentive for non-governmental actors to change their behaviour in ways 
that align more closely with governmental policy objectives (Börzel & Risse 
2010). In other words, what has been termed a shadow of hierarchy constitutes 
the damoclean sword of control (Papadopoulos 2007), reducing the incentives 
for actors to veto or exit from voluntary commitments (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 
2008). At the other end of the scale, informal consequences may involve 
reputation-based approaches in which actors will seek to advance their 
credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis different audiences (Busuioc and Lodge 
2016). This approach contends that organizations are driven by reputational 
concerns as a means of demonstrating their credibility, or signalling the 
legitimacy of particular decisions (Carpenter 2014). Informal mechanisms of 
accountability presuppose that political interest and media reporting of policy 
problems (Boswell 2012) will prompt actors to engage in accountability seeking 
behaviour, as an organisational response to reputational risks. This research 
empirically explores the operationalization of reputation-based accountability 
mechanisms under the Coalition government as a functional equivalent to a 
shadow of hierarchy, highlighting the weaknesses of this approach in producing 





A feature of the literature on accountability is the widespread application of 
principal-agent theory as a model of social relations, predicated on the arms-
length principle between principal and agent (Flinders 2001). Principal-agent 
models theorise that the delegation of functions at arms-length from central 
government departments – implemented as part of New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms over the past three decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) – 
require procedural instruments that institutionalise ex ante control of rules, 
standards and norms and ex post auditing requirement and the possible threat 
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of sanctions (Flinders 2008). These dimensions of control are framed as a 
solution to the problem of “accountability deficits” and “agency loss” (Strøm 
2000). In principal-agent accounts, preventing bureaucratic “drift” (McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast 1987) is focused on reducing information asymmetries 
between principal and agent. In public administration, principals are assumed 
to be elected politicians (often ministers) and agent an umbrella term used to 
describe the third parties that have been delegated responsibility by the 
principal (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015) The theoretical core of principal-
agent theory is therefore simple: the delegation of functions at arms-length 
necessitates that the principal monitor and assess the behaviour of the agent. 
Accountability therefore denotes a conflictual relationship between actor and 
forum(s) characterised by distrust, which assumes that agents invariably need 
to be prevented from “shirking” (McCubbins and Page 1987) through monitoring 
and political oversight (Krause and Meier 2005). 
 
As Busuioc and Schillemans (2015) observe, the literature on accountability is 
characterised by scholars that explicitly use principal-agent theory, but note that 
most research reflects the assumptions typically addressed in principal-agent 
theory. For example, a high-profile book on global health governance (Clinton 
and Sridhar 2017) explicitly draws on principal-agent theory as an organising 
framework to assess the effectiveness of partnerships in addressing issues 
such as TB and malaria. Indeed, Bovens et al note that their concept of 
accountability is ‘firmly grounded in monocentric, state-oriented models of 
governance, which presupposes that ‘accountor’ and ‘accountee’ are known, 
coherent, straightforward entities embedded in a single and clear-cut 
governance system’ (Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans 2014). Taking these 
assumptions forward, the Busuioc and Schillemans highlight the limits of 
principal-agent theory as a model of accountability relationships in practice. The 
findings of this research emphasise accountability as a relational, interactional 
process, emphasising that principals sometimes delegate functions they do not 
care about, do not want to hold actors accountable, and fail to take information 
seriously. Furthermore, research within governance-focused political science 
(Koop 2014; Skelcher 2010; Thatcher 2002) and regulation-related research 
(Black 2008; Mörth 2007) have noted that the assumption of hierarchical 
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relationships implicit in principal-agent approaches under-theorises the 
interdependencies of governance networks.  
 
Accountability in networks 
 
While the strength of principal-agent theory is its simplicity, a growing body of 
literature (Busuioc & Schillemans 2015; Bache et al 2015; Flinders 2008; Black 
2008; Papadopoulos 2007) has highlighted the limits of this theoretical 
framework in understanding contemporary modes of network and multi-level 
governance. Indeed, researchers working within the paradigm of principal-agent 
frameworks have suggested that decentred forms of governance pose a 
significant challenge to the notion of accountability as structured by a clear chain 
of delegation between principal and agent (Bovens et al 2014). While the 
rational assumptions of principal-agent models provide a parsimonious micro-
political theory of delegated governance (Flinders 2008), the simplicity of this 
framework under-plays the complexities of governance networks characterised 
by multiple accountability forums involving multiple, interdependent actors. In 
contrast to the state-centric model of delegated governance assumed in 
principal-agent accounts, the interdependencies of polycentric networks disrupt 
hierarchical relationships (Black 2008). 
 
First, the inclusion of non-governmental actors in the forums for co-production 
based around collective decision-making (Sørensen & Torfing 2017) challenges 
the idea of linear models of accountability relationships within governance 
networks. Conversely, negotiated interaction between governmental and non-
governmental actors constitute an accountability space in which organisational 
boundaries are blurred. In contrast to the portrayal of accountability as a 
contractual relationship between principal and agent, the accountability space 
within governance networks can be conceptualised as dialectical (Black 2008). 
This non-linearity is attributable to the direct participation of non-governmental 
actors in the institutional design of the accountability space, such as reporting 
requirements and monitoring frameworks. In other words, the integration of non-
governmental actors as co-producers of decisions that affect them results in a 
dispersal of regulatory roles and responsibilities, in which actors who are 
expected to “render account” are involved in formulating rules and standards 
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that constitute accountability relationships. This blurring of boundaries has been 
described by accountability scholars as the problem of “many hands” 
(Thompson 1980) or ‘paradox of shared responsibility’ (Bovens 1998). This 
relates to the idea that policies pass through the hands of multiple actors, 
diluting responsibility and rendering it difficult to disentangle which actors have 
contributed in what ways to the formulation and implementation of policy 
(Bovens 2007). Accountability relationships are likely to resemble a ‘complex 
undergrowth’ of institutional practices that lack coherence (Curtin 2007). This, 
in turn, may allow actors to strategically engage in blame-shifting strategies and 
risk transfer that distances them from political dilemmas (Hood 2007).  
 
The problem of ‘many hands’ thus focuses attention on the central question of 
meta-governance as a steering mechanism to effectively manage the 
‘undergrowth’ of accountability mechanisms that are likely to proliferate in 
polycentric governance networks. As discussed (above), the concept of meta-
governance describes the mechanisms that facilitate self-regulation and 
strategically guides actors in a certain direction (Sørensen & Torfing 2009). At 
the core of public governance, is a commitment to meta-governing the 
“accountability space” in ways that institutionalise effective reporting and 
monitoring frameworks that affect how actors “render account”. If we return to 
the three-stage accountability process, accountability depends on the exercise 
of meta-governance in ways that promote coherence in policy formulation and 
implementation. The key challenge for government actors is therefore to ensure 
that the institutional design of governance networks holds actors to account in 
ways aligned with the stated policy goals (Dryzek 1999). This may include 
reporting standards (what types of information are legitimate), forums that 
involve governmental and non-governmental actors in communicative 
interaction over information provision, and the presence of sanctioning 
mechanisms to reduce the incentive for actors to renege on collective 
agreements (Börzel & Risse 2010). However, as Busuioc and Schillemans 
(2015) observe, it should not be assumed that forums have an interest in holding 
actors to account, as is assumed by certain network theorists (Kickert, Klijn, and 
Koppenjan 1997). As Sørensen and Torfing argue in their account of meta-
governance, ‘there is no guarantee that politicians and public managers will 
assume this responsibility; they are also engaged in political conflicts and power 
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struggles and may seek to exploit their privileged position to pursue 
particularistic interests’ (2009: 235). Moreover, accountability relationships may 
prove particularly challenging to meta-govern, given implicit or explicit 
expectations of collaborative decision making in the design and decision 
processes of network governance. As Koppell (2005) observes, the practice of 
accountability is marked by competing expectations of its operative definition, 
giving rise to multiple accountabilities disorder. This refers to the notion that 
public officials attempt to mix together different types of accountability (in 
Koppell’s typology, the five dimensions of accountability include transparency, 
liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness) that resembles a 
‘bureaucratic version of Twister’ in which public officials are often confronted 
with irreconcilable expectations. Indeed, even where governments take the role 
and responsibilities of meta-governance seriously, this may not be sufficient to 
incentivise compliance with negotiated agreements in situations where non-
governmental actors retain veto power and can exit governance networks to 
pursue their interests unilaterally (Papadopoulos 2007). All this suggests that 
understanding governance networks necessitates making sense of complex 
processes of decision-making in which responsibilities are dispersed among 
multiple actors. This is the focus of several of the empirical chapters in this 
research, which explore how accountability mechanisms are operationalized 
and shaped by state and non-state actors. In order to unpack these processes, 
the thesis draws on the deliberative policy analysis perspective of Hajer and 
Wagenaar (2003), discussed in the final sub-section of this chapter. 
 
2.3.5 Deliberative policy analysis 
 
In the preface to their edited collection, Deliberative Policy Analysis: 
Understanding Governance in the Network Society, Hajer and Wagenaar 
(2003) argue for a new vocabulary of political analysis that helps to understand 
new forms of governance. Taking The Argumentative Turn as a key point of 
reference, Hajer and Wagenaar argue that deliberative approach to the study 
of policy mark an attempt to build on the intellectual foundations of Fischer and 
Forester’s (Fischer and Forester 1993) seminal work. In this sense, deliberative 
policy analysis is not epistemologically or methodologically different from other 
interpretive approaches, as a reiteration of the practice-orientation of political 
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and administrative work (Wagenaar and Cook 2011). Deliberative policy 
analysis (DPA), as conceptualised by Hajer and Wagenaar, understands 
language as related to the concrete practices of political decision making. The 
idea that language and practice are mutually constitutive is reflected in Hajer’s 
understanding of discourse as ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts and 
categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical 
phenomena, and which is produced and reproduces in an identifiable set of 
practices’ (Hajer 1995: 44) 
 
It is important to note that the discourse-analytical framework developed in 
Deliberative Policy Analysis was framed by its authors as a response to the 
changing nature of policy making and politics. At the core of this approach is 
the claim that classical-modernist institutions (e.g. the core executive) co-exist 
with the informal practices of governance networks that are claimed to represent 
‘new political spaces’ (Hajer 2003: 178). 
 
In this research, I focus more specifically on the discursive-analytical framework 
theorised by Maarten Hajer, in which he develops the idea of policy making as 
a series of performances that take place under uncertain institutional conditions. 
This approach proposes a threefold operationalization that differentiates 
between discourse, performance, and deliberation, all of which are explicitly 
linked to the practice orientation of DPA. The discourse dimension draws on the 
definition (above) formulated by Hajer in his first book, The Politics of 
Environmental Discourse (Hajer 1995), with a vocabulary of ‘politics as 
performance’ developed across subsequent papers including an interpretive 
study of the process of rebuilding Ground Zero (Hajer 2005). Drawing on J.L. 
Austin’s (Austin 1975) analysis of speech acts as things that ‘do things’ and 
Edelman’s (1985) understanding of governance as political drama, Hajer points 
to the physical-symbolic contexture in which political decision making takes 
place. In this sense, performance theory understands discourse and practice as 
reproduced in a particular setting constructed by institutional scripts that embed 
a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989), staged interactions of the 
meeting as the central practice of politics, and the document as the principal 
artefact of politics that co-constructs discourse and practices (Freeman 2006). 
To analyse politics in terms of performativity, opens the study of a policy process 
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to questions that are not captured through discourse-analytical tools (Hajer 
2005). For example, how are rules and norms of interaction determined? What 
actors are involved? Who is the audience? In this research, I use the idea of 
performativity as a conceptual bridge between meso-level accounts of network 
and multi-level governance and micro-level DPA. The analytical focus here is 
on the use of meta-governance tools in ‘setting the stage’ of negotiated 
interactions and the performative dimensions of accountability as staged acts 
of corporate responsibility (cf. Dubnick 2005). 
 
To explore these questions, I also turn to the work of Erving Goffman. While 
Hajer (2006) draws on Goffman in understanding politics as a series of staged 
performances, we might also consider Goffman’s (1959) distinction between 
frontstage and backstage in exploring the performative dimensions of 
governance. As Wodak observes in her political ethnography of EU decision 
making, the notion of performance is linked to a demarcation between the 
frontstage of institutional settings and the backstage of the politics du couloir 
(Wodak 2009: 4). Moreover, Van Tatenhove (2003) highlights the strategic 
motivation that actors often have in negotiating the ‘rules of the game’ of 
governance arrangements in backstage settings. This is examined in Chapter 
6, which traces corporate influence in the hidden back stage of policy making. 
 
Before we move on to the deliberative dimension it is important to stress that 
Hajer (2006) considers discourse and performativity as particularly useful tools 
of analysis that can be used to empirically explore the shift towards political 
practices that have emerged between and beyond Type I institutions, conceived 
as state-focused jurisdictions (Bache et al 2016). A key concept for Hajer is the 
hypothesis that the emergence of informal spaces of politics means that policy 
making often takes place in the institutional void where ‘there are no clear rules 
and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures 
to be agreed upon’ (Hajer 2003: 175). In contrast with the codified rules and 
decision making procedures of traditional institutions, Type II bodies are marked 
by conditions of institutional ambiguity where there are no commonly agreed 
rules that predetermine where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken 
(Hajer & Versteeg 2005). It is clear that Hajer (2003) has in mind governance 
networks as operating in conditions of ambiguity, or in extreme cases the 
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institutional void. In a co-authored paper with Wytske Versteeg, they conclude 
that ‘any particular governance network will first have to develop a shared 
discourse and ‘set the stage’, that is, work out a script for resolving conflict and 
develop its logic of appropriateness’ (Hajer & Versteeg 2005: 346). The 
dynamics of informal governance therefore create ‘living institutions’ (Hajer 
2006) in which rules are not codified in agreed-upon procedures, but negotiated 
in practice. This refers to both negotiated interaction over substantive issues of 
policy but also the institutional ‘rules of the game’ according to which negotiation 
is to take place (Hajer 2006). In other words, what DPA shares with the 
relational school of governance is a focus on the proliferation of networks as 
modes of governance that include non-governmental actors in joint decisions 
over policy formulation and implementation. As such, it provides an intellectual 
bridge that links analysis of the discourse and practice of partnership to meso-
level concepts of networks and multi-level governance. 
 
Finally, the emphasis on deliberation reflects a broader ‘deliberative’ turn in the 
field of policy analysis. The shift towards understanding policy in terms of 
participation can be traced to a shared theoretical and empirical interest of 
democracy theorists and political scientists in the potential of deliberative forms 
of network governance (Escobar 2015). From this shared interest two 
contrasting themes have gained prominence. First, the shift to governance has 
been interpreted by a range of prominent democracy theorists as a tool to 
enhance participation and representation in political decision making. In this 
field, John Dryzek (2002) and Archon Fung (2006) are notable for having 
explored network governance in terms of its potential for democratic 
government. For instance, Fung (2003) draws on in-depth analysis of Chicago 
municipal agencies to develop a framework of ‘empowered participation’ in 
participatory governance. While it is important to acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of this literature, a central assumption of deliberation in the 
context of public policy is that communicative interactions align with normative 
ideals of reciprocity and reasonable dialogue (Fung 2006; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1998). This conceptualization of deliberation draws on democratic 
social theory, and specifically Jürgen Habermas’ ‘communicative ethics’ 
(Habermas 1986), to portray communication as taking place in spaces of politics 
that induce reflective decision making (Dryzek and Hendriks 2012). The 
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Habermasian idea of deliberation as a practice in which the force of the better 
argument prevails, is a central assumption of much deliberative theory (Fischer 
2003). For example, della Porta argues that ‘we have deliberative democracy 
when, under conditions of equality, inclusiveness and transparency, a 
communicative process based on reason (the strength of the good argument) 
is able to transform individual preferences and reach decisions oriented to the 
public good’ (Porta 2005). In other words, Habermasian ideas of deliberation 
assume that actors will demonstrate a shared willingness to be persuaded 
based on argumentative reasoning. However, this research contrasts the 
deliberative ideals of policy statements with the realpolitik of back stage 
decision-making. 
 
Second, the work of many network theorists resonates with deliberative ideas 
that depict policy making as an accommodative and consensus-oriented 
process (Stoker 1998). In this view, deliberative principles can be expected to 
shape interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors leading 
to learning processes and the joint production of effective public policy 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2017). In a deliberative understanding of governance 
networks, preferences are not fixed but subject to discursive challenges. As 
Risse (2004) theorises in his research on processes of global governance 
(Risse 2000), deliberative processes such as arguing and persuasion imply that 
actors are prepared to change their interests or worldviews when presented with 
the better argument. Indeed, in their study of arguing and bargaining in 
multilateral negotiations, Ulbert and Risse (2005) find that specific phases of 
negotiation are characterised by deliberative processes that successfully 
reframed the sequencing and normative principles of policy negotiations on the 
Ottawa Treaty banning landmines. However, as the authors conclude, the 
institutional context of a ‘dense framework of previously agreed-upon principles, 
norms, and rules […] had strong effects on negotiating outcomes (Ulbert & 
Risse 2005: 363). In other words, institutional design is central to shaping how 
deliberation works and achieving the conditions for ‘thick’ forms of deliberation 
is invariably resource and time-intensive (Elgström and Jönsson 2000). For 
example, Dryzek and Hendriks (2012) argue that designing or achieving 
deliberation demands focus on design issues around the structure and rules 
that help actors to engage in reflective decision making, careful facilitation that 
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empowers and challenges issues under deliberation, and the roles of 
responsibilities of actors in meta-governing forums in agenda setting 
(Mansbridge et al. 2006; Fung and Wright 2003). The above suggests that 
achieving even deliberative moments (Hajer and Versteeg 2008) in governance 
networks require that the role of institutional design in shaping the ‘rules of the 
game’ is taken seriously. Even where policy processes are designed to facilitate 
deliberation, participation is affected by the incentives for actors to pursue 
economic or policy preferences unilaterally (Ansell & Gash 2008). As Holzinger 
suggests, ‘external factors can […] set very narrow parameters for negotiated 
settlements. No negotiation or discursive procedure, regardless of how well it 
otherwise progresses, can overcome exogenous restrictions and better outside 
options’ (2001: 93). The straightforward argument here, is that the starting 
conditions for collective decision making is the expectation that there exist 
incentives for engaging in negotiation. For example, a strong shadow of 
hierarchy provides a non-trivial incentive for commercial sector actors to 
cooperate over voluntary agreements (Schillemans 2008). All this implies the 
fragility of deliberative processes in governance networks (Hajer & Versteeg 
2008). 
 
Moreover, this discursive fragility points to policy areas where fundamental (and 
often irreconcilable) conflicts of interest exist between the economic policy 
objectives of commercial sector actors and public policy objectives (Thauer 
2014; Collin 2012). In such instances, communicative interaction is likely to shift 
towards bargaining
3
 or might simply lead to lowest common denominator 
solutions and deadlock (Börzel 2011). Indeed, the notion that governance 
networks operate on deliberative ‘software’ (Dryzek 1996) risks framing 
decision making as taking place in a power-free space in which actors can learn 
through deliberation (Papadopoulos & Warin 2007). As one of the few scholars 
that has explored how policy actors with vested interests engage in deliberative 
forums, Hendriks (Hendriks 2006) concludes that interest organizations chose 
to support or oppose citizens’ forums based on calculations about the 
instrumental value of participation. This finding underpins the empirical and 
                                                
3
 While it is possible to demarcate bargaining and deliberative processes of problem 
solving or persuasion based on the process tracing of the sequence of negotiation, in 
practice bargaining and arguing processes usually go together (Risse 2004) 
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theoretical focus of this research concerning modes of interaction in the 
governance of UK food and obesity policy. 
 
A discourse-analytical framework 
 
This section details the two analytical frameworks that this research draws 
upon. The first is Sørensen and Torfing’s ‘tools of metagovernance’ framework 
that outlines four overlapping forms of metagovernance: 
 
1. Network design that aims to influence the scope, character, 
composition, and institutional procedures of networks 
2. Network framing that seeks to determine the political goals, fiscal 
conditions, legal basis and discursive story-line of the networks 
3. Network management that attempts to reduce tensions, resolve 
conflicts, empower particular actors and lower the transaction costs 
in networks by providing different kinds of material and immaterial 
inputs and resources 
4. Network participation that endeavours to influence the policy 
agenda, the range of feasible options, the premises for decision-
making and the negotiated policy outputs  
 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2009: 456-247) 
 
Sørensen and Torfing describe the first two tools as ‘hands-off’ forms of 
metagovernance that elected officials and policy makers can employ to design 
institutions and discursively shape the boundaries of action. This notion of 
hands-off metagovernance is used to explore three dimensions of governance: 
the operationalization of accountability mechanisms in Chapter 5; food industry 
influence in informal back-stage practices in Chapter 6; and negotiation of a 
voluntary standard on responsible marketing in Chapter 7. 
 
Second, the thesis draws on insights from the discursive institutionalist 
approaches as a lens to understand the role of ideas and discourse in 
institutional contexts. This fourth ‘new institutionalism’ (in addition to rational 
choice, historical and sociological institutionalisms) is concerned with the 
constitutive role of ideas in institutional contexts. As such, it is overtly 
constructivist in viewing ideas as constitutive of institutions (Smith 2013b). 
Through this ideational constructivism, discursive institutionalism depicts actors 
as both constrained by ideas that have undergone process of 
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institutionalisation, but also able to ‘conceive of and talk about institutions as 
objects at a distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as they 
continue to use them’ (Schmidt 2008: 316). Discursive institutionalist accounts 
have tended to examine the role of ideas in policy making, which develop 
theoretical claims based on the empirical study of the mobilisation, circulation, 
and institutionalisation of ideas in different policy contexts (Schmidt 2016; 
Boswell and Hampshire 2017; McCann 2014; Smith 2013b). While the 
boundaries between ideational and discourse research is blurred, a 
demarcation can be drawn between scholars that focus on the substantive 
content of ideas (Palier 2005; Campbell 2004; Blyth 2002; Berman 2001; 
Sabatier 1998; Weir 1992) and those that explore the interactive processes 
through which ideas shape, and are shaped by, institutions (Schmidt 2012). In 
this research, I focus on the discursive interactions through which partnership 
ideas are communicated through discourse and embedded in practice. 
Following Schmidt (2012), interactive processes of discourse may involve policy 
actors engaged in coordinative discourses in dialogical forms of interaction, 
such as deliberation, discussion, and bargaining (Landwehr and Holzinger 
2010). The coordinative sphere encompasses the wide range of actors that 
interact in the construction of policy (Schmidt 2011). This term could describe 
transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999) or ‘epistemic 
communities’ of policy experts, but is focused in this research on the interactions 
between state and non-state actors in partnership working. On the other hand, 
the term communicative sphere refers to how policy preferences are 
substantiated in political debate, where political parties, interest groups, and 
think tanks depend on media reporting to attract political attention (Boswell 
2012). While the distinction between coordinative and communicative spheres 
is not used explicitly in this research, this conception of discursive practices 
underpins much of the analysis developed in the thesis. This framework is 
situated more broadly within an interpretive approach to policy analysis that 
focus on meanings that shape action and institutions, and the way in which they 







Chapter 3. Methodological approach 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach of the thesis, focusing on 
the use of an interpretive approach to studying policy, key informant interviews, 
and analysis of documents. This chapter is structured into three sections that 
explore: the methodological approach of the thesis and its empirical focus; 
practical details of fieldwork; and a reflexive account of doing interpretive 
research. Taken together, this provides a rationale for interpretive policy 
analysis, and explores conceptual and methodological debates about ways of 
doing interpretive analysis. The first section describes interpretation in policy 
analysis, which can be broadly defined as a set of approaches to understand 
the ways in which meaning shapes institutions and how this is interconnected 
with political practices (Cook and Wagenaar 2012; Yanow 2007; Bevir and 
Rhodes 2003). This represents the overarching methodological approach, 
incorporating interviews and documentary analysis. The second section offers 
a reflexive account of the practices and experiences of key informant interviews. 
It begins with a descriptive overview of the approach taken to interviewing, 
before considering the methodological literature on ‘elite’ interviews in relation 
to my own experiences of interviewing individuals engaged in obesity policy 
debates in the UK. The third section examines the use of documents in this 
research, conceptualising documents in terms of their substantive content and 
as artefacts of governing practices (Freeman and Maybin 2011). This section 
draws on the discourse-analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter, 
and outlines the rationale and use of frame analysis as a key tool in my 
methodological approach. 
 
 3.2 Interpretive policy analysis 
 
Interpretive policy analysis is an approach to political studies that focuses on 
meaning. It explores the ways in actors make sense of the world and how their 
perceptions relate to practices (Boswell and Corbett 2015; Yanow 2000). The 
interpretive turn in policy analysis is self-consciously positioned as an 
alternative to rational positivist approaches (Wagenaar 2007) which are 
associated with the assumption that it is not possible to generate objective 
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knowledge about policy (Fischer and Gottweis 2013). This rejects the idea that 
there is a reality ‘out there’ that exists independently of our knowledge of it 
(Wagenaar 2011).  
 
Over the last three decades, interpretive policy analysis has emerged as an 
established research program within mainstream political science. Among the 
first to conduct and advocate for interpretive research were Dvora Yanow 
(1996), Fischer & Forester (1993), Hajer (1995), Rein & Schön (1977), Deborah 
Stone (1989), and Bevir & Rhodes (2003). In the field of health governance, 
interpretive researchers have studied a range of public health issues, such as 
food safety (Paul 2012; Wilkinson 2011; Hajer 2009), the relationship between 
evidence and policy (Smith 2013b; Abeysinghe 2012), and commercial sector 
engagement and interference in public health policy making (Hawkins and 
Holden 2013; Smith et al. 2010) 
 
While there are nuanced differences in normative dimensions, methods, and 
vocabulary between multiple sub-fields (such as Hajer’s performative theory of 
governance, or Bevir and Rhodes’ decentred approach focused on ‘governance 
stories’), interpretive approaches share a focus on what policies, texts, stories, 
and objects ‘mean’ in their political context. This approach is captured by Yanow 
(1996), who argues that interpretive approaches introduce a set of what, how, 
and to whom questions. For interpretive researchers, policy analysis explores 
how actors attach meaning to social and political phenomena, and how this 
meaning in turn shapes institutions, practices, and policies. This is captured in 
Bevir and Rhodes’ (2004: 130) definition of interpretive policy analysis, which 
states that ‘interpretive approaches to political studies focus on meanings that 
shape action and institutions, and the ways in which they do so’. 
 
It is useful to highlight some of the tenets of interpretive policy analysis, in which 
analytical approaches share a set of ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions. In terms of ontology (the existence or ‘reality’ of a particular 
phenomena), interpretive approaches are linked to social constructivism 
(Hendriks 2007). This philosophical position views social and political 
phenomena as socially constructed though the meanings that actors attach to 
them. Interpretive researchers rarely, if ever, claim that everything is socially 
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constructed. This ontological position is most identifiable with ‘critical realists’ 
(Gofas and Hay 2010), who distinguish between the material world and its social 
construction. Searle (1995) distinguishes between ‘social facts’ which are 
dependent on meaning and knowledge for their existence (and are therefore 
socially constructed), and ‘brute facts’ which exist regardless of whether actors 
acknowledge their existence or not (think of the Himalayas). Thus, critical 
realists accept that a material reality exists, while maintaining that much of the 
world is constructed beyond a basic level (Schmidt 2012). In this view, political 
institutions are sets of informal rules and practices that are ‘real’, even though 
it is socially constructed (Olsen 2013). Second, from an epistemological 
perspective, interpretive policy analysis is focused on: (i) embodied 
assumptions and frames; and (ii) how meaning is enacted in practice, and 
inscribed in texts or artefacts (Ercan, Hendriks, and Boswell 2017; Freeman and 
Sturdy 2015; Yanow 2007)  
 
Reflecting these philosophical assumptions, interpretive policy analysis focuses 
on developing in-depth case studies, contextualise within their political and 
social context (Fischer 2003). Thus, interpretive researchers are interested in 
generating data though interviews (Smith 2006), analysis of key policy 
statements (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2000), exploring the production of 
documents (Freeman 2006), and ethnographic methods (Gains 2011). For the 
purposes of this research, I felt it was important to explore how partnerships are 
constructed and discussed in policy documents, their operationalization across 
administrative and political contexts, and the ways in which frames and 
discourses relate to particular practices. The aim of this research was to explore 
partnership as a set of texts, stories, events, and practice, using key informant 
interviews and documents as core methods of interpretive policy analysis 
(Wagenaar 2011). The first phase of the interpretive research process began 
with scoping reviews of the political science and public health literatures and 
background reading to contextualise myself with the policy context in UK and 
Scottish administrations. As part of this process, I was interested in political 
science literatures that could help conceptualise this mode of governance. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, I turned to three inter-related meso-level theories 
developed within sub-fields of political science: network governance, public 
accountability, and deliberative policy analysis. Based on extensive reading 
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within these literatures, I generated two research questions that set out to 
explore the ‘black box’ of partnership. As discussed in Chapter 1, the first 
question focused on the construction and operationalization of partnership by 
UK and Scottish government. The second research question related to the 
analytical usefulness of governance theories in exploring partnership working, 
and asked what this empirical case study of obesity policy reveals about the 
practice and theory of governance networks. The following sections of this 
chapter focuses on how interviews and documents were used to explore the 
practice of partnership. 
 
3.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
3.3.1 A descriptive overview of the interview process 
 
The first stage in the research process was to identify a list of potential 
interviewees. This list was constructed through a wide range of sources, 
including: (1) partnership documents, such as action notes and attendee lists; 
(2) parliamentary reports, and particularly Health Select Committee inquiries 
into obesity; (3) searches of Scottish government and Department of Health 
websites; (4) the use of Linkedin (a professional networking website) to search 
for individuals that did not appear in Google searches; (5) keyword searches 
using Google (especially of public health advocacy organisations and industry 
trade association websites). This list was created using an Excel spreadsheet, 
which included information relevant to the potential interviewees’ involvement 
in obesity policy making. For example, organisational affiliation (e.g. academic 
institution, government department, advocacy organisation), previous/current 
roles and responsibilities, email address (obtained from websites), and a 
biographical note of their activities in this policy area. This list was constructed 
during the first stage of research, and was regularly updated to add potential 
interviewees. In total, 160 individuals were identified and added to this 
spreadsheet. Working from this initial list, 82 individuals were approached, 
based on posts that they had held (or continued to hold) that I felt were relevant 
to partnership working and public health policy making more broadly. The 
removal of 78 individuals from the list of potential interviewees was based on 
two criteria: the perceived closeness of fit between the professional occupation 
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and individuals and this research project; and whether there existed individuals 
within the same organisation and/or institution that I felt were better placed to 
talk about partnership working. During the fieldwork stage of the research, the 
spreadsheet was updated to reflect interviews that been undertaken (coloured 
green), interview date/time confirmed (amber), or requests that were refused 
and/or received no response (red). Using this process helped to manage the 
interviewing process, and was particularly useful in maximising time spent in 
London conducting fieldwork. 
 
In the end, 51 individuals agreed to be interviewed; a relatively high response 
rate of 64%, which suggests that people were willing to talk about their 
experiences of obesity policy. These individuals included civil servants and 
former civil servants who had held posts relevant to public health policy in 
central government departments and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), 
academic researchers, individuals involved in public health advocacy within civil 
society organisations, and representatives from national and sub-national trade 
bodies that represented the manufacturing and food retail sectors. The aim was 
to interview a wide range of policy-based individuals, which was intended to 
capture the perspectives of non-state actors that were involved in governance 
processes. As the research aimed to explore partnership with the food industry 
at UK and devolved level, I focused on interviewing individuals who had 
experience of this mode of governance. In order to explore the longer-term 
political context of this policy issue, I also focused on interviewing individuals 
who had worked in obesity policy for an extended period of time. As Table 3.1 
(below) illustrates, interviews were conducted with a cross-section of individuals 
based on professional position, with 23 being based in Scotland and 27 in 
England. It is important to note that, while the overall response rate was high, 
individuals from the DH were less willing to be interviewed (44%). While 
potential interviewees that declined to be interviewed did take the time to 
respond via email, the rationale for nearly all individuals that declined to 
participate was that they no longer worked in this policy area (as discussed in 
more detail later in this section). This compares to an extremely high response 
rate (85%) with individuals working within the Scottish government. While this 
may reflect a more open and consultative Scottish ‘policy style’ (Keating 2005), 
I would suggest that this access to policy makers in Scotland also related to 
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temporal aspects of policy processes (namely the increased time available to 
civil servants in the run up to elections; an issue discussed further in sub-section 
3.3.3). The response rate from individuals that worked in public health advocacy 
organisations was very high across both regions (82%), which is perhaps 
unsurprising given that many organisations had been critical of partnerships as 
a governance tool and were open to speaking about these policy processes. 
This also appeared to be a factor in the high response rate of academic 
researchers (69%), which is also likely to reflect a normative commitment 
among academics to engage with research projects. For example, in the small 
talk that preceded and/or followed interviews (for example, during the walk to 
the meeting room), various interviewees remarked on their personal interest in 
this research topic. While I felt that these types of comments were constructive 
statements intended to help with my visible nervousness, it also seemed to 
reflect underlying normative and principles beliefs that provided a rationale for 
being interviewed. On the other hand, the response rate from trade associations 
was low (57%). However, this is likely to reflect the focus on interviewing 
individuals who had subsequently moved to different occupational positions, 
often in a different sector. 
 
 
Having discussed interviewing with one of my supervisors (Smith), who had in-
depth knowledge of this methodological approach from her own experiences of 








Civil servants 7 12 19 58 
Public health 
advocates 
10 4 14 82 
Academic researchers 7 2 9 69 
Trade association 
representatives 
3 5 8 57 
Total 27 23 50 66.5 
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undertaking interviewees with policy-based individuals, I felt that guaranteeing 
anonymity (as had been the case during her research) was likely to be important 
in gaining access to individuals, and particularly those that had been involved 
in partnership working. On this basis, emails sent to potential interviewees 
included a consent form that described the steps taken to ensure anonymity, 
such as storing personal details and interview transcripts on a password 
protected external hard-dive (see Appendix III) In terms of gaining access more 
broadly, I used the information gathered on potential interviewees (see above) 
to personalise emails. This framed the interview in terms of my interest in their 
views and experience, rather than those of the department or organisation. For 
example, emails to potential interviewees referred to their occupation and 
experience of partnership working and/or obesity policy as the rationale for 
contacting them with a request for an interview. While this process was more 
time intensive than generic emails, various interviewees stated (both in email 
correspondence and face-to-face interviews) that this approach had influenced 
their decision to participate in my research. For example, an individual who was 
cautious about being interviewed was subsequently persuaded by follow-up 
emails that outlined my interest in this policy area and the contribution I felt that 
this interview would make to the research project, which made detailed 
reference to their work and involvement in policy making. To quote this 
individual, who stated that they received a ‘large and increasing number of these 
requests’, this contextualising information was key to their decision to 
participate in the research. While it is impossible to empirically assess whether 
generic emails would have adversely affected the overall response rate, it is 
evident that this approach was instrumental in securing access to individuals 
that might not have otherwise participated. 
 
A semi-structured approach to interviews was taken, using a thematic interview 
schedule that was structured around four core themes: (1) governance 
processes and the role of government; (2) commercial sector engagement in 
health policy making; (3) policy divergence and post-devolution policy making; 
(4) political and social context. Interview schedules were adapted, depending 
on the interviewee and region (see Appendix II). For example, interviews with 
UK-based civil servants included questions related to partnership working within 
the Department of Health and regulatory approaches of the UK government to 
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unhealthy commodity industries (notably, tobacco and alcohol). In addition, 
interview schedules were adapted to reflect policy developments, such as the 
announcement of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) as part of the Spring 
Budget in March 2016. In response, I added some questions about the 
perceived impact of SDIL and whether this had influenced the dynamics of 
policy discussions. Thematic interview schedules were adapted in the days 
leading up to the interview, used with the intention of covering core issues in a 
systematic way and providing questions that could steer discussion back to 
relevant topics (Duke 2002).  
 
Interviews took place between Spring and Autumn 2016, with most interviews 
in Scotland taking place between April and July, followed by interviews in 
England spread across three fieldwork trips between July and October. 
Interviews lasted between 20-120 minutes (although most were approximately 
55-60 minutes). The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face (68%) 
in a range of settings that varied from private offices and meeting rooms, and 
less frequently in cafés. The remainder of the interviews were via telephone or 
Skype (a video chat software) at the request of interviewees. While my aim was 
to conduct interviews face-to-face, this was not always possible for individuals 
who had busy schedules or expressed a preference for this type of interview 
(cf. Holt 2010). In almost all cases, this mode of interviewing was used for 
England-based individuals. As discussed above, this appeared to relate to the 
over-full diaries of individuals, but also the narrow window of opportunity for 
interviewing over the course of approximately 3 weeks spent in London 
conducting fieldwork. It is impossible to know whether this mode of interviewing 
affected the data in terms of substantive responses to interview questions. 
However, interviews conducted via telephone and Skype were qualitatively 
different from face-to-face interviews in some procedural respects. From a 
communicative perspective, a lack of non-verbal cues resulted in cross-talk, 
hesitations from both researcher and interviewee, and interruptions in dialogue. 
For instance, in the absence of visual communication, it proved challenging to 
differentiate between gaps in discussion during the interview, in which 
interviewees often paused to recall experiences or formulate a response, but 
also used a pause as a non-verbal marker to conclude a response to a question. 
In the early interviews, it became apparent that I was not creating space for 
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individuals to respond to interview questions. This was evident listening back to 
the audio files, which revealed a tendency to conflate the need for interviewees 
to pause, with a non-verbal cue to push ahead with the interview. While 
interviewees did not seem to find such interruptions problematic, I can’t help but 
feel that this negatively impacted on the flow of the interview. With this in mind, 
I decided to allow 2-3 seconds to elapse during pauses, which I hoped would 
give interviewees the space to explore their observations and experiences. 
While this meant that there could be brief silences, I felt that this was important 
in indicating that interviewees could take time to reflect on each question. Yet, 
in my own experiences of interviewing, a lack of non-verbal communication also 
had methodological and procedural advantages. From a methodological 
perspective, I felt that the inability to use facial or hand gestures (at least in 
telephone interviewing) had the effect of improving my interviewing technique 
and the phrasing of interview questions. As Holt (2010) observed in her use of 
telephone interviews, the lack of face-to-face interaction means that everything 
needs to be articulated. This focus on precise research questions helped in 
subsequent face-to-face interviews, which I felt were improved by my 
experiences of telephone interviewing. From a procedural perspective, 
telephone interviews allowed me to use a laptop and an interview schedule 
without feeling that this inhibited the flow or mood of the interview. In contrast 
to face-to-face interviews, in which I tried to minimise my use of an interview 
schedule, telephone interviewing allowed me to jog my memory of policy 
documents and use Google keyword searches to follow-up on interviewee 
comments. Overall, while face-to-face interviews would have been preferable, 
the resource limitations (both financial and temporal) inherent to PhD research 
meant that this was not always a feasible option. 
 
All interviewees were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix III) that 
allowed the interview to be digitally recorded and transcribed. In face-to-face 
interviews, interviewees would often bring a pre-signed form, although I always 
made sure to bring a copy with me. The negotiation of consent in telephone and 
Skype interviews varied. In some cases, individuals opted to email a signed 
consent form prior to the interview, while others requested that a consent form 
be signed and emailed after the interview had taken place (the window varied 
between a couple of hours and a few weeks post-interview). Within the latter 
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group, verbal consent was obtained prior to any questions being asked and 
digitally recorded. All interviews were transcribed, 17 by myself and the rest by 
a specialist transcription firm, which was funded through an ESRC Research 
Support Training Grant. This transcription specialist was recommended by one 
of my supervisors (Smith), and had been used by other public health academics 
working with confidential documents. In order to feel able to guarantee 
anonymity, a confidentiality and non-disclosure form was provided by the firm 
prior to any files having been sent for transcription. This requested that all staff 
who had access to recording signed an in-house confidentiality agreement, and 
required that all audio and electronic files be deleted on completion of 
transcription. 
 
The transcripts were then coded using the widely used qualitative data analysis 
software, NVivo 10 (QSR international). The coding framework was developed 
iteratively, based around the four core themes outlined above, in addition to 
creating a folder in the NVivo project that organised descriptive statements 
made by interviewees (i.e. verifiable facts). This involved moving between 
empirical data and theory, constructing codes using an abductive approach that 
focused on exploring actors’ understanding of their involvement in this policy 
area. In other words, I wanted to explain governance in terms of the 
perspectives of policy actors that were involved in these processes. The coding 
framework helped to organise the interview data, which I structured around 
patterns in the interview data, focused on the discourses and narratives 
employed by interviewees to describe policy processes. At an early stage in the 
coding process, I decided to use NVivo in a basic way, and opted not to use 
advanced query functions based on my awareness that this risked introducing 
rigid deductive elements into the analysis. So, I used the software as a tool to 
manage and search the data through iteratively developed codes, rather than 
explore its comparative functions. While I sometimes felt that this approach 
under-utilised the functionality of NVivo, I feel confident that it allowed me to 
reflect on emergent themes and ensure a degree of openness that interpretive 
research demands. While it is important to acknowledge that the interview 
schedule was deductive to the extent that it was informed by prior theoretical 
frameworks and ideas, I worked on the phrasing of interview schedule to frame 
questions as contingent and open-ended. This approach was focused on 
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precise, open questions that created space for interviewees to explore 
embodied meanings and experiences (Wagenaar 2011). This often involved 
adapting earlier interview schedules to reframe questions to allow interviewees 
to respond in more detail and allow the interviewee to develop their thoughts. In 
trying to balance the inductive and deductive dimensions of this research, I 
adapted the interview schedule to avoid closed questions that could be 
interpreted by interviewees as asking them to confirm a pre-determined 
hypothesis. 
 
3.3.2 The methodological literature on interviewing ‘elites’ 
 
Having adopted an interpretive approach to policy analysis, the first sequences 
of the research process (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000) were spent moving 
from ‘puzzles’ to research questions that could then be operationalized through 
fieldwork (Hendrik 2007). Having little experience of ‘researching up’ (Desmond 
2004), I turned to the methodological literature on interviewing ‘elites’ in 
preparation for the next phase of my research. However, the research 
encounters described in this literature were quite different from my own 
experiences in conducting interviews. This sub-section provides an overview of 
this methodological literature, and argues for a more reflexive consideration of 
the temporal dimension of interviewing as a method of interpretive research. 
 
The methodological literature on qualitative interviewing can be stylized as a 
dichotomy between research that focuses on the issues and challenges of 
researching vulnerable groups (Hugman, Pittaway, and Bartolomei 2011; Smith 
2008; Wright, Klee, and Reid 1998), and at the other end of the continuum, a 
literature that explores challenges imagined to relate specifically to researching 
‘elites’ (Mikecz 2012; Stephens 2007; Desmond 2004; Lilleker 2003; Bradshaw 
2001; Ostrander 1993). This literature argues that ‘elite’ groups are more difficult 
to research than other groups, and is characterised by journal papers that 
present ‘insider knowledge’ about how to access ‘elite’ groups and interviewing 
strategies to minimise the exercise of power over the research encounter. The 
inherent challenges of researching up is at the core of much of this literature, 
such as the following extract from Desmond’s (2004: 265) paper on the 
challenges of researching up: 
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‘Invariably, any attempt to map the researched-researcher relationship 
inevitably centres on the question of power and in particular its 
exploitative potential. This is because with elite interviewees the 
relationship is inevitably asymmetrical regardless of the research 
strategies deployed’. 
 
As the quotation above illustrates, the methodological literature relies on a 
dualism in relation to power that relies on categorising interviewees as ‘elites’ 
and the researcher as ‘non-elite’. In other words, power relations in interviewing 
up are conceptualised in terms of structural notions of power, in which power is 
embodied in the ‘elite’ and exercised in and through the interview space. This 
conceptualisation of power is visible in the methodological literature, in which it 
is assumed that an ‘elite’ individual can be demarcated from ‘non-elites’ through 
their professional positions (Smith 2006). It is unsurprising that multiple 
contributions to the literature on ‘elite’ interviewing focus on research strategies 
that can be utilised to mitigate power asymmetries. In her paper on interviewing 
individuals from privileged backgrounds involved in philanthropic organisations, 
Ostrander (1993) describes the micro-politics of the interview space and how 
this related to the power of ‘elites’ to shape interaction: 
 
‘In my experience, nonverbal strategies work best. I found it important 
for the interviewer to establish some visible control of the situation at the 
very beginning, even if the elite is momentarily set off balance’. 
 
‘[…] My friend suggested that I begin by arriving early and be sitting at 
his [the interviewee] table when came in. That would give me some time 
to get accustomed to the space and claim some of it as my own before 
he arrived. It worked like a charm. He appeared briefly taken aback and 
began by deferring to me and my research interests’. 
 
In both extracts, an emphasis is placed on attempting to reconfigure power 
relations through strategies that disrupted ‘elite’ individuals from exercising 
power. This approach is highly visible within the methodological literature, 
structured around guidelines for interviewing ‘elites’ that range from vague 
statements about the need to build trust and rapport (Lilleker 2003; Richards 
1996; Zuckerman 1972) to the notion that ‘elite’ individuals have pre-determined 
preferences for the length of interview and mode of questioning (Harvey 2011; 
Aberbach and Rockman 2002). 
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However, this structural conceptualisation of power relations has been 
problematised in other parts of the methodological literature, especially within 
the sub-field of feminist and human geography. From this perspective, power is 
conceptualised as complex and unstable, which is translated between social 
and political contexts in uncertain and fluid ways (Allen 2003). This 
poststructural lens conceptualises interviewing as a research encounter in 
which both the researcher and interviewee are multiply positioned, depending 
on the mode of interaction and topic(s) of discussion (Valentine 2002; McDowell 
1998). In contrast to structural perspectives, this lens creates space to 
conceptualise power as ambiguous and multi-directional. This argument is 
persuasively made by one of my supervisors, Smith (2006: 645): 
 
‘The idea that ‘elites’ can be neatly defined and treated as consistently 
powerful is a view which relies on the rather simplistic idea that there is 
a dichotomy between ‘powerful elites’ and ‘powerless’ others […] Such 
an outlook ignores the preposition that power exists in a variety of 
modalities, that these modalities of power can be negotiated and are 
neither constant nor inscribed and, consequently, that ‘elites’ may 
change over time (even during the course of one research project)’. 
 
Smith’s problematisation of power relations within the interview space as 
uncertain and variable, which reflects on the problematic idea of ‘elite’ 
individuals. This reflexive account argues that the extent to which interviewees 
are able to exercise power associated with their position should not be 
overstated, and that power within a profession is not necessarily automatically 
transposed to the interview space (Smith 2006). This poststructural lens allow 
for the possibility that an ‘elite’ individual can become, or experience feeling, 
vulnerable during the interviewing process. For example, Neal and McLaughlin 
(2009) offer a reflexive account of the experience of researching the work of a 
Commission on ethnicity and citizenship in the UK context, in which negative 
media coverage proved traumatic for many of the individuals involved in the 
production of the report. This paper describes how the authors felt uncertain 
how to respond to the emotional intensity of experiences recalled by 
interviewees, in which individuals that might be defined as ‘elite’ in terms of 
professional occupation were made vulnerable through retelling stories and 
memories of the media reception of the Commission’s report. While I did not 
perceive that interviews conducted in this research were as destabilising for 
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interviewees, I found that poststructural conceptions of power more closely 
reflects my own experience of interviewing policy-based individuals. 
 
This is not to minimise experiences in which I felt vulnerable in my role as a PhD 
researcher. Reflecting my status as a white Scottish male, I rarely felt 
disempowered researching this policy area. For instance, I was not made to feel 
self-conscious entering government buildings or the offices of non-state actors 
(even if I was feeling nervous). Having acknowledged this positionality, I should 
also make clear that the interviewing process was punctuated with interactions 
in which I felt interviewees exercised power in the research encounter. This is 
illustrated in the following extract, in which I felt the interviewee was quite 
obstructive when I asked if there were any other individuals who they felt it might 
be useful to interview: 
 
Interviewer: ‘Would it be possible to recommend some people to speak 
to in the department […]’ 
Civil servant: ‘Well, I mean, you can have a go at it. I mean, he’s [a 
colleague within the department] just taken over at [policy unit] so I don’t 
know what questions you would have for him […] I think I’m the person 
to speak to on all this stuff. I just don’t know what your questions are. I 
don’t know anyone who would be able to give you that perspective [on 
obesity policy]. I mean, if you have specific questions, but I don’t know 
what questions you would have apart from that. 
Interviewer: ‘I guess it’s just to get a cross-section of…’ 
Civil servant: [interrupting] I don’t know anyone else. I mean you could 
talk to [a non-departmental public body]. You could try and talk to 
somebody there, but it might be better if you write to them and just send 
them questions’. 
 
This was a discouraging experience, especially as it occurred at an early stage 
in the interviewing process. Although it is difficult to convey the mood of the 
interview (particularly as it was conducted via telephone), this marked a terse 
conclusion to an interview that I had hoped would help me gain access to 
potential interviewees within the department. Moreover, as by far the shortest 
interview (lasting 20 minutes), I felt there was very limited time to ask questions, 
despite the implication that I had exhausted areas of interest. While I was 
subsequently able to access and interview other individuals, this seemed to be 
quite a clear example of an individual exercising power available to them in their 
professional capacity, and as a sought-after interviewee. In a separate 
interview, a senior representative from a large trade association attempted to 
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demonstrate their authority by having me conduct the interview from a coffee 
table, while the individual sat at their desk. In addition, the interviewee 
announced that they had to attend a lunch meeting, at which point I was told 
that the interview could continue if was willing to walk for 5 minutes through 
central London to the restaurant. This felt like a rather absurd scenario, in which 
I felt the interviewee was attempting to underline that their time was significantly 
more valuable than mine. While this appears to support methodological 
literature that perpetuates the idea of the self-important ‘elite’, this was an 
unusual instance within the 50 interviews. More commonly, as the following sub-
section describes, the interviewing process was marked by complex and 
uncertain power relations.  
 
3.3.3 A reflexive account of interviewing 
 
This sub-section reflects on my experiences of the interviewing process, 
focusing on gaining access, and power relations in the interview space. Using 
a poststructural lens, I suggest that the discursive micro-politics of interviews 
provide a useful lens to examine how power is exercised in the interview space. 
This draws on experiences of conducting interviews with civil servants with a 
role in policy making, considering the ways in which temporality was employed 
by several participants in responding to interview questions that had the 
potential to render them vulnerable or destabilised. 
 
A key focus of the methodological literature is the assumption that ‘elite’ 
individuals are particularly difficult to access. Several authors have suggested 
that ‘elites’ are relatively under-researched due to the challenges of researching 
up (Mikecz 2012; Harvey 2011; Laurila 1997). For example, Hunter (1995) 
argues that the structural power of the ‘elite’ individual is embodied in an ability 
to protect themselves from criticism and unwanted requests. Having read much 
of this methodological literature in the first stage of my PhD research, I was 
prepared for negotiating access to be an extremely difficult process. However, 
this guidance was substantively different from my own experiences, in which 
gaining access to potential interviewees did not constitute the unique challenge 
that the methodological literature suggests. Indeed, having read multiple papers 
that emphasised the difficulty of gaining access (Mikecz 2012; Shenton and 
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Hayter 2004), I found it relatively straightforward to identify and access potential 
interviewees through websites and policy documents. Moreover, having 
approached the preliminary phase of the interviewing process with a sense of 
trepidation, I was frequently surprised at the willingness of individuals to 
participate in this research project. In contrast to the expectation that access 
would be obstructed by gatekeepers (Laurila 1997), my own experience was 
that individuals responded directly to emails even if this was to (in a small 
number of cases) to decline the request for an interview. Overall, this 
experience of researching suggests that gaining access to policy-based 
individuals may not be the problematic dimension of interviewing implied in the 
methodological literature (Mikecz 2012; Harvey 2011; Ostrander 1995), at least 
in the contemporary UK. While it is important to recognise that negotiating 
access depends on political and social contexts in which research takes place, 
the idea that access to professional individuals represented a unique 
methodological difficulty was a minimal feature of my experience of undertaking 
interviews. Indeed, it may be the case that the literature exaggerates the 
problems around access (Duke 2002). This appears to be, at least partially, due 
to the implicit assumption that the ‘elite’ is a taken for granted category of 
individual who share characteristics (identifiable by researchers) that demarcate 
them from ‘non-elite’ groups (Smith 2006). 
 
This final sub-section draws on the poststructural conceptualisation of power 
discussed above, to think about power relations using a discourse-analytical 
framework that illustrates time discourses as a toolkit used by interviewees in 
the research encounter. It is useful to distinguish this from temporal aspects of 
the interviewing process, in which timing had implications for negotiating access 
to potential interviewees. It is worth exploring these temporal factors, before 
moving on to explore the idea of discursive power. The timing of the interviewing 
process had some important implications in terms of the response rate from civil 
servants and the actual interviews themselves. In Scotland, gaining access and 
undertaking interviews was structured around the Scottish Parliament election 
that took place in May 2016. In part, this was coincidental and reflected the 
timing of the PhD itself. However, this sequencing was also a purposeful 
strategy to gain access to potential civil servant interviewees during the six-
week election period (colloquially referred to as ‘purdah’). The rationale that 
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underpinned this decision was the expectation that the work schedules of 
potential interviewees would be less full, as the political convention of ‘purdah’ 
precludes ministers and civil servants from taking decisions or making public 
announcements which may be significant or politically contentious. While it is 
impossible to know how many individuals would not have declined to be 
interviewed in ‘normal policy-making’, it is clear from my experiences of 
interviewing Scottish civil servants that the purdah period allowed them to 
engage with academic research in ways that may not have been feasible 
otherwise. For example, almost all interviewees were extremely flexible in 
relation to the timing of interviews (including multiple provisional dates and time 
slots), with interviews frequently lasting between 70 – 90 minutes. While it is 
likely that the ‘open and consultative’ style of policy-making in Scotland helps 
explain the high response rate (and was often referred to during interviews), 
interviewees implied that purdah allowed them to extend interviews to allow for 
further questions and discussion. While there was not such a purposeful 
strategy for interviewing individuals involved in policy debates at the UK level, 
the timing of this fieldwork overlapped with the House of Commons summer 
recess (24
th
 July – 4
th
 September 2016). While it is not clear how this affected 
the response rate, the recess did appear to free up diary space for individuals, 
with interviews (both face-to-face and telephone) clustering around this period. 
 
While I successfully gained access to civil servants working within UK and 
Scottish governments, I felt that many of the interviews with the civil servant 
interviewees were characterised by the exercise of discursive power within the 
interview space. Utilising a discourse-analytical framework, I argue that power 
can be exercised through discourses that use time to frame conversations within 
the research encounter. This focuses on interviews conducted with civil 
servants across both administrations. Drawing on my own experiences of the 
interviewing process, time was discursively constructed in terms of horizons, 
conceptualised in terms past, present, and future. Time horizons were 
employed by interviewees to make sense of the research encounter in terms of 
their current roles and responsibilities. This often involved responding to 
interview questions in a way that shifted the focus away from past decision-
making to future policies. For example:  
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Interviewer: ‘What would you see as the key mechanisms of partnership 
working?’  
Civil servant: ‘I think we need to design [partnership working] for the 
childhood obesity plan. I think what we’ve done is we have set out the 
stall of what we think needs to happen to tackle childhood obesity. I think 
what we will be doing in the coming weeks is working with partners and 
having conversations with them about what part they are going to play, 
and what will be the right ways of working in partnership with them’. 
 
Interviewer: ‘[…] UK governments emphasise the importance of working 
in partnership and I’m keen to get a sense of the ways in which you feel 
this rhetorical commitment influenced policy making?’ 
Civil servant: ‘Well don’t forget that that [the Responsibility Deal] was 
under the last [coalition] government. I mean, the voluntary partnership 
has not been closed down yet. I mean, how we go forward working with 
industry is part of our childhood obesity strategy. That will be announced 
this summer’. 
 
The quotations above capture the subtlety of this framing, in which these civil 
servants discussed interview questions in terms of future decision-making. 
While I sequenced the interview schedule to focus on expository discussion of 
the Responsibility Deal before moving on to more open-ended questions about 
partnership working, this ambiguity was useful for interviewees in reframing the 
conversation away from past governance arrangements to aspirations for the 
future. The consequence of such discourses is that it allowed interviewees to 
talk about partnership as an abstract concept, which precluded the concrete 
‘thick’ descriptions I had hoped these questions would generate. Indeed, re-
reading the interview transcripts I am aware of the subtle influence of this 
reframing on follow-up questions, which tended to reproduce this substantive 
focus on upcoming policy strategies. Although much of what was said in these 
discussions about future policies was interesting and relevant to my research, 
it left me with limited time to bring the interview back to my questions. On 
reflection, I feel that I could have identified conversation going off on tangents, 
and tried to steer it back to my research interest in descriptions of actual policy 
practices. In part, this reflects a fear that I might jeopardise access to other civil 
servants by gaining a reputation as confrontational. This was an anxiety that I 
would think about en route to the interview, particularly as interviewees had told 
me via email correspondence that they had already spoken to colleagues that I 
had interviewed. However, I feel that this framing was illustrate of a broader 
‘mood’ of interviews (Neal & McLaughlin 2009), in which civil servants appeared 
uncertain or reticent to talk about the past policy decisions. As Chapter 1 
 68 
outlined, the PIRU evaluation found little evidence to support claims that the 
operationalization of the Responsibility Deal would offer ‘more progress, more 
quickly, and with less cost than legislation’ (DH 2011: 2). Indeed, on more than 
one occasion, the partnership was referred to as having become a toxic policy, 
with various interviewees stating that this remained a very sensitive area for the 
DH. All this suggests that time horizons were used by some civil servants to 
create a distance between themselves and this policy failure. Time discourses 
were also visible in interviews with Scottish civil servants, in which interviewees 
constructed a boundary between the past and present as a means of framing 
the temporal dynamics of policy making. For example: 
 
Interviewer: ‘The first question I had was really where the idea to 
commission the British Standards Institute to develop a voluntary 
standard on marketing came from?’ 
Civil servant: ‘[…] I think looking back at it, I think we were probably a 
bit naïve ourselves. You’ve got to bear in mind that we were [pause] I 
mean, this is history really. Rather than of particular relevance to current 
public health policy, which is why going back on it now is a bit odd. It’s 
more of a history lesson’ […]  
Interviewer: ‘Just to pick up on something you mentioned, you described 
the decision-making process as quite a technical process. Could you 
expand on the dynamics of this process? 
Civil servant: ‘[…] you have got to bear in mind that this [a voluntary 
standard] was occurring at the same time as the Responsibility Deal that 
the UK government later abolished. That proved to be not worth the 
paper it was written on […] and that’s why we’ve ended up in the position 
we’re currently at with a [policy] document out for consultation that’s 




Like the above civil servant, most of the interviewees based in Scotland talked 
about partnership using time horizons that constructed a boundary between 
past governance and current policy strategies. In the above extract, the 
publication of a consultation document (entitled A Healthier Future: Action and 
Ambitions on Diet, Activity and Healthy Weight) is framed as helping to shift the 
policy agenda from past failures at the UK level. In other words, time discourses 
were used to create a distance between the past and present. Overall, the 
discursive construction of time horizons highlights the complex dimensions of 
power relations in research encounters. On the one hand, subtle framing 
processes shaped the topics and focus of interviews with civil servants, in which 
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interviewees appeared to rely on frames that allowed them to interpret questions 
in ways aligned with the existing direction of policy. Drawing on my own 
experience of interviewing, the use of time as a framing device existed at 
multiple points on a continuum between intentional and tacit action (Hajer and 
Laws 2006). For example, re-reading transcripts of interviews with civil servants 
working in the UK government, it seems clear that participants reframed the 
discussion away from politically sensitive topics. Indeed, it is evident looking 
back over written reflections and my embodied recollections of particular 
interviews that I felt I had received a ‘public relations’ account of policy making 
(Duke 2002). On the other hand, a poststructural conceptualisation of power 
challenges the notion that framing processes reflect the asymmetrical exercise 
of power by ‘elite’ interviewees. In contrast, the construction of distance reveals 
the inherent uncertainty of the research encounter (Bondi 2003), in which the 
topic of discussion had the potential to shift the power dynamic. This was the 
case for many of the interviews with civil servants working in the UK 
government, particularly around questions focused on the Responsibility Deal. 
As the above extracts illustrate, interviewees constructed temporal boundaries 
around what they were prepared to talk about, which implies that they felt 
uncomfortable discussing a policy that was highly sensitive. All this supports the 
interpretation of the research encounter as a discursive space in which the 
professional identities of interviewees can be become destabilised and 
uncertain. From this perspective, interviewees seemed to use temporal framing 
devices to position themselves in ways that avoided having to confront policy 
failures that could expose them both personally and professionally. As Smith 
(2006) argues, poststructural conceptions of power problematise the idea that 
power is embodied in individuals, and make space to consider the possibility 
that interviewees may feel vulnerable or exposed in the interview space. 
 
As I have outlined in this section, a discourse-analytical framework provides a 
lens to conceptualise power relations as ambiguous and uncertain. From a 
poststructural perspective, it is important not to overstate the power that is 
available to ‘elite’ interviewees in the interview space (Smith 2006). This is not 
to suggest that research participants do not exercise significant power, but that 
shifting power dynamics can manifest in ‘elite’ individuals becoming 
destabilised. Drawing on my own experiences, this section argues that 
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discursive power is fluid and multi-directional, and can be exercised and 
experienced in multiple ways. It demonstrates how the use of time boundaries 
can be employed by interviewees to reshape the focus of interview questions 
and/or demarcate some topics as not-for-discussion. In other words, 
interviewees can use references to time boundaries to exercise power within 
the interview space. 
 
3.3.4 Interviewing policy actors from the commercial sector 
 
This final section reflects on interviews with representatives of trade 
associations, which extends the analysis on the discursive micro-politics of the 
interview space in examining how industry representatives employed frames (or 
narratives) to manage the interview space. The section first gives a brief 
account of how power was discursively exercised through talking in the 
‘generalized present’ (Weiss 1995), which allowed interviewees to distance 
themselves from questions that aimed to elicit concrete descriptions of the role 
of industry actors in political decision-making. The section will then move on to 
consider the utility of interviews with commercial sector actors, contrasting the 
empirical focus of this research with the use of interview data in the wider 
literature focusing on how unhealthy commodity industries engage in policy 
debates. 
 
Overall, interviews with trade association representatives was a remarkably 
similar experience to those conducted with civil servants. Although the response 
rate was low relative to other types of policy actor this can be attributed to a 
combination of (i) individuals moving to equivalent positions in a different sector 
(e.g. banking); and (ii) backstage coordination between invited participants to 
designate a spokesperson for the organisation. As the following email 
correspondence illustrates, individuals who declined to be interviewed 
suggested that I speak to one of their colleagues: 
 
Trade association representative: ‘My colleague [X] passed the below 
email to me. I’m happy to sit down for an hour at some point in early 
September if that would suit? 
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This email highlights the enthusiasm of individuals for the views of their 
organisation to be captured in the research. Hence, while I found gaining access 
was relatively straightforward, interviews were limited to individuals who 
performed a ‘gate-keeping’ role for their organisation as a public relations and/or 
policy affairs spokesperson. Reflecting this, it became clear that there was a 
well-rehearsed ‘official line’ that interviewees communicated about the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of food industry engagement in policy debates. 
Moreover, this narrative was framed in ways that avoided concrete descriptions 
and provided broad generalized accounts that Weiss (1995) refers to as the 
‘generalized present’. As Wagenaar observes, generalized talk create a 
problem for policy analysis as it ‘masquerades as a series of descriptive, 
technical statements’, which ‘leaves us without sufficient detail to understand 
policy process and its effects’ (2011: 254). This framing was evident in several 
interviews and nicely captured in the following quotation: 
 
Interviewer: ‘[…] I was looking through the notes from a Health Select 
Committee report and noticed it mentioned that [interviewee’s trade 
association] were consulted on reports of [advisory committee]. I’m 
interested in how that works – do the [advisory committee] forward a 
draft or is it more collaborative? 
 
Trade association representative: ‘[..] we are on government’s radar as 
a stakeholder organisation for food and drink. So, whenever they are 
making policy in that area, typically they would ask us to be involved as 
I say in a [pause] a kind of outer ring. So not necessarily developing the 
policy […] we’re not involved in the decisions but the process is that they 
would reach out to a broader group of stakeholders and say: ‘this is the 
direction of travel’ 
 
 
The above quotation reveals the way in which the interviewee reframed the 
question in the generalized present, masquerading as a concrete description of 
their organisation’s engagement in a specific policy consultation. In this case, 
the interviewee downplays the political agency of their organisation in decision-
making, while reinforcing a claim about the food industry as a legitimate policy 
actor. This suggests that the generalized present was employed by 
interviewees as a discursive means to minimise the political strategies of food 
industry actors and avoid revealing details about specific incidents. Moreover, 
it is clear that this kind of narrative reproduced policy frames that had already 
been communicated in media coverage of political debates. For example, a 
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statement released by this trade association in response to the Health 
Committee report was also explicit in downplaying the political influence of the 
food industry. 
 
This raises questions about the value-added of interview data with trade 
association representations for examining the ‘black box’ of decision-making in 
partnerships, given that interviewees appeared to have a predetermined official 
line that aligned with policy positions stated in press releases, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reports, and policy briefings (Hawkins and Cassidy 2017). 
Although I found that civil servants similarly communicated an ‘official line’ about 
particular issues, these interviews also provided important insights into 
institutional and organisational processes. In contrast, the interview data 
provided by trade association representatives was more tightly bound to an 
‘official line’ that would often be repeated in response to different questions 
(Lancaster 2017). This is not to discount the relevance of interviews with 
individuals working for unhealthy commodity industries. Indeed, a study of 
debates about minimum unit pricing (MUP) used semi-structured interviews and 
publicly available documents to explore divergences in policy positions between 
different sectors of the alcohol industry (Holden et al 2013). More recently, a 
study of policy framing in media coverage of the Responsibility Deal (Douglas 
et al 2018) revealed the narratives used by public relations spokespersons to 
depict the food and alcohol industry as legitimate policy actors. As outlined 
above, I found the interview data was less relevant for research into decision-
making processes that were invisible to the media and wider public (a point 
explored in more detail in Chapter 5). Although it is hardly unexpected that 
interviewees representing industry interests sought to manage the interview 
space, this reflexive account helps to explain how power was exerted within the 





The final section of this methods chapter focuses on how interpretive research 
was practiced through analysing documents in relation to their content and 
context. This describes how I conceptualise documents as both vehicles of 
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discourses, and as artefacts (Freeman 2006) which function as the nexus of 
governing practices (Freeman & Maybin 2011). In interpretive terms, this 
approach focused on what documents mean, and how meanings are embedded 
in artefacts and practices. This is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-
section describes the process of document selection and outlines the rationale 
for including (and excluding) documents. The second section introduces 
framing theory and its use in interpretive policy analysis. The third and fourth 
sections then outline the notion of frames as story lines and practices, 
demonstrating how this conception of framing was used to explore the 
construction and operationalization of partnership. Having outlined this 
approach to frame analysis, I provide a reflexive account of how document and 
interview data were integrated in this research. 
 
3.4.1 Which documents? 
 
Having generated an empirical research question to explore how partnership 
has been constructed and operationalised in UK and Scottish administrations, 
the second phase of my research began with identifying policy statements that 
appeared of direct relevance to this question. The preliminary criteria had two 
dimensions for inclusion. First, documents should have a substantive focus on 
partnership as a mode of governance and/or have a specific policy focus on 
obesity (and diet-related ill health). Second, the time period should allow for 
partnerships operationalized under the Coalition government to be located in 
historical and political context (Prior 2008). For the purposes of this research, 
policy statements produced by previous Labour administrations
4
 were included, 
based on the rationale that public-private partnerships were central to Labour’s 
program to modernize governance (Newman 2001). 
 
The first stage was to map the policy landscape between 1997 – 2015. This was 
a recursive process, bouncing backwards and forwards between time periods 
and across regions. The aim of this mapping exercise was to locate documents 
in a way that retained an openness and interpretive flexibility that avoided 
                                                
4
 Labour retained power as a majority government in the UK between 1997 – 2010, and formed 
two consecutive coalition governments in Scotland with the Liberal Democrats between 1999 – 
2007. 
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excluding policy documents that might have been potentially useful to my 
research. Yanow’s (2006: 12) description of interpretive research as analogous 
to piecing together a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle, captures my own 
experiences of mapping documents to analyse. The first step in this process 
was to search for policy statements related to partnerships between 
governments and food industry actors in obesity policy between 2010 – 2015. 
At the UK level, keyword searches of government websites were used to locate 
policy statements with a specific focus on the Responsibility Deal. In Scotland, 
searches of the government website located documents relevant to the 
Supporting Healthy Choices framework. This was straightforward, as 
partnership documents reflected an active policy approach for UK and Scottish 
governments. In addition, keyword Google searches [using search terms in 
various combinations] were used to identify media reporting on partnerships. 
While media attention was very limited (a point discussed in Chapter 5), various 
articles by Felicity Lawrence (The Guardian’s special correspondent on the 
politics of food) highlighted a public health commission, created by the 
Conservative party while in opposition to assess policy proposals for a 
Responsibility Deal. This helped to inform searches of the UK Web Archive
 
(an 
archive maintained by the British Library which gives permanent access to 
websites no longer available on the live web) for documents relating to this 
commission. The second step was to expand this focus through searches for 
documents produced by UK and Scottish administrations between 2010 – 2015, 
and diachronic (over time) searches for policy statements produced by Labour 
administrations between 1997 – 2010. This focused on keyword Google 
searches for policy statements, intertextual references made in documents, and 
my background knowledge of UK health policy (Ulijaszek and McLennan 2016; 
Baggott 2013; Smith 2013b; Jebb, Aveyard, and Hawkes 2013; Smith et al. 
2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the flexibility of the inclusion criteria produced a 
large number of policy documents relevant to partnership and/or obesity policy. 
This included: White Papers, Green Papers, select committee reports, working 
papers, and annual reports from NDPBs (e.g. the National Audit Office). 
Appendix IV provides illustrative examples of these types of documents. In order 
to keep track of these documents, I maintained an archive that provided a brief 
outline of each document (and hyperlinks for archived sources), publication 
year, and organisational affiliation (e.g. the Department of Health). Indeed, it 
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was the time intensive process of working through this information that I realised 
I had to produce a list of documents that would be feasible to analyse within the 
time and resource constraints of a PhD research project. With this in mind, I 
made the decision to include policy statements which had a substantive focus 
on the role of government and non-state actors in partnership. These 
reconfigured boundaries for inclusion produced a list of 25 documents to 
analyse. This was broadly demarcated into two types of document: (i) White 
Papers and Green Papers produced by administrations between 1997 – 2015 
that focused on obesity and/or food policy; (ii) drafts, consultative documents, 
and working papers which related to the formulation and implementation of 
partnerships in relation to obesity and/or food policy. The documents that I 
decided not to include were used as background texts (Shaw 2010) that helped 
to situate partnership within a historical and political context. 
 
The second stage in this process was to generate documents that related to 
partnership working. This involved searching for documents through which 
governance processes are organised and reproduced: agendas, meeting 
minutes, memos, and reports. I began this process by searching for texts using 
Google keyword searches. This process was made easier by the fact that 
partnerships in both UK and Scottish contexts were active strands of policy and 
had ‘live’ government webpages during the data generation phase of the 
research
5
. For example, papers from plenary group and steering group 
meetings were published on the Responsibility Deal webpage, including 
agendas and memos for all meetings held between March 2011 – November 
2014. Although the Scottish government website did not have a dedicated 
webpage, meeting documents were uploaded to the Health and Social Care 
page. These documents helped to inform subsequent Freedom of Information 
(FOI) requests, which I discuss in more detail later in this section. Having 
outlined the rationale for including certain documents, the following sub-section 
introduces the concept of framing and how this was used to explore narratives 
and stories in policy statements. 
 
                                                
5




3.4.2 Framing theory  
 
The concept of frames (and framing theory) has an established intellectual 
tradition in policy studies, notably the symbolic interactionist ideas of Goffman 
(1974) and the behavioural psychology of Tversky and Kahneman (1981). The 
use of frame analysis in policy studies is associated with the Schön and Rein’s 
(1996;1977) analysis of policy controversies (Laws and Rein 2003). Building on 
Rein’s (1983) earlier conceptualisation of frames, this later work with Schön is 
widely cited in interpretive research (Hulst and Yanow 2014; Schmidt 2011; 
Béland 2009). Indeed, framing has become a key concept and methodological 
approach of interpretive policy analysis (Wagenaar 2011). 
 
The concept of framing, as developed by Schön and Rein (1994) adopts a 
constructivist ontology in viewing the social world as indeterminate and 
contested, in which reality is constructed in and through framing. This ontology 
approximates a critical realist perspective, in interpreting reality as essentially 
under-determined by ‘brute’ facts about the material world (Searle 1995). 
Framing theory therefore starts from the assumption that policy processes are 
inherently ambiguous and lack agreed-upon definitions or understandings of a 
given issue. Rein and Schön (1994) observe that it is this indeterminacy that 
leads to intractable policy controversies, in which there is the potential for a 
multiplicity of frames to shape policy debates. Hajer (2006) refers to this as the 
phenomenon of multi-signification. This term describes how actors make sense 
of policy events by drawing implicitly or explicitly on ‘systems of signification’ 
(for example, frames, narratives, discourses). The actors involved in 
controversies ‘contend with one another over the definition of a problematic 
policy situation […]’ (Rein & Schön 1994: 29). Rein and Schön (1994: 23) argue 
that frames help to order the social world as ‘underlying structures of belief, 
perception, and appreciation’. In Goffman’s (1974: 8) description, framing 
happens when individuals interact with situations and face the question: ‘What 
is going on here?’. Frames, in other words, guide the ways in which actors 
construct the realities of the social world. 
 
As Hajer and Laws (2006) argue, the frame concept has an intuitive appeal. In 
their words, it ‘captures something about the dynamics of policy making that 
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makes sense to practitioners and to those who analyse policy practice’. The 
usefulness of this concept is reflected in the use of framing as an ordering 
device for researchers working in a wide range of academic fields, notably social 
movement studies (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) and 
public health (Larsen 2010; Dorfman, Wallack, and Woodruff 2005; Lawrence 
2004). While frames are used in a variety of ways, a key assumption is that 
framing helps to structure reality and functions to stabilise meaning in complex 
or uncertain situations (Rein 2011). For instance, Schön and Rein (1996) use 
the everyday language of a picture frame as a metaphor to define a frame, 
observing that the frame focuses our attention to the content inside it. In more 
abstract terms, ‘whatever is said of a thing, denies something else of it’ (Rein & 
Schön 1977: 239). This notion is also shared by Snow and Benford (Snow and 
Benford 1992), who define a frame as ‘an interpretive schemata that signifies 
and condenses the “world out there”. Taking this definition of frames as the 
starting point, my approach understood frames more specifically as story lines, 
and ordering devices that form the basis of discussion and practice (Laws and 
Rein 2003). The following sub-sections clarify each term and describe how this 
underpinned the analysis of policy documents. 
 
3.4.3 Frames as policy stories 
 
First, framing is used in this research to refer to policy stories that narrate a 
problem-centred discourse (Laws & Rein 2003). In this account, frames are 
normative-prescriptive stories that make sense of what has been going on, what 
is going on, and what need to be done (Hulst & Yanow 2014). That is, policy 
stories are temporal, taking us from one place to another (Feldman et al. 2004). 
A good example is Stone’s notion of causal stories: 
 
‘Definitions of policy problems usually have a narrative structure; that is, 
they are stories with a beginning, middle and an end, involving some 
change or transformation […] the story line in policy writing is often 
hidden, but one should not be thwarted by the surface details from 
searching for the underlying story. Often what appears as conflict over 





Story lines therefore ‘do particular kinds of work’ (Forester 1993) as a way of 
ordering and constructing shared meaning. The ‘future-directedness’ (van Hulst 
2012) of policy stories incorporates a certain kind of work that glues together a 
problematic situation, attributes responsibility, and advocates for particular 
solutions (Czarniawska 1997). As Weick (1995) observes, stories do not need 
to be accurate, but simply plausible. As he puts it, what is important is that story 
lines have a coherence that ‘holds disparate elements together long enough to 
energize and guide action’ (Weick 1995: 61). This might involve the use of 
myths or metaphors that tie discursive elements together and provide a 
persuasive depiction of reality (van Hulst 2012). Returning to the work of Rein 
and Schön, story lines are important because they give coherence to policy 
issues (1996), and mediate between what is, but also what ought to be (1977). 
The notion that partnerships could be interpreted in terms of stories was an 
inductive element of the research that emerged in the process of conducting 
frame analysis of policy statements. It is worth reflecting on this process in more 
detail, before we move on to discuss the second approach to framing. 
 
From the outset of the analysis phase of the research, I had intended to adopt 
a flexible approach to framing that would be able to capture and map the 
different ways in which partnership was framed. This approach to analysing 
documents adopted the ‘naming and framing’ approach to analysis set out by 
Rein and Schön (1977), which I was confident would help to identify the ways 
in which partnership was framed in policy statements. As Rein and Schön 
argue: 
 
‘[…] the process of framing is complementary to a process of naming. 
We cannot frame a field of experience without also generating a context 
for the naming of elements within the frame. And just as frames give us 
a way of seeing some things and of not seeing other things, so names 
call our attention to certain features of elements. Whatever is said of a 




In relation to this research, I combined this naming approach with the recent 
contribution to frame analysis by van Hulst and Yanow (2014), who talk about 
selecting and categorizing as complementary to Rein and Schön’s framework: 
 79 
framing processes select some things as relevant, backgrounding or ignoring 
others, and it categorizes (itself a form of naming) events and objects as this 
thing but not that thing (van Hulst and Yanow 2014: 8). For example, the term 
‘Public Health Responsibility Deal’ selects particular aspects of governance as 
relevant (the notion of corporate social responsibility), it categorizes (a mutual 
agreement and not a contractual arrangement), and it names the partnership in 
ways that lay the conceptual groundwork for future courses of action (that 
makes it clear that this policy is collaborative and not hierarchical). 
 
Policy statements were coded using NVivo 10 (QSR International). The 
approach taken to frame analysis was to create four overarching categories that 
would be used to guide analysis: selecting, categorizing, naming, and story 
lines. This approach to interpretive policy analysis aimed to generate ‘thick’ 
descriptions that would help me to trace the framing of obesity and the ways in 
which partnership was talked about in policy statements. This involved 
analysing each document using this multifaceted approach, a process that 
required multiple readings to focus on each framing device. This was an iterative 
process, in which material was organised in codes that formed sub-sets of these 
framing processes. For example, a categorizing node6 was created, under 
which I created sub-nodes that coded material relevant to this framing (e.g. 
references in policy statements to ‘multi-stakeholder’ approaches). During the 
early stages of frame analysis, I created multiple codes that I felt were relevant 
to understanding the discursive construction of partnership approaches. These 
initial codes were subsequently adapted in response to discursive patterns that 
emerged from coding multiple documents. In my own experience, frame 
analysis was a continual process of adaptation, in which preliminary codes were 
added, removed, and merged depending on themes and patterns that I felt 
emerged from the empirical data.  
 
Even with the use of data analysis software, this process of frame analysis was 
a laborious process that generated a huge volume of data that I was unable to 
discuss within the constraints of the thesis (e.g. policy statements produced by 
                                                
6
 Nodes are central to coding using NVivo software. In this research, I refer to the QSR definition 
of nodes as a tool to gather material in one place to enable identification of emerging themes and 
ideas. 
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the Coalition government that discussed the use of insights from behavioural 
economics as a policy solution). However, I felt that this immersion was crucial 
in unpacking how policy statements constructed obesity as a policy problem. As 
Hendriks (2007) reflects in a methodological paper that shares her experiences 
of PhD research, engaging deeply in interpretive data has the downside of what 
she refers to as ‘over-immersion syndrome’. This description precisely captures 
my own experience, in which I recall believing that I had generated too much 
data and began to feel that I was drowning in material (Hendriks 2007: 287). On 
reflection, this painstaking immersion was indispensable in connecting 
emerging themes in the empirical data to the meso-level theories that I began 
to explore in parallel to this coding phase of the research.  
 
As highlighted above, this research draws on policy stories as the framing 
device that I felt offered clarity and accurately reflected the empirical data. While 
it is difficult to precisely identify when the analysis moved to focus on policy 
stories, this shift occurred during the writing up phase of the research. It was at 
this stage that I felt better placed to distinguish a meta-narrative (Roe 1994) 
across policy statements, which highlighted discourses and assumptions used 
to legitimate partnership with food industry actors as a dominant governance 
tool (this argument is developed in Chapter 4). 
 
3.4.4 Frames as practices 
 
The second approach to interpreting documents was to view framing as a 
distinctive feature of practice. The significance of this approach is that 
discourses do not simply ‘float’ in documents, but are related to particular 
practices (Hajer 1995). The practice-oriented perspective of frames was a 
feature of Schön and Rein’s (1994) later work (cf. Wagenaar 2011), which 
developed a conception of frames as organising frameworks (or road maps). As 
Schön and Rein state: 
 
‘Each story constructs its view of social reality through a complementary 
process of naming and framing […] They select for attention a few 
salient features and relations from what otherwise would be an 
overwhelmingly complex reality. They give these elements a coherent 
organization, and they describe what is wrong with the present situation 
in such a way as to set the direction for its future transformation. Through 
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the processes of naming and framing, the stories make a “normative 




As the above extract illustrates, frames are described as stories that reduce 
complexity and provide a guide for doing and acting (cf. Laws & Rein 2003; 
Schön & Rein 1996). In other words, frames mediate the relationship between 
thought and practice in policy making (Laws & Rein 2003). My approach to 
analysing frames as practices draws on the discourse-analytical framework 
developed by Hajer and Wagenaar (2003). This approach refers to discourse 
as: 
 
‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which 
meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and which is 
produced and reproduced in an identifiable set of practices’. 
 
[Hajer 2005: 448] 
 
From this perspective, discourse and practice ‘co-construct’ policy through 
institutional practices (Hajer 2003). In relation to my own interpretive approach, 
this conception of discursive practice (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) 
was useful in structuring the frame analysis of policy documents. In particular, I 
expected that the framing of partnership in policy statements might plausibly be 
reproduced in the documents that are produced and used as part of policy 
making. More specifically, I was interested in exploring whether narratives that 
were revealed in frame analysis of policy statements appeared to have become 
sedimented in institutionalised rules and organizational practices (Hajer 2009). 
In order to explore discursive practices, I used frame analysis of documents to 
explore how narratives visible in policy statements were reproduced in the 
practices of partnership working. This used documents produced through 
stakeholder meetings to trace how discourses related to practice (Hajer 1995). 
The rationale for using documents relates to the notion that the materiality of 
the document is central to governance processes. This shifts attention from 
substantive content of policy statements to the ‘work that the document does’ in 
structuring governing practices. As Freeman states: 
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‘Documents are important for the vocabularies and ways of thinking they 
generate, reproduce, translate, and set in motion. But they are also 





In this way, documents are material traces (and triggers) of governance 
processes (Czarniawska 2010). Take the coordinative work of an agenda: it 
organizes the meeting, framing the issues that are to be commented on, 
revised, and drafted. In this way, documents are the nexus of governing 
practices, produced in, by and for groups. Documents are the material corollary 
of the meeting, and the artefact through which frames are reproduced. As 
Freeman and Maybin observe: 
 
‘Documents tell stories […] This is not because they carry words that 
comprise a narrative, but because they embody the political processes 
by which they are produced’. 
 
[2011: 164] 
I felt that this focus on the ‘social life’ (Brown and Duguid 1996) of partnership 
documents would help to explore how this mode of governance had been 
operationalized, which could then be compared with narratives revealed 
through frame analysis. In particular, I was interested in tracing the influence of 
food industry actors in shaping discursive practices. In other words, I felt that 
the sequence of documents and how they are produced would reveal much 
about the extent to which decisional processes reflected the result of 
collaboration between government actors and the commercial sector. 
 
This process involved using FOI requests as a means of generating data on 
decision-making in informal spaces of governance that I felt would be able to 
contextualise documents produced through stakeholder meetings. This 
approach aimed to build on a paper by Panjwani and Caraher (2014) focused 
on the Food Network of the Responsibility Deal that used FOI requests to 
examine the revision of voluntary industry commitments. Drawing on this 
analysis, FOI requests were used to further unpack the decision-making 
process. This was a time-consuming process in which requests were bounced 
back and forth with civil servants working in government freedom of information 
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teams. While requests submitted to the Scottish government generated a 
significant volume of documents, FOI submissions made to the UK Department 
of Health was a frustrating process. Although I was able obtain documents 
through persistence, FOI teams would take 20 working days (the time limit for 
compliance) in responding to requests, even if this was to refuse requests where 
it estimated that compliance would exceed the appropriate limit (£600 for central 
government). This exemption was applied to the first wave of FOI requests (8 
in total) which aggregated under Section 12(4) of the FOI Act for the purposes 
of calculating costs. These submissions had a broad scope, requesting 
information on interactions between Department of Health policy makers and 
multiple food industry actors (for example, Mars and Tesco) in addition to 
documents relating to all meetings that had taken place between May 2010 – 
February 2011. Reflecting back on this process, I had naïvely assumed that this 
blanket approach to requesting information would help to access ‘known 
unknown’ documents (Pawson, Wong, and Owen 2011). Yet, this process was 
made more difficult by the interpretive flexibility that officials appeared to have 
in estimating the cost of complying with requests, with varying estimates of how 
long it would take to review files (between 3 – 4 minutes). Yet the estimated 
time to review files seemed to be calculated with the appropriate limit in mind, 
in the absence of an explicit rationale for why particular groups of files would 
take longer to review. For example: 
 
‘A search of our records for [X] has returned over 800 files between 11 
May 2010 and 14 March 2011 […] We estimate that it would take 3 
minutes to review each file for any information relevant to your request. 
Therefore, to check our records would exceed the cost limit’. 
 
‘A search for our records has returned over 500 files between 1 January 
and 1 July 2010 […] We estimate that it would take 4 minutes to review 
each file for any information relevant to your request. Therefore, to check 
our records would exceed the cost limit.’ 
 
As part of its analysis of FOI trends, the Institute for Government (an 
independent think tank established to improve government effectiveness) found 
that the use of cost limits to refuse requests had significantly increased since 
2010 (Institute for Government 2018). Moreover, Institute for Government 
analysis highlights that the percentage of requests withheld by government 
departments has increased by over a third since 2010. This observed that the 
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way central government departments (including the Department of Health) 
respond to FOI requests has noticeably shifted, with more than 60% of requests 
granted in full in 2011, to fewer than 40% in 2017. While it is almost impossible 
to infer whether the handling of my requests was motivated by instrumental 
interests to withhold information, it became increasingly clear that a different 
approach to FOI was required. Following informal discussions with academic 
peers and interviewees that had faced similar challenges in gaining access to 
documents, I decided to focus on tracing interaction between Department of 
Health policy makers and the food and beverage manufacturing trade 
association (the Food and Drink Federation). The rationale for this approach 
was that I would be able to request information over an extended period, but 
avoid cost limits that been applied to earlier requests. This approach proved to 
be much more effective in generating documents, particularly as I had adapted 
my request template (see Appendix I) to precisely state the policy unit (within 
the Department of Health) that I was requesting information from, within a 
clearly demarcated time period (between 3 – 5 months). 
 
The methodological approach to analysing frames as practice required 
interpreting documents in a different way from narrative analysis of story lines. 
In taking practice as the analytical framework, I was interested in exploring the 
relationship between the discursive construction of partnership and the actual 
practices that characterised this mode of governance in the UK and Scottish 
context. In other words, this approach to frame analysis centred on examining 
discursive practices and how this related to claims made in policy statements. 
In order to capture this, a separate NVivo project was created that focused on 
key aspects of practice that inductively emerged from the empirical material. 
This project included nodes that organised coding according to decision-making 
procedures and accountability processes (and sub-nodes to capture what I felt 
were important aspects of institutional design and operational routines). In 
addition, frame analysis focused on normative-prescriptive stories that were 
visible in partnership documents and the kinds of work (Forester 1993) that 
policy stories achieved for food industry actors. In terms of organisation, 
documents were collated in folders corresponding to plenary and steering group 
meetings with a separate folder created for documents generated from FOI 
requests. Documents were analysed iteratively, and in temporal sequence. In 
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the UK context, it involved moving back and forth between email 
correspondence generated from FOI requests, and documents produced 
through meetings. This process was similar in Scotland, but instead focused on 
documents generated through FOI related to the development of a Publicly 
Available Specification (PAS) on responsible marketing of food and drink. This 
approach to frame analysis focused on tracing decision-making in the informal 
spaces of governance (Ayres 2017), tracking subtle revisions to documents. 
While this process-oriented approach has an obvious correlate with the 
methodological literature on ‘process tracing’ (Trampusch and Palier 2016), I 
have avoided using this term to describe my approach on the basis that this 
literature is often associated with drawing causal inferences and hypothesis 
testing (Mahoney 2010; Collier 2011) that I felt might pull in a different direction 
from my research aims. This is not to argue that process tracing is incompatible 
with interpretive policy analysis (and concepts used in this literature do inform 
the thesis), but reflects an attempt to avoid confusion about the methodological 
approach. Overall, this approach to frame analysis explored the ways in which 
discourses appeared to have undergone a process of institutionalisation (Smith 
2013b) and become embedded in the operational rules and norms of 
partnership working. 
 
3.5 Integrating methodological approaches  
 
The final section of this chapter briefly explains how interviewing and document 
analysis were integrated during fieldwork and writing up phases of the research. 
First, policy statements were employed during fieldwork as a point of reference 
for interviewees in responding to interview questions. Indeed, I would often ask 
interviewees which policy documents they felt had informed the policy 
approaches of UK and Scottish governments, and why they perceived certain 
policy statements to have been influential. This often involved printing physical 
copies of policy statements to bring to interviews that I hoped would function as 
a point of reference for conversation (Maybin 2016). This technique helped to 
focus interview questions around a material artefact that the interviewee could 
read over, and was often crucial in helping to jog the memory of interviewees 
(however, this did not seem to impact the use of time boundaries by 
interviewees, as discussed in sub-section 3.3.3). Second, the interview data 
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provided by interviewees was triangulated (Flick 2014) with the accounts of 
other interviewees and documents related to partnership working, in order to 
validate statements about particular meetings or decision-making processes. 
Yet, it is important to emphasize that triangulation was used to establish 
empirical facts that exist independent of interviewee perceptions and beliefs 
(Kelly and McGoey 2018). Reflecting the interpretive approach to studying 
partnerships, this research explores how policy actors construct narratives 
about the political world and rejects the idea that there is a ‘real world’ 
independent of the experiences and perceptions that construct it (Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea 2014). 
 
I began this research project with the intention of completing frame analysis of 
policy statements and meeting and FOI documents before starting the 
interviewing process. However, this sequenced approach was adapted to 
maximise the window of opportunity provided by the purdah period in the run-
up to the Scottish parliamentary election. In retrospect, I feel that this had both 
positive and negative consequences for the research project. On the one hand, 
responses to interview questions helped me to identify which documents were 
interpreted as important by those involved. For example, interviewees 
repeatedly mentioned the PAS as a feature of post-devolution obesity policy 
making, which motivated FOI requests submitted to the Scottish government to 
generate documents on this process. Yet, it is not at all clear that I would have 
made this interpretive link from frame analysis of policy statements and draft 
papers, in which this policy is only briefly mentioned. This is illustrative of how 
interviewing changed the way I looked at policy developments, and explore 
research themes that were less visible in documents. On the other hand, I feel 
that a more in-depth understanding of policy statements and partnership 
documents would have helped in probing interviewees through follow-up 
questions, but also to more effectively manage situations where interviewees 
(and particularly civil servants) responded with semi-official discourses or went 
off on tangents. In retrospect, there were instances where I felt that an 
immersion in policy developments would have been useful in adapting 
questions within the interview space as an interviewing technique to deal with 
the subtle discursive power often exercised by interviewees. Returning to PAS 
example, having completed analysis of documents generated from FOI prior to 
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an interview with a Scottish policy maker, I felt able to minimise my use of an 
interview schedule and formulate questions during the interview that were 
grounded in concrete events. While it is difficult to predict if and how the 
interviewing process might have been different, I feel that a more in-depth 
knowledge of documents would probably have been helpful in interviewing. 
 
Second, I have used the term of ‘writing up phase’ as a shorthand to simplify 
what was a messy process of interpretive analysis that meant drawing on 
theoretical, empirical and methodological insights (Law 2004) that did not 
always cohere. As reflexive methodological texts on doing interpretive policy 
analysis outline (Boswell & Corbett 2015; Hendriks 2007), this can be a painful 
exercise, in which the researcher needs to disconnect from preliminary ideas or 
mini-theories to produce interpretive policy research. This captures my own 
experience of this phase of the research. For me, the writing process was an 
endless source of frustration and confusion, but also an exciting and reflexive 
phase of the research in which my initial understandings were transformed (and 
discarded) as ideas were reinterpreted in response to data generated from 
interviews and frame analysis. For example, the first draft chapter on 
accountability (Chapter 5) was intended to focus on corporate political 
strategies, but shifted to examine how institutional design was used to limit 
government responsibility for accountability mechanisms and depoliticise this 
process. Yet, it was only through searching back through interview data that I 
was able to reinterpret working papers and meeting notes through the lens of 
depoliticization. This is illustrative of my experiences of doing interpretive 
research, in which understanding governance was a messy process of working  










The thesis is structured into four empirical chapters. Chapters 4 – 6 focus on 
the UK context, while Chapter 7 explores policy developments in Scotland. The 
structure of empirical findings chapters reflects the interpretive approach used 
in this research project, in which I felt that the themes emerging from data 
analysis could be communicated more effectively through a more fluid chapter 
structure than a cross-case comparative study would allow. Consequently, the 
finding chapters are structured thematically around core dimensions of 
governance. This follows a broadly temporal narrative that traces: the 
operationalization of partnership ideas (Chapter 4); accountability mechanisms 
(Chapter 5); informal governance (Chapter 6); and the institutionalisation of 
partnership at the devolved level. 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the structure of policy ideas underpin the institutional 
design and discursive practice of partnership in the UK context. This argument 
makes two claims: (1) partnership ideas are malleable in ways that allow actors 
to interpret and transform its meaning; (2) this malleability has been used to 
frame partnership as a tool to displace responsibility from government. In order 
to make this argument, the chapter is organized into three sections. The first 
section explores the institutionalisation of partnership as the preferred mode of 
governance under Labour governments in power between 1997 – 2010. It 
describes how this idea was operationalized, identifying a rhetoric-reality gap 
between partnership discourses and practice using a case study of salt 
reduction strategies developed under the Food Standards Agency (FSA). The 
second section then describes the transformation of this policy idea by the 
Conservative party. It traces the construction of the Responsibility Deal in key 
policy statements produced during the Conservatives’ period in opposition 
(focusing specifically on the period between 2008 – 2010). The third section 
concentrates on the operationalization of partnership under the Coalition 
government. It focuses on the transfer of policy functions from the FSA to the 
DH following the 2010 general election, assessing the discourses used by the 
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Coalition government to frame this reform as necessary to operationalize 
genuine partnership between government and the food industry. Overall, this 
chapter examines the operationalization of partnership, understood as an 
interplay of ideas, interests, and institutions. 
 
4.2 New Labour, 1997 – 2010 
 
The period spanning 1997 – 2010 was one of electoral dominance for New 
Labour, and in relation to food policy was characterised by institutional 
innovation and ideational creativity coupled with the implementation of 
partnership approaches. In its first term, New Labour delegated policy 
responsibilities for important aspects of food policy to a UK-wide regulatory body 
in the form of the Food Standards Agency (FSA), constitutive of its ‘third way’ 
policy agenda (Flinders 2004; Barling and Lang 2003). This was followed by 
rhetorical commitments to fostering ‘partnership’ between governmental 
agencies and non-state actors, with particular emphasis on engaging the food 
industry. From 2003, the Food Standards Agency led an industry-wide salt 
reduction initiative, receiving backing by the Department of Health and 
ministerial support. Five years later, commitments made in the Healthy Weight 
Healthy Lives White Paper (Department of Health, 2008) to promote 
responsible food industry practices were translated into the Healthy Food Code 
of Good Practice partnership. This section starts by assessing the creation of 
the Food Standards Agency and the ‘third way’ of partnership as a response to 
the perennial dilemmas faced by governments in increasing accountability, 
effectiveness, and transparency (Hood, 2007; Flinders, 2004). 
 
4.2.1 New forms of governance: the Food Standards Agency  
 
Following their landslide victory in the 1997 general election, the incoming 
Labour government was keen to emphasise their commitment to addressing the 
perceived governance failures of the previous Conservative government. The 
timing of the BSE crisis, which had rapidly unfolded over the previous year, 
provided an opportunity for Labour to institutionalise a ‘new governance’ 
(Newman, 2001). Writing in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Jasanoff 
noted the civic dislocation between what institutions were supposed to do and 
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what they actually did (Jasanoff 1997). Tasked with balancing the interests of 
consumers and industry. the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food 
(MAFF) sought to downplay public health concerns that might risk the economic 
interests of the agricultural sector and food industry (Zwanenburg and Millstone 
2005), and failed to provide credible reassurance to citizens (Jasanoff, 1997). 
The growing public distrust of government institutions in the wake of this 
institutional breakdown created a window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984) for the 
Labour Party to articulate a ‘new’ form of delegated governance (Flinders, 
Dommett, and Tonkiss 2014; Thatcher and Sweet 2002). 
 
As the leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair commissioned Professor Philip 
James, Director of the Rowett Institute, to write a report containing 
recommendations for a new food standards body. Received by Blair in May 
1997, the James report recommended that rebuilding public trust mandates that 
a new agency should be placed at arms-length from politicians and protected 
from vested industry interests. After a landslide victory in the 1997 general 
election, the Labour government embarked on its manifesto commitment to 
establish an ‘independent food standards agency’ (The Labour party 1996), 
publishing a White Paper The Food Standards Agency: A Force for Change. In 
its summary of proposals, the White Paper supported key recommendations of 
the James report (Hajer 2009). These proposals consolidated the principle of 
‘putting the consumer first’ and recommended that the proposed agency should 
possess executive powers and be directly accountable to Parliament (MAFF 
1998). 
 
Formed on 1 April 2000, the Food Standards Agency was established as a Non-
ministerial department (NMD) and given the main statutory objective of 
protecting the interests of consumers, in addition to an advisory role to 
government (Food Standards Act, 1999). This function was further elaborated 
in a Statement of General Objectives and Practices (FSA, 2000) setting out six 
key priorities, which included improving dietary health, promoting informative 
labelling, and promoting best practice with the food industry. This statement 
also set out working practices that promoted, amongst other things, being ‘open 
and consultative’ (Food Standards Agency 2000). Importantly for the argument 
presented in this chapter, these guidelines conferred a formal role to the Food 
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Standards Agency of ‘putting the consumer first’ and ‘being an independent 
voice’ (FSA, 2000). As might be expected, this principle was expressed by 
interviewees with experience of working with, or within, the Food Standards 
Agency. This was summarised very clearly by the following interviewee: 
  
Senior civil servant: ‘In terms of the trigger events, I think it was clearly 
the BSE crisis and a perceived need for there to be an independent 
consumer facing body responsible for managing food safety issue, as 
opposed to having the Ministry of Agriculture, which, rightly or wrongly, 
was perceived to have a conflict of interests of the red meat industry and 
promoting consumer safety.’ 
 
Importantly, this interviewee suggested that the guiding principles of the Food 
Standards Agency were indelibly linked to the BSE crisis, which was perceived 
as demanding an alternative organizational form to ministerial departments 
headed by politicians (Flinders et al., 2014). As alluded to in the extract above, 
this required insulating policy making from the type of short term political 
pressures that had led to the perception that economic interests had been 
prioritized over public safety. Although this interviewee was careful to 
differentiate between real and perceived conflicts of interest, it is nevertheless 
argued that a transfer of functions to an arms-length body constituted a 
necessary institutional response to the BSE crisis. This finding is important for 
two reasons. First, it clearly demonstrates a conceptualization of ‘good 
governance’ as requiring that certain areas of policy be insulated from short 
term electoral pressures (Durose et al., 2015: 140). Second, the extract 
underlines the distinctive response by a Labour government intent on appearing 
progressive and transparent in its policy making (Dommett et al, 2015), which 
imbued the Food Standards Agency with an authority and legitimacy to make 
decisions that were perceived as ‘putting the consumer first’. 
 
4.2.3 New ideas: The ‘third way’ of partnership 
 
In addressing this perceived failure of ministers to safeguard the public interest 
in the case of BSE (Jasanoff, 1997) by delegating functions to an arms-length 
public body (Durose et al., 2015), the Food Standards Agency was emblematic 
of a wider ‘modernising’ agenda initiated by New Labour that set out a 
‘pragmatic’ approach to policy making (Cabinet Office 1999). This agenda 
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framed previous administrations as doggedly ideological, differentiating New 
Labour’s approach to policy making as implementing ‘what works’ (Cabinet 
Office, 1999: 17). This was expressed as an ‘evidence-based’ approach to 
policy making (Blunkett, 2000), with government working across public, private 
and voluntary sectors to deliver more efficient public services (Cabinet Office, 
1999). This proclaimed pragmatism was underpinned by pervading discourses 
of a ‘third way’ between ‘old’ models of social democracy and the conservative 
right (Finlayson 1999). The ‘third way’ constituted a distinctive set of ideas that 
informed New Labour’s public philosophy and approach to welfare and the 
provision of public services (Bevir and O’Brien 2001). Writing in 1998, the Prime 
Minister Tony Blair discussed the ‘third way’ as a label that captured a ‘new 
politics’ that moved beyond the ‘old left’ and ‘new right’ (Romano 2006). In this 
attempt to update social democracy, Blair was heavily influenced by the ideas 
of the sociologist Anthony Giddens, particularly his book The Third Way 
(Giddens 1998) that recommended a renewal of the state-society relationship 
aimed at empowering individuals, civil society, and the private sector to serve 
the public interest. 
 
This idea of a ‘third way’ underpinned an emerging consensus around the value 
of partnership as a mode of governance that could bridge the public/private 
divide (Flinders, 2004), presented as moving beyond the two extremes of state-
centric managerialism and market adversarialism (Ansell and Gash 2008). This 
rationale is clearly articulated in the Modernising Government White Paper 
(Cabinet Office, 1999: 9), which noted that the ‘distinctions between services 
delivered by the public and private sector are breaking down in many areas, 
opening the way to new ideas, partnerships and opportunities for devising and 
delivering what the public wants’. It is important to emphasize that the 
involvement of non-state actors in governing food policy was hardly novel, with 
trade bodies having successfully lobbied for self-regulatory standards of food 
production as far back as the 1930s (Phillips and Smith 2013). Yet, in naming 
interactive processes between public agencies and non-state actors using the 
language of partnership, this helped to embed the narrative of a distinctive ‘third 
way’ through partnership. As Colebatch (2009) notes, ‘the activity of governing 
is suffused by accounts of governing’. In this context, what was new about 
partnership was not that it described a radical break with the past, but that it 
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helped to brand collaborative approaches as constitutive of ‘good governance’ 
(Torfing et al. 2012). Indeed, the framing of partnership as an accepted standard 
of good governance has mirrored the rapid proliferation of public-private 
partnerships in global health (Buse & Harmer, 2007). 
 
It is important at this stage to emphasize that partnership could take various 
forms, not all of which institutionalised collective decision-making processes. 
For example, the continuation of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) under New 
Labour involved the delegation of implementation and service delivery to private 
sector organisations (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt 2003; Hood 1991). This 
type of partnership could be represented as a contractual agreement between 
government and business, in which deliberative interactions are limited. This 
can be contrasted with the type of partnership ideas articulated in health 
focused White Papers published by New Labour between 1997 – 2008, which 
framed partnership in food policy in overtly participatory terms. For example: 
 
‘Partnership is a key element of the Government’s approach to a wide 
range of issues […] Partnership is at the heart of our new approach to 
public health.’  
 
‘Governments can set the preconditions for success in improving health. 
But Governments alone cannot determine success. To do that, 
Government needs to work in partnership with others.’ 
 
 
Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation 
 (Secretary of State for Health 1999) 
 
 
‘Where the Government is able to work closely with industry, there are 
clear advantages to a voluntary approach […]’ 
 
 
Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives 
(Department of Health, 2008) 
 
 
In the above extracts, there is a clear assumption that government is unable to 
govern effectively through traditional forms of regulation. The solution to the 
apparent ungovernability of health policy, is framed as partnership working. 
More specifically, policy statements frame partnership working with the food 
industry as a legitimate approach to obesity policy. This identified a coordinative 
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role of government in health policy, working with stakeholders in policy 
formulation and implementation. Table 4.1 (below) provides further illustrative 
extracts of this framing, which emphasised the role of the food industry as key 
stakeholders in obesity policy. Overall, policy statements produced by Labour 
governments emphasised voluntary industry commitments as an effective 




It is important to highlight that the concept of a third way constructed partnership 
as breaking with state-centric interventionism and neoliberal ideas of 
individualism (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). This framing is clear in the foreword 
to the Labour government’s first public health White Paper, Saving Lives 
(Secretary of State for Health 1999), which states: 
 
‘[…] There is a vital role for government […]. Not as the so-called nanny 
state in action […] It sets out a new, modern approach to public health 
– an approach which refuses to accept that there is no role to do 
anything other than individual improvement, or that only government can 
do something. An approach which no government in Britain has adopted 
before’. 
 
Table 4.1 Assumptions about the shared responsibility for addressing population 
health between government and non-state actors 
White Paper Year Extract 
Choosing 
Health  
2004 ‘Recognising that the public sector can never provide all the 
answers, we have been encouraged by industry’s commitment 








2008 ‘To support stakeholders in business and the third sector in 
engaging with each other on how they can meet the challenge 
of tackling excess weight in the population, the Government 
will seek to work with stakeholders on how to strengthen 
existing arrangements. Our aim is to build a Coalition for Better 
Health [sic], which would reach agreements on joint 
programmes […] and challenge each other to go further.’ 
 
[2008: 29] 
Source: (Secretary of State for Health 2004; DH 2008)   
 95 
This employed the myth that a ‘nanny state’ approach had been demonstrated 
to have failed, which helped to construct a narrative of the third way as moving 
beyond statism and market individualism. This narrative was reproduced in 
subsequent health policy statements, such as the 2004 public health White 
Paper Choosing Health:  
 
‘In recent decades, the debate about the respective roles of 
Government, individuals, communities, industry and others in improving 
health has too often become bogged down in a ritual battle between two 
ends of a political spectrum. On one hand, a paternalistic state is 
encouraged more and more to limit individual choice […] On the other, 
the Government is asked to stand back, leaving people’s health to 
whatever the hidden hand of the market and freedom of choice 
produces.’  
 
 (Secretary of State for Health 2004) 
 
All this suggests that third way agenda was strategically used to distinguish the 
Labour government from neoliberal strains of individualism through constructing 
a more proactive role for government in encouraging personal responsibility. 
This relates to a broader meta narrative under successive Labour governments 
of promoting responsibility through state intervention, for example in its active 
labour market policy (Carstensen 2011). As Bevir (Bevir 2005) argues, New 
Labour accepted the idea of individualisation, but recombined this with an 
emphasis on the role of the state in creating opportunities for work and training. 
Moreover, this political agenda required insulating individuals from the worst 
excesses of the market. Importantly, this critique of the New Right 
reconceptualised business as capable of acting as socially responsible 
corporate citizens that could be trusted by government to act as suitable 
partners in health policy 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was initially bound up in the neo-liberal 
policy agenda of Thatcher in the 1980s, intended to legitimate market 
deregulation (Kinderman 2012), it was adapted by Labour governments to 
promote the notion of ‘stakeholder capitalism’. The concept of stakeholding – a 
theory of the company that interprets them as organizations with attendant 
social responsibilities – became an influential idea articulated by key advisers 
to the Labour Party, such as Hutton (1995). As Prabhakar (2004) notes in his 
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analysis, while the notion of stakeholding was initially endorsed by senior 
Labour figures, including Blair, explicit references to stakeholding were replaced 
with ‘third way’ language in response to the unexpectedly hostile media and 
political reaction it received prior to the 1997 UK general election. However, 
while references to stakeholding as a programmatic set of ideas are absent in 
policy documents produced by Labour governments from Blair onwards, the 
core tenet of the stakeholding approach – that the function of a company should 
go beyond maximization of shareholder value – underpins the framing of CSR. 
This was codified under Article 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, which 
required that company directors promote shareholder interests with ‘regard to 
the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment’ 
(Companies Act 2006). As Brammer and colleagues (Brammer, Jackson, and 
Matten 2012) note, the inclusion of this legal norm permitted consideration to 
be afforded to stakeholders, giving discretionary scope for companies to 
implement CSR initiatives where this supports shareholder value. This legal 
standard of conduct was supported through discourses evident in White Papers 
(and subsequent action plans), which emphasised normative values (based on 
the assumption that food companies have internalised ethical values) and 
pragmatic economic interests (bad corporate behaviour will have reputational 
consequences for food companies). The extracts in Table 4.2 provide examples 
of this kind of rationale. 
 
4.2.4 Mandating corporate responsibility: The Food Standard Agency’s 
salt reduction program 
 
While third way discourses emphasized a common set of ethical values that 
were assumed to constitute the interests of food companies, the Labour 
government’s policy agenda suggests that engagement with industry was 
based on external standards mandated by the FSA. In contrast to frames in 
policy statements, this highlights a tacit acceptance (within the FSA at least) 
that ‘pure’ industry self-regulation (Gunningham and Rees 1997) would not be 
a particularly effective regulatory framework in motivating industry to reduce the 





Table 4.2 Framing by Labour governments of the food industry as socially 
responsible corporate actors 
Context Year Illustrative extracts 
Choosing Health  
 
2004 ‘The public expects big organisations to be 
socially responsible corporate citizens, an 
expectation that industry is increasingly 
realizing. Many corporate organisations 
acknowledge that what they do for the 
community impacts on their reputation and that 
meeting these expectations can make good 
business sense.’ 
 
[Secretary of State for Health 2003: 30] 
 
Choosing a Better Diet: a 
food and health action 
plan strategy paper  
2005 ‘The food industry has a corporate social 
responsibility to promote healthier eating. The 
Government acknowledges that industry 
recognises its corporate social responsibility and 
has shown it wants to play its part, working with 
the Government to help tackle obesity.’ 
 
[Secretary of State for Health 2005: 17] 
 






2008 ‘Halting the obesity epidemic is about individual 
behaviour and responsibility […] It is also about 
the responsibility of the private and voluntary 
sectors too – a food industry, for example, that 
takes its responsibility to supply food that 
promote health seriously.’ 
 
[Secretary of State for Health 2008: iv] 
 
Source: (Secretary of State for Health 2004; DH 2005; 2008) 
 
 
Before moving on to consider this salt reduction program, it is worth delineating 
the scope of the FSA in relation to obesity policy. In terms of its remit, the Food 
Standards Agency: A force for change (MAFF 1998: 5.7) White Paper stated 
that public health functions related to diet would remain with the Department of 
Health, while the FSA would be tasked with protecting consumer interests. This 
was framed in the White Paper as wide-ranging, with executive powers over 
legislation and policy making relating to: compositional standards of food; 
labelling (including nutrition labelling); and a responsibility to provide information 
about the nutritional quality of food. While public health functions would remain 
with the DH, the transfer of policy functions meant that nutrition policy would be 
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a shared responsibility with the FSA. This blurred boundary between policy 
functions is illustrated in the following quotation:  
 
Senior civil servant: ‘I think that the uncertainty was that [nutrition] was 
a shared responsibility between the DH and the Food Standards 
Agency, as I understood it. But essentially the DH was not interested in 
public health because they were so focused on the NHS. Nothing much 
was being done in the DH. So, [the FSA] essentially took on that 
responsibility, if you like, and that meant that we started working with the 
food industry to improve the dietary health of consumers by focusing on 
reformulation, initially with salt.’ 
 
This helps to explain why the FSA had the institutional flexibility to interpret its 
remit in terms of public health functions, in which the DH had little apparent 
interest in obesity policy that went beyond persuading individuals to make 
healthier lifestyle choices. As the interviewee describes, this created the political 
space for the FSA to develop a program of food reformulation that began with 
salt reduction. 
 
The FSA salt reduction program followed the publication of the Scientific 
Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN) report on Salt and Health that 
recommended reductions in salt intake from the then current level of 9.5g to 6p 
per day (SACN 2003). In February 2005, the FSA and DH committed to reduce 
salt intakes in line with SACN recommendations, leading to the publication of a 
comprehensive set of time bound targets across a wide range of product 
categories that industry was expected to achieve through reformulation (FSA, 
2009). The first set of targets were announced in March 2006, based on a 
combination of maximum and sales-weighted average targets (MacGregor and 
Hashem 2014) for key foods such as bread, breakfast cereals and ready meals. 
These targets were incrementally revised downwards in phases by the FSA, 
with participating industry actors expected to progressively reduce the salt 
content of processed foods over two-year target cycles. This mandated 
approach to regulation communicated performance standards that clearly 
defined how compliance with the salt reduction program was monitored. This 
mandated form of self-regulation was widely perceived by interviewees as 
helping to institutionalise accountability mechanisms based on substantive 
standards that had to be adopted by participating companies. For example: 
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Public health advocate: ‘You had a very active food standard agency 
who were very clear about what they wanted to achieve in terms of 
targets for reformulation and the development of the salt model and all 
the rest of it. National targets set by government [the FSA].’ 
 
Academic researcher: ‘What the Food Standards Agency did was sit in 
the middle as a broker. And I know someone who worked there who said 
that they knew they were on the right path when almost neither NGOs 
or the food industry were happy, but both were satisfied.’ 
 
Public health advocate: ‘What the Food Standards Agency appeared to 
do quite successfully was that, because they were close to the food 
industry, they had a good understanding of what the realities and 
challenges for the food industry were, but they retained the authority to 
work out what would be reasonable targets and timelines and then invite 
the industry to meet those targets against those timelines.’ 
 
The above extracts suggest that the formulating of salt reduction targets was a 
consultative process that took account of the views of industry actors. Yet, 
interviewees’ consistent view was that the FSA had the authority and legitimacy 
to create a meta-regulatory framework that mandated substantive standards 
governing industry self-regulation. In other words, the FSA shaped the ‘rules of 
the game’ of self-regulation. This meta-regulatory function is nicely captured in 
the following quotation, in which the interviewee describes the use of 
performance standards in self-regulation: 
 
Academic researcher: ‘[…] I think you can have voluntary approaches 
which are more independent, which are rigorously monitored, rigorously 
implemented, can be rigorously evaluated, but which don’t involve 
partnership. You can think of a voluntary approach where industry 
regulates itself […] or where government or some other independent 
body had the role of monitoring whether the voluntary mechanism was 
working or not […].’ 
 
In the above extract, the interviewee distinguishes between voluntary forms of 
self-regulation and mandated self-regulation, linking the former to partnership 
between government and industry (and explicitly to the RD later in the 
interview). In terms of the FSA salt reduction program, this distinction was 
captured in the following quotation:  
 
Senior academic: ‘It’s cited as an exemplar, but the language is 
misused. When you look around the world at voluntary agreements and 
salt reduction, they have failed […] so it is utterly misleading to say that 
it was voluntary […] there was a lot of arm twisting that went on.’ 
 
 100 
These extracts contrast with the notion that corporations would be voluntarily 
willing to implement such policies. Indeed, not a single interviewee suggested 
that the policy success of salt reduction was attributable to CSR or proactive 
standard setting on the part of industry. Instead, the widespread perception 
among interviewees was that this program depended on the meta-governance 
role of the FSA in standard setting. 
 
Moreover, the FSA attempted to reproduce this regulatory framework to cover 
other nutrients, including saturated fat and sugar. This followed the publication 
of the public health White Paper, Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives (Secretary of 
State for Health 2008), which included the aim to ‘be the first major nation to 
reverse the rising tide of obesity and overweight in the population’ (Secretary of 
State for Health 2008: 10). As part of this commitment, a Healthy Food Code 
working group was established, described in a memorandum distributed to 
stakeholders as a partnership between the DH, FSA and food industry. This 
memo stated that the FSA would assume responsibility for reductions in 
saturated fat and sugar (in addition to its salt reduction program). The final 
recommendations of the FSA ‘Saturated Fat and Energy Intake’ were produced 
in March 2010. This reproduced the mandated standards used in salt reduction, 
extending targets to a wide range of product categories, such as chocolate, 
biscuits, cakes, and sugar-sweetened beverages (Food Standards Agency 
2010). Yet, as the following section explores, the political context of obesity 
policy shifted abruptly following the formation of the Conservative-Liberal 
government in which public health functions were transferred away from the 
FSA 
 
4.3 The Conservative Party, 2008 – 2010 
 
Before examining the political landscape following the 2010 general election, it 
is important to trace how partnership ideas were reworked by the Conservatives 
during their time in opposition. More specifically, this policy work was 
undertaken between 2008 – 2010, during which the Conservatives 
commissioned various working groups to develop the idea of a Responsibility 
Deal. This section focuses on two key reports produced by the Conservatives 
that constituted the reworking of partnership. The analysis explores the 
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reworking of ideational elements of this policy idea, in which notions of 
stakeholding were substituted with an emphasis on the market as a driver of 
corporate citizenship. 
 
4.3.1 The malleability of policy ideas: constructing the Responsibility 
Deal 
 
The Responsibility Deal was constructed over a two-year period between 2008 
– 2010, during which the Conservatives commissioned two working groups to 
develop policy ideas for a partnership between government and the food 
industry. This section analyses the reports of these working groups, tracing 
changes in the epistemic structure of partnership ideas. The key claim is that 
this process attached new elements of meaning to partnership, in which a logic 
of market accountability substituted for the third way notion of stakeholding. It 
argues that ideational process transformed the meaning of partnership. 
 
This process began with the Conservatives commissioning the Ethical 
Corporation Institute – a management consultancy specializing in CSR with 
clients including Pepsico and Nestlé – to formulate a ‘modern responsible 
business policy’ (Conservative party 2008). The final report of the working 
group, A light but effective touch was produced in 2008, and set out the 
institutional design and ambitions of a Responsibility Deal between government 
and industry across environmental and health policy areas. Analogous to public 
health White Papers under previous Labour administrations, this report 
reproduced mythical discourses that traditional forms of regulation had failed to 
address obesity. Indeed, this myth was framed using an almost identical 
narrative to Saving Lives (Secretary of State for Health 1999) and Choosing 
Health (Secretary of State for Health 2004). For example: 
 
‘We have reached a situation where we expect government to do too 
much. The usual response to a newly identified societal problem or 
intractable old one is: “the government must act.” In our view, this 
position is untenable for the simple reason that change cannot be 
brought about by government alone.’ 
 
(Conservative Party 2008: 7) 
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As the above extract illustrates, this report reproduced the narrative that 
government is unable to govern effectively through state-centric regulation. This 
is clearly expressed in the following extract: 
 
‘We believe that an exclusively regulatory approach is based on a 
fundamentally flawed view of the world, and actually stifles more 
collaborative and more effective ways of addressing issues of concerns 
to society.’ 
 
 (Conservative Party 2008: 7) 
 
However, this report was clearer about the role of government in partnership, 
framing its responsibilities in terms of a facilitative or coordinative function. The 
extracts in Table 4.3 illustrate this framing, in which state regulation is explicitly 
rejected as a legitimate policy solution to health issues, such as obesity and 
alcohol-related harm. In other words, government was to perform a 
metagovernance role (Sørensen & Torfing 2009), performing a hands-off role in 
network framing and design of collaborative institutions. 
 
While this report employed narratives used by previous Labour administrations, 
it is also evident that the epistemic structure of partnership was transformed to 
emphasise market accountability. Indeed, the first section of this report 
underlines the ‘value of the market’ in addressing social and environmental 
issues. For example: 
 
‘We believe that the market, steered where necessary, is capable of 
generating environmental and social goods, and that the market is the 
most expedient vehicle for generating more responsible business 
practice.’ 
 
 ‘[…] criticism of particular companies on specific issues is sometimes 
taken to imply that somehow companies in general, with their profit 
motive, are “a bad thing” and that they are incapable of providing any 
social benefit beyond their economic success. We reject this. Any 
schema that sees companies as necessarily in conflict with society is 
wrong […] the problem is that markets must be better aligned with 
society’s needs.’ 
 






As the above extracts illustrate, the logic of market accountability is emphasised 
repeatedly as the solution to producing public goods. This point is critical, as it 
provides a clear articulation of the market-driven logic that provided a rationale 
for the institutional design of accountability mechanisms within the 
Responsibility Deal Food Network (RDFN). More specifically, the above two 
extracts claim that market-driven forms of accountability can provide incentives 
for more responsible business practice, generating environmental and social 
goods. This explicitly claims that profit maximization can be reconciled with 
public policy aims, which implicitly relies on a reputation-based model of 
accountability. There is, however, a discursive ambiguity about how precisely 
profit maximization can be reconciled with public health. Indeed, the report 
frames corporate activities in ways that are in tension with one another, which 
appeals to the normative ideal that companies will ‘do the right thing’, but on the 
next page states that the ‘primary motivating force behind a company’s actions 
is, and can only be, enlightened self-interest’ (2008: 7). This tension between 
Table 4.3 Illustrative extracts of the metagovernance role for government in the 
Responsibility Deal 
 
‘Despite a proliferation of regulations, initiatives, and other interventions by the 
current government, the negative effects of issues like obesity and drinking are 
increasing […] we advocate a shift in emphasis for government from seeking to ‘do’ 





‘The Working Group’s central recommendations, which reflects our post-bureaucratic 
view of the world, is the development of what we call Responsibility Deals. Such deals 
represented a fundamental shift in the model of government in the UK, from the 






‘We advocate that the role of government should be to develop its role as a catalyst 
to instigate intelligent debate about key issues of concern, and then act as a 
facilitator for solutions, bringing together all those different groups that can help 




Source: (Conservative party 2008) 
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the fiduciary duties of companies to maximize profits and legitimate public 
health aims embodies the paradoxical nature of the RD (explored in greater 
detail over the following two chapters). While this is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 5, this form of accountability assumes that consumers will express a 
preference for socially responsible corporate practices, translating into 
accountability constituted through the market. Overall, the Ethical Corporation 
Institute produced a report that emphasised the public goods that can be 
achieved through markets, in which the government was to perform a 
metagovernance role in facilitating and steering the market to achieve its policy 
ambitions. 
 
This discursive emphasis points to the transformation of partnership by the 
Conservatives, in which market accountability was substituted for notions of 
stakeholding that had been visible in White Papers produced by Labour 
governments. Bevir (1999) conceptualises the structure of ideas as ‘webs of 
meaning’ that may be transformed by adding new elements (cf. Carstensen 
2011). In other words, partnership can be understood as a malleable entity 
(Smith 2013), allowing it to be discursively constructed as market-oriented, 
while retaining the ‘common-sense’ inference of partnership working as 
cooperative and equal (Skelcher 2005). Indeed, A light but effective touch 
(2008: 14) states that CSR has become an ‘unattractive’ term for companies. 
This suggests that the Conservatives were acutely aware of securing broad 
support among the food (and alcohol) industries for the Responsibility Deal, 
underlined by the Conservatives commissioning the industry-led Public Health 
Commission to road test its policy ideas. 
 
4.3.2  Public Health Commission, 2009 
 
The idea of partnership framed in the report of the Ethical Corporation Institute 
began to be operationalized by the Conservatives in the year leading up to the 
2010 general election. The commissioning of the Public Health Commission 
(PHC) to explore the possible implementation of Responsibility Deals, 
institutionalised the idea that partnership should be a collaborative and 
consensus-oriented process in which industry actors ought to participate in 
decisional processes about the ‘rules of the game’ (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003). 
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This section provides a brief overview of the policy work of this working group, 
before moving on to assess the final PHC report. Its recommendations highlight 
a consensus that the FSA had overstepped its statutory remit in taking on public 
health functions, particularly in its support for ‘traffic light’ labelling (Lang 2006). 
 
The PHC was established to respond to a policy paper on the RD, which 
reproduced the assumptions of the Ethical Corporation Institute report. This 
paper, imaginatively termed Responsibility Deal 2, framed the PHC as the 
working group that would contribute to the institutional design and scope of the 
RD. This paper reproduced assumptions that policy change could not be ‘solved 
by regulation and legislation alone’, stating that partnership working ‘balances 
proportionate regulation with corporate responsibility’. This paper described 
three public health pillars of the RD, which collectively focused on ‘incentivising’ 
healthier lifestyle choices. The first pillar was to ‘enable, encourage and 
incentivise consumers to adopt a healthier diet’, which asked the food industry 
to negotiate further action on the reformulation of HFSS products. 
 
The membership of the PHC included a wide range of food and alcohol industry 
actors, receiving input from transnational corporations such as Kraft, Kellogg’s. 
McDonalds, and SABMiller in addition to trade bodies including the Scotch 
Whisky Association (SWA) and Food and Drink Federation (FDF) and 
biomedical researchers from academic institutions and policy leads from civil 
society organisations (such as Diabetes UK). The PHC held various meetings 
at Unilever House in central London (Lawrence 2010), which also provided the 
secretariat. 
 
The recommendations of the final report reproduced discourses of personal 
responsibility and consumer choice, framing health in terms of the importance 
of ‘balanced diets’ and education campaigns about harmful drinking and 
physical activity (Public Health Commission 2009). More specifically, the 
recommendations of the report highlighted support for partnership working 
among food and alcohol industry actors. The interview data suggests that the 
positive outcome of policy discussions reflected the influence of industry actors 
in drafting the PHC report. For example, one interviewee described 
commercially sensitive policy recommendations as having ‘magically 
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disappeared’ from the final draft. The decision-making process was bluntly 
referred to having been ‘captured’ by industry interests. However, the language 
of regulatory capture (Miller and Harkins 2010) arguably understates the explicit 
aim of the Conservatives to incorporate commercial sector actors in decisional 
processes. This point was made by the following interviewee, who viewed the 
PHC as a forum to develop a consensus about the overarching objectives of 
partnership working: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘Andrew Lansley [the Secretary of State for 
Health] commissioned this Public Health Commission, which I think was 
really his test bed for the Responsibility Deal [pause] and that didn’t bode 
well. It gave a clear signal as to how things might be taken forward, both 
with the food and alcohol industries under the Coalition government’.  
 
Like the above interviewee, many of the public health advocate and academic 
interviewees linked the PHC to a shift towards a less interventionist approach 
to obesity policy than had been the case under the FSA. This was particularly 
visible in the commitment made in the first Pillar of the Responsibility Deal 2 to 
support Guideline Daily Amounts (GDA) labelling over colour-coded labelling. 
This diverged from the traffic-light labelling supported by the FSA. Research on 
this labelling system conducted by the FSA found that traffic lights - green, 
amber and red to indicate levels of fat, sugar and salt – were felt by consumers 
to be the simplest system to use (Lang 2006). Despite this, this paper stated 
that a future Conservative government would ‘give backing for public awareness 
of GDAs and how they can be used to build a better diet’. This explicitly ruled 
out regulation as incompatible with the aim of partnership to promote healthier 
lifestyle choices through voluntary commitments, and ‘not a narrow focus based 
on a fear of ‘junk foods’. This commitment provides a clear example of the 
transformation of partnership to emphasise market-driven accountability. This 
commitment was met enthusiastically by the PHC, which criticised the 
‘disproportionate amount of attention’ assigned to traffic light labelling in policy 
discussions. All this suggests that the FSA was viewed by both the 
Conservatives and food industry actors as having overstepped its policy remit. 
This is captured in the following quotation from a public health advocate 
interviewee that had worked in obesity policy for the past two decades: 
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Public health advocate: ‘If we’re going back to the mid-2000s, the Food 
Standards Agency had the responsibility for public health nutrition as 
well as food safety and were much more, if you like, progressive, 
drawing together the evidence and making recommendations for action 
[…] I think they did push, both on marketing and front of pack labelling. 
It marked their card and I have heard it said that that [labelling] was the 
issue. That was the straw that broke the camel’s back. I think with the 
change of government, the Conservatives in particular were never 
happy with the remit for nutrition resting with the Food Standards Agency 
and were keen to have it taken back to the Department of Health.’ 
 
In the above extract, the interviewee captures the tension between the public 
health functions of the FSA, and the preference within the Conservatives for 
health policy to be reserved to the DH. For example, the Shadow Health Minister 
had previously remarked that the FSA had ‘been trying to reinvent itself as a 
much more broad-ranging public health education creature’ (Ungoed Thomas 
and Winnett 2005). For food industry actors, lobbying against the traffic light 
system had an obvious economic rationale, given that more profitable HFSS 
products (Stuckler et al., 2012) would be labelled with red lights. As the following 
civil servant who had worked in the FSA observed: 
 
Civil servant: ‘They [industry] will in principle oppose anything that 
affects their bottom line. And that was most notable in the proposal for 
the ‘traffic light’ labelling system, where the Chief Executive of one of the 
major food companies – whose products largely consisted of sugar and 
fat – did say to me that if the traffic light idea was pursued, he would 
personally make it his mission to make sure my career was destroyed. 
So that was a kind of friendly intervention […] I think the industry 
objected when it affected their bottom line.’ 
 
Importantly, these discourses aligned with the commitment of David Cameron 
(then leader of the opposition) in his 2009 ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’ speech that 
committed to reduce their ‘number, size, scope and influence’ (Cameron, 2009). 
In this way, refusing to back the traffic light system was underpinned by a wider 
reform agenda that aimed to address the ‘quango problem’ (Cameron, 2009). 
As the following interviewee reflected, this helped to legitimate transferring 
functions from the Food Standards Agency: 
 
‘They [the Conservative Party] were looking when they came in to 
streamline things - “we’re going to trim some of these autonomous 
organisations, get them down to a scalable size” – So there’d been an 
ideological coincidence between their wish to cut back on things and the 
food industry simultaneously saying, “great, if there’s something you 
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Crucially, the traffic light system provided a rationale for the transfer of functions 
away from a non-ministerial department, given that a future Conservative 
government would find it difficult to implement the proposals of Responsibility 
Deal 2 while public health remained a shared competence of the FSA and DH. 
In other words, FSA responsibility for labelling had to be brought under 
ministerial oversight. This issue also provided a de facto rationale for 
transferring functions, given that partnership had been discursively constructed 
in policy papers as a collaborative and consensus-oriented mode of 
governance. The regulation of labelling could then be framed as a barrier to the 
operationalization of the RD. Indeed, this was a central recommendation of the 
PHC report, which called for the institutionalisation of genuine partnership:  
 
‘There is growing concern that Government may be better at talking 
about partnership than it is about nurturing it and delivering through it. 
We require a shift towards co-invention of solutions between key 
stakeholders rather than merely consultation on programmes solely 
developed within Government.’ 
 
 (Public Health Commission 2009: 19) 
 
This extract illustrates the notion that operationalizing partnership required 
shared decision-making and co-construction of policies between government 
and food industry actors. All this suggests that the transformation of policy ideas 
helped to reframe the public health functions of the FSA as an institutional 
barrier to the RD model. The following section examines how the construction 
of this barrier to partnership working was resolved by the Coalition government 
following the 2010 general election. 
 
4.4 Machinery of Government changes  
 
The formation of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government in May 
provided the opportunity for the Conservatives to begin operationalizing the 
partnership idea it had reworked over the previous two years. This section 
traces how nutrition policy was framed as a policy function that ought to be the 
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responsibility of the core executive, and describes the use of Machinery of 
Government (MoG) changes (the restructuring of ministerial responsibilities and 
departmental functions) as a tool to achieve this institutional and policy change. 
Before moving on to assess this political process, it is worth noting that the 
obesity policy of the Coalition government was indistinguishable from the ideas 
discussed in the previous section. While it is conceivable that the Liberal 
Democrats approved the RD approach behind closed doors it appears that their 
policy influence was minimal, particularly as Andrew Lansley - the key architect 
of the RD – became the Secretary of State for Health in the Coalition 
government. Thus, the policy ideas of the Coalition government should be 
interpreted as synonymous with the partnership approach developed by the 
Conservatives in opposition.  
 
The Programme for Government was published by the Coalition government on 
12 May 2010, following the results of the general election a week earlier. This 
document reproduced the commitment to reduce the ‘quango state’ (HM 
Government 2010: 16). Moreover, this public bodies reform was given 
legislative approval in the Public Bodies Act 2011, enabling the implementation 
of proposed changes to public bodies (Flinders & Skelcher, 2012). As Flinders 
and colleagues (2014) argue, public bodies reform constituted not so much a 
‘bonfire of the quangos’, as a process of bureau shuffling of functions between 
organizations. Crucially, reform of arms-length bodies was guided by the 
intention of increasing ministerial accountability. For example, the Cabinet 
Office Public Bodies 2012 report argued that ‘overall responsibility for public 
functions should rest with democratically-elected ministers (Cabinet Office, 
2012: 7). In other words, the focus of public bodies reform was to re-establish 
ministerial departments as the core organizational unit (Flinders et al 2014). 
This rhetoric of returning policy functions to the assumed default of the 
government department (Elston, 2014) provided a narrative that could be used 
to justify the transfer of public health functions away from the FSA. For example, 
as Table 4.4 highlights, departmental press releases framed this reform as 
bringing policy making back into the DH. More specifically, the DH press release 
states that the transfer of nutrition policy from the FSA will improve policy 
coherence through the operationalization of more effective partnership working 
between government and stakeholders.  
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As the previous section has argued, this narrative of returning policy making to 
ministerial departments related to the idea that decision-making in partnership 
should be collaborative and consensus-oriented between government and 
industry actors. This is contrasted with the implicit claim that decisional 
processes within the FSA had not effectively coordinated the potential 
contribution of companies to health policy making. 
 
The public bodies reform programme created a policy window (Kingdon, 1984) 
that could be exploited to implement Machinery of Government (MoG) changes 
prior to the announcement of a cross-government quango review. The 
departmental press releases in Table 4.4 highlight the timing of this decision 
between July – September 2010, which followed the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’s Queen’s Speech economy debate on 8 June announcing the 
government’s commitment to ‘reduce administrative spending in central 
Whitehall and quangos by at least a third’ (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2010). 
This preceded the confirmation in October of the public bodies identified for 
abolition, merger, or reform (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2010), which 
suggests an awareness within government that this legislation had created a 
window to implement institutional and policy changes that did not fall under the 
remit of the Public Bodies Act 2011. 
 
This window was used by the Coalition government to implement MoG changes, 
which offered a mechanism to transfer policy functions without the need for 
primary legislation. The Cabinet Office (2010) best practice handbook states 
that the responsibility for the allocation of functions between ministers belongs 
to the prime minister, in which MoG is a tool that allows functions to be 
transferred in the absence of ‘hard and fast rules’ (2010: 3). Returning to Table 
4.4, the Cabinet Office and Number 10 press release announced the use of this 








This announcement appeared to take senior officials within the FSA off -guard, 
including its chair, Lord Rooker. At a later DEFRA select committee session on 
the role of the FSA in the ‘horse meat’ scandal, Rooker described a meeting 
with the Secretary of State for Health: 
 
Lord Rooker: ‘They informed us, at that date, they were taking from us 
all that they could without legislation, because this was a machinery-of-
government change on the back of the diet and nutrition changes. There 
Table 4.4 Departmental press releases justifying transfer of policy functions 
from the FSA to DH, July – September 2010 
 
Department Date Press release 
DEFRA  20
th
 July ‘Reorganising in this way will contribute to the 
Government’s objectives to improve efficiency, and is 
paramount to the key priority of improving the health 
of the nation by creating a public health service. To 
achieve this coherence, some policy-based functions 
can be brought ‘in-house’ to give a more coordinated 
approach on health and food issues. 
 
Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, said: 
‘It’s absolutely crucial for the Food Standards Agency 
to continue providing expert advice about food safety. 
But bringing nutrition policy into the Department of 









 July ‘The Government recognises the important role of the 
Food Standards Agency in England, which will 
continue to be responsible for food safety […] In 
England, nutrition policy will become a responsibility of 






 Sept ‘The change will ensure nutrition policy is delivered in 
a coherent and consistent manner. This is an early 
step toward realising the Government’s vision of 
drawing together the diverse arrangements for 
delivering public health […] Health Secretary Andrew 
Lansley said: “I am committed to improving the 
public’s health by providing evidence-based advice to 
support people in making healthier choices. The 
transfer of nutrition policy in England into the 
Department of Health means we can give the general 
public more consistent information. It will also mean a 
more co-ordinated and coherent policy-making 
process; and a more effective potential partnership 
between Government and external stakeholders’. 
 
Source: (DEFRA 2010; Cabinet Office 2010; DH, 2010) 
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was no discussion. The Prime Minister had agreed it, and, on 20 July, 
the Prime Minister made a written statement to Parliament giving the 
machinery-of-government changes, setting out that the Food Standards 
Agency would lose diet and nutrition […]’ 
 
(DEFRA select committee, 2010) 
 
As this oral evidence to the select committee underlines, the transfer of policy 
functions was perceived as an abrupt process that was executed with little to no 
consultation with senior FSA officials. Not only did this allow the Coalition 
government to divest itself of responsibility for advocating a traffic light system 
of labelling, it also removed the political and institutional hurdles to 
operationalizing the RD. Indeed, the narrative of bringing policy making ‘in-
house’ helps to explain how the transformation of policy ideas by the 
Conservatives were later constitutive of processes of institutional change. 
These ideas distinguished the RD from notions of ‘good governance’ under 
previous Labour governments, in which the delegation of functions to the FSA 
embodied the assumption that particular areas of policy had to be insulated from 
political and/or societal pressures. By contrast, the conceptual malleability of 
partnership allowed its transformation by the Conservatives to emphasis 
collaborative and consensus-oriented governing processes. This provided both 





This chapter has explored the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutions in the 
operationalization of the RD. The central argument is first that the malleability 
of partnership as a policy idea has allowed actors to construct its meaning in 
divergent ways, and second, that this malleability has been used as a tool to 
displace responsibility from government to the market. The chapter begins by 
providing an overview of partnership ideas under Labour governments between 
1997 – 2010. This section argues that the third way agenda of New Labour 
framed the food industry as stakeholders in obesity policy that could be trusted 
to produce public goods that went beyond profit maximisation. The delegation 
of policy functions to the FSA also embodied this modernising agenda, viewed 
as a tool to rebuild public trust and embed evidence-based policy making. While 
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the stated preference of Labour government was to develop voluntary 
agreements with industry, it is important to highlight that the FSA 
institutionalised an approach to self-regulation that contrasts with the notion that 
food industry actors could be expected to voluntarily reformulate HFSS 
products. The second section then examines the shift in the political context 
following the formation of the Coalition government in 2010. It begins, however, 
by examining the transformation of partnership ideas by the Conservatives in 
the lead up to the general election. This section traces the changing epistemic 
structure of partnership, arguing that notions of stakeholding and CSR were 
replaced with the logic of market accountability. The remaining sections of the 
chapter then explore how the Conservatives began to operationalize their 
partnership ideas. The argument being made here is that the PHC 
institutionalised the idea that industry actors ought to be rule-makers, but also 
highlighted the shared view within the Conservative party and among food 
industry actors that the FSA had overstepped its remit. This involved criticism 
of its support for traffic light labelling, which was framed by the Conservatives 
(2008) as perpetuating a ‘fear of junk foods’. Moreover, this issue was used by 
the Conservatives to frame the FSA as an institutional barrier to operationalizing 
partnership, the solution to which was the transfer of public health functions to 
the DH. Following on from this, the third section describes the policy window 
opened by the wide-ranging public bodies reform implemented by the Coalition 
government (Flinders et al 2014). The key point in this section is that the 
narrative of returning policy responsibilities to the assumed default of the 
government department, helped to construct the transfer of functions from the 
FSA as a required step in operationalizing partnership between government and 
the food industry. This section concludes by describing how MoG was used as 
a tool to remove nutrition policy from the FSA and allow for the 
operationalization of the RD. 
Overall, this chapter has attempted to situate the RD within its historical and 
political context, tracing the transformation of partnership as a policy idea from 
the third way of Labour to its market-oriented conception under the 
Conservatives. This is an important phase in analysing partnership, because it 
helps to explain how this mode of governance is mediated ideationally. 
Empirically, this chapter demonstrates the conceptual malleability of partnership 
and how this can be used to justify institutional change. It also points to the role 
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of ideas in constituting institutional practices, such as an emphasis on market 
accountability and consensus-oriented decisional processes. These 
dimensions are the focus of the following two chapters, which explore the 







































In its launch document published in March 2011, the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal was framed as maximising the benefits of working in 
partnership with commercial sector actors to ‘accelerate the progress toward 
public health goals’ (Department of Health 2011a). This chapter unpacks the 
claim that business could ‘accelerate the progress towards public health goals’ 
(DH 2011: 2), examining the operationalization of accountability mechanisms in 
partnership. It traces political discourses and partnership practices to concretely 
examine the interplay of governance and accountability. This draws on a 
theoretically informed empirical research on the Food Network that identifies a 
lack of formal mechanisms as helping to facilitate opportunities for industry 
actors to avoid public accountability. It argues that the accountability process 
reveals tensions and paradoxes between the market-driven logic of reputation-
based accountability mechanisms, and the invisibility of governance networks 
to the media and wider public. This uses the bridging concept of ‘depoliticization’ 
- defined as the set of processes (including various tactics and tools) that 
displace issues from formal institutions of political decision making to informal 
arenas – as a lens to help explain how the paradoxical nature of accountability 
mechanisms can be traced to the purposeful use of metagovernance ‘tools’ of 
network framing and institutional design. Through the lens of depoliticization, it 
is argued here that accountability processes were underpinned by 
governmental strategies to displace responsibility beyond the state. The 
consequence of this strategy to depoliticise accountability mechanisms was the 
unanticipated (but predictable from an institutional design perspective) 
reluctance of industry actors to adopt high standards of monitoring and 
information reporting. The core argument here, is that the strategic action of the 
Coalition government to depoliticise its role in metagoverning the Responsibility 
Deal, worked to undermine market-driven accountability mechanisms. 
 
This chapter is divided into three substantive sections. The first section outlines 
the theoretical framework, including how depoliticization can be used as a 
bridging concept between the meso-level theory of metagovernance and micro-
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level process tracing of accountability processes. This section provides a brief 
overview of the literature on depoliticization and how this concept is utilised in 
this chapter. This takes inspiration from the influential work of Hay ( 2007) on 
processes of (de)politicization, and draws on recent contributions to this 
emerging literature. Following Flinders and Wood (2014), the framework 
developed in this chapter conceptualises depoliticization in terms of three 
‘faces’ – discursive, societal, and governmental. The three faces are defined by 
Flinders and Wood as follows: discursive depoliticization focuses on ideas and 
language in and through which debates about political decisions are shaped; 
societal depoliticization is conceptualised as a process by which social 
deliberation surrounding a political issue erodes; and governmental 
depoliticization refers to a state-centric or institutionalist approach that 
examines the reduction of control and responsibility as a governing strategy. 
Depoliticization research has concentrated on the governmental face of 
depoliticization, particularly associated with scholarship on the delegation of 
functions to technocratic arm’s-length bodies (Wood 2016; Burnham Peter 
2001) and in terms of economic and monetary policy (Rogers 2009; Kettell 
2008; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay 2004). This chapter draws on dimensions 
of all three faces of depoliticization in exploring the institutional design of the 
RD, but concentrates on governmental and discursive depoliticization. The 
chapter then bridges between the concept of depoliticization and theories of 
metagovernance, arguing that depoliticization can be conceptualised as a shift 
in the institutional setting of decision-making towards emphasizing self-
governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). 
 
Second, a detailed empirical account of accountability processes is developed, 
in which the metagovernance tools of framing and institutional design 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2009) are described in the context of plenary and steering 
group meetings. The analysis presented in this section draws on the findings 
from interviews with key policy actors, policy statements produced by the 
Conservative party in opposition, and partnership documents published under 
the Coalition government. It argues that accountability mechanisms were 
depoliticised through the discursive framing and institutionalisation of a marginal 
role for the state in steering governing arrangements. The third section 
discusses the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, examining 
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contradictions between the market-driven logic of reputation-based 
accountability and the low visibility of partnership in media reporting. This 
explores sporadic media attention through focusing events. This section also 
examines the withdrawal of public health organisations from partnership 
approaches, using interview data with public health advocates to explore 
concerns relating to accountability processes in the Food Network. The findings 
suggest that depoliticising processes shifted responsibility for information 
reporting and monitoring to industry actors, with deleterious consequences for 
public accountability. The conclusion reflects on the paradoxes of 
metagovernance, and its impact on the public accountability of food industry 
actors. 
 
5.2 Accountability, (de)politicization and metagovernance 
 
The concepts of ‘depoliticization’ and ‘politicization’ have been used by political 
scientists to describe the fluid processes through which political issues open up 
or close down to public deliberation and contestation. Issues become 
depoliticised where there is little to no room for contestation, with politicization 
operating in reverse. This dynamic is captured in Hay’s Why we hate politics 
(2007), in which he conceptualises three realms of (de)politicization that take 
place across governmental, private and public spheres (see Figure 5.1). As the 
schema below illustrates, Hay identifies three spheres of the political and three 
corresponding types of (de)politicization that operate between them. Type 1 
depoliticization involves the transfer of an issue from the governmental sphere 
to the public sphere, with the next stage of depoliticization (Type 2) displacing 
an issue from the public sphere to the private sphere, becoming a matter of 
consumer choice (Hay 2007: 850). Hay (2007) uses the issue of environmental 
degradation as an example of Type 2 depoliticization, in which responsibility is 
allocated neither with government or business, but rather framed as the 
responsibility of the consumer to address.  
 
As Hay argues: 
 
“If consumers desire a more environmentally sustainable capitalism, it is 
argued, then their choices in the marketplace will reveal this. The laws 
of supply and demand will ensure that such preferences are reflected in 
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the greater provision of environmentally sustainable commodities, 
without the need for either the interference of government or the taming 





















As the above extract underlines, this schema provides a clear articulation of 
depoliticization that can be used as a lens to explore governance processes 
between governments and food industry actors. In order to develop this 
analysis, this chapter also draws on the three ‘faces’ of depoliticization 
developed by Wood and Flinders (2014). This analytical framework takes Hay’s 
work as a starting point for further conceptualisation, mapping three ‘faces’ of 
depoliticization that distinguish between modes of depoliticization. This is 
categorised into governmental, societal, and discursive faces. This substantive 
contribution to the literature has been used by scholars as an organising 
perspective (Wood 2016) to capture complex processes of (de)politicization. 













Source: Hay 2007 




chart the politicization of assisted reproductive technologies
7
 using a case study 
of the Father’s Clause parliamentary debates. This research charts the policy 
life-cycle of this technology, exploring the interplay between the different faces 
of (de)politicization. 
 
This chapter focuses on discursive and governmental faces of depoliticization. 
Wood and Flinders (2014) associate discursive depoliticization with the denial 
of political choice, in which narrative, frames, or ideas become sedimented as 
part of a political system (Kuzemko 2014). This focuses on ideas and language 
(Bates et al 2014) as a form of statecraft through which accountability can be 
transferred away from the state. This is linked to governmental depoliticization, 
which refers to the delegation or removal of functions from the direct control of 
politicians to quasi-autonomous bodies (Thatcher and Sweet 2002). As 
Burnham (2001: 128) notes, depoliticization is the process of placing ‘at one 
remove the politically contested character of decision-making’. Indeed, a focus 
on the hiving-off of responsibilities at arms-length (Flinders, Dommett, and 
Tonkiss 2014) constitutes the ‘dominant perspective’ (Wood & Flinders 2014) in 
the literature on governmental depoliticization. This chapter diverges from this 
perspective in viewing governmental depoliticization as helping to capture the 
shift in practices of decision making, from formal political institutions, to the 
extra-formal settings of collaborative governance. Following Beveridge 
(Beveridge 2012), governmental depoliticization is defined as a shift in the arena 
of decision-making, focusing attention on the concrete changes in political 
practices associated with the apparent shift from government to governance 
(Beveridge and Naumann 2014). In the most simple terms, this definition implies 
a transformed role for the state in contemporary governance (M. Flinders and 
Buller 2006), in which depoliticization is not about less politics, but about a 
different kind of politics occurring in institutional settings that are invisible to non-
participants (Hay 2007). 
 
In order to explore this different kind of politics, the chapter links discursive and 
governmental faces of depoliticization to the metagovernance role of 
government in shaping the norms and rules of partnership. It employs Sørensen 
                                                
7
 Assisted reproductive technologies refers to human fertilisation and embryology (Bates et al 
2014) 
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and Torfing’s framework of metagovernance, and in particular, the tools of 
network framing and institutional design. According to Sørensen and Torfing 
(2016), framing refers to the political goals, financial conditions, and discursive 
framework of governance networks. This can be shaped through interactive 
processes, in which government actors communicate ideas through narratives 
and frames (Schön and Rein 1994). This aims to define the basic task of the 
network, and encourage actors to implement particular strategies (Sørensen 
and Torfing 2016). Institutional design refers to the arena in which interactions 
take place and the rules that guide practice. This aims to influence policy output 
through the design of decision-making processes that shape the scope and 
content of institutional procedures. Following Sørensen and Torfing (2009), both 
are categorised as ‘hands-off’ tools that shape the practices of governance 
networks. This chapter explores discursive and governmental depoliticization 
through the meso-level concepts of framing and institutional design, which helps 
to examine micro-level accountability processes. The following sections 
highlights the metagovernance tools used by government to shape 
accountability mechanisms in partnership. 
 
5.3 Accountability mechanisms in the Responsibility Deal 
 
5.3.1 Framing partnership  
 
It is evident through the discourses and assumptions in documents, that 
responsibility for accountability mechanisms was expected to transfer from the 
government to the market (Type 1 depoliticization). This is visible across the 
interview data, policy statements, and documents that formed the basis (and 
outcome) of Responsibility Deal meetings. More specifically, empirical analysis 
of policy documents through the lens of metagovernance reveals at least two 
aspects of network framing. The first relates to framing of the limited financial 
resources available to the Department of Health (DH) to metagovern 
accountability processes. The second regards frames that attempted to justify 
a limited role for the state in motivating industry actors to initiate self-regulatory 




Financial conditions  
 
The dominant strand of the Coalition government’s economic and social policy 
was the imposition of austerity through unprecedented spending cuts (Levitas 
2012). While scholars within political science have critiqued the necessity of 
austerity as a way out of the post-global financial crisis economic downturn 
(Hopkin and Rosamond 2017; Blyth 2013), the reality for central government 
departments was budget reductions and staff cuts. This included swingeing 
reductions in staff numbers and overall departmental resource budget for the 
DH, announced as part of the 2010 Spending Review. In October 2010, a press 
release set out the fiscal constraints that would be imposed on DH between 
2010 - 2015, with a shrinking of its administrative budget by over a third.  
 
The impact of this fiscal retrenchment is visible across plenary group 
documents, which underline the limited resources available to DH officials to 
assess the scope and reliability of information provided by industry actors. This 
framing is evident in a discussion paper discussed at the first high-level steering 
group meeting of the Food Network in March 2011. The first line of this draft 
underlines the ‘limited resources available for DH funded evaluation to assess 
the impact of RD pledges’. It continues by reiterating the ‘limited RD resources’, 
stating that less priority should be placed on areas where external funding could 
be secured for monitoring. It should also be noted that policy-based 
interviewees were critical of the resources allocated to partnership.  
For example: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘Don’t forget that this was a time of austerity. 
There was very little civil service resources put into this…very little’. 
 
Academic researcher: ‘I don’t think the resources were there. Or, the 
Department of Health did not have the resources to put monitoring in 
place. I’m sure it was thought of, but I don’t think the resources were 
there. I think the assumption was that industry would take on the role of 






As the above extracts suggest, the retrenchment of DH’s administrative budget 
meant that resources were simply not available to monitor industry compliance 
with performance standards. Moreover, both interviewees described financial 
conditions as framing the basic task of the partnership, which was perceived by 
the second interviewee to have precluded the meta-regulation of industry 
reporting. This illustrates the network framing of this mode of governance as 
operating within a dominant paradigm of austerity. 
 
Limited state intervention 
 
The second aspect of network framing regards narratives that attempted to 
justify a limited role for the state in the metagovernance of partnership. This 
discourse is evident at the first plenary group meeting in September 2010. In a 
DH-drafted discussion paper, it is stated that partnership has the potential to 
‘reframe the relation between government, business, NGOs, local government 
and the public […]’. Following on from this, the discussion paper argues it is not 
the role of DH to ‘police whether organisations are delivering their 
commitments’. Instead, the draft suggests that policy functions be delegated to 
network participants: 
 
[DH discussion paper]: ‘We propose that the networks themselves 
should develop proposals on how they can demonstrate successful 
achievement of each deliverable. It will then be for signatories to publish 
progress against the deliverables that they have committed to in their 
annual report, on their website, or whatever form they deem 
appropriate’. 
 
This extract demonstrates the discursive framing of accountability processes as 
the displacement of responsibility from the governmental to the public sphere 
(Type 1 depoliticization). This is implied in the proposal that industry actors (or 
signatories) adopt internal standards that could be self-certified in annual public 
reports. This framing raises the question of what tasks DH would perform in 
governance arrangements. The following sub-section explores how institutional 
design was used as a tool to transfer responsibilities from the state to market-
driven forms of accountability 
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5.3.2 Institutional design 
 
The dominant framing of accountability as a responsibility that needed to be 
transferred from the government, was operationalised through the institutional 
design of partnership (the creation of arenas for interaction and influencing 
institutional procedures in networks). The influence of network design is evident 
across the three stages of the accountability process: ex post provision of 
information; debating phase; and possibility of consequences (Busuioc 2013). 
This sub-section assesses the impact of institutional design on accountability 
processes across each stage. 
 
Information reporting  
 
As described in the previous sub-section, a plenary group discussion paper 
reveals assumptions about a limited role for government in monitoring 
accountability. This was reflected in the design of information reporting 
mechanisms, which shifted responsibility to industry actors for formulating self-
regulatory standards and providing information about compliance. The 
metagovernance role of DH was limited to managing a web presence that 
entailed providing an online platform for information to be accessed. The launch 
paper frames the website as a tool to establish the transparency of regulatory 
activities through publication of annual reports. This website, the paper claims: 
 
‘[…] will allow partners, the public, and other interested parties to track 
progress. Information will also be available to indicate where partners 
are reporting on their own progress. In time, the registry will act as a 
portal for partners to submit information to the Department of Health as 
part of the agreed monitoring processes for each pledge. The online 
registry can be reached on the Department of Health website’. 
 
In the above extract, the role of DH is depicted as communicating the policy 
outputs of the Responsibility Deal through an appropriate web presence. This 
illustrates the position of government as curating networks through the 
coordination of information. This is evident in an earlier plenary group 
discussion paper that frames the central task of DH officials as managers of 
communication processes. This proposed that government actors metagovern 
partnership through taking on a coordinative role, in which ‘the department will 
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collate this information for publication […]’. This hands-off approach to 
metagovernance is captured in the following reflections of a civil servant 
interviewee: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think one of the decisions that was taken 
under the Responsibility Deal, was that it would not be overly 
prescriptive, and that we would give organisations who signed up the 
flexibility to report as and how they wanted to. And that could mean 
corporate social responsibility reports that they could cross reference 
and make use of that data […]. At the outset we left it for individual 
partners to describe – particularly in the first year – the actions they were 
taking and where they were going’. 
 
This quotation captures the role of DH officials as mediators between internal 
accountability processes and external policy audiences. The way in which the 
interviewee talks about the flexibility of reporting mechanisms, suggests a 
symbolic approach to accountability. 
 
This contrasted with the way interviewees talked about negotiated interactions 
between government and industry actors over salt reduction, which were 
perceived as illustrative of the Food Standards Agency’s (FSA) meta-regulation 
of performance standards (as discussed in Chapter 4). This kind of logic is 
evident in the following quotation from a civil servant interviewee: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘There wasn’t an explicit sort of assessment 
[…] it was very much down to individual companies as to how they 
wanted to set about [reporting] but if you looked at salt reduction targets 
[pause] the initial work predated the Responsibility Deal – which 
launched in 2011 – that was probably the most quantitative in terms of 
being very clear about categories of food, and what the aims and targets 
would be. The reporting around that [salt reduction] was of a different 
nature, and much more prescriptive, I think. That was a little different, 
particularly in terms of how we could synthesise that data’. 
 
In the above extract, the interviewee suggests that the meta-regulation of 
performance standards provided reliable quantitative information about industry 
compliance with mandated targets. This reflects an implicit assumption that 
information reporting in the Food Network was less coherent as an 
accountability mechanism. This suggests that a consequence of the shift from 
the institutionalised rules and practices of the FSA to the extra-formal context 
of partnership, was the depoliticization of the monitoring role of government 
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actors. The following sub-section suggests that the lack of space to scrutinise 
information reporting also reflected a depoliticising process, in which the shift in 




While institutionalised procedures for dialogue between an actor and a forum is 
held by many scholars to constitute a central mechanism of accountability 
(Busuioc 2013; Mulgan 2003; Dubnick 2005), the possibility of a dialectical 
accountability relationship between the government and industry actors was 
explicitly ruled out in policy statements and discussion papers. For example, the 
final report of the Conservative party working group warned of the risk of the 
Responsibility Deal losing credibility, becoming ‘just another quango-like talking 
shop’ (Conservative Party 2008: 10). 
 
This idea was reflected in DH-drafted plenary group discussion papers in which 
external auditing of industry self-reporting is precluded as a metagovernance 
tool. For example, a ‘monitoring and evaluation’ paper, circulated at the third 
plenary group meeting in January 2011, emphasised that DH will collate 
information, but ‘it will not provide any detailed analysis or commentary’. At the 
fourth plenary group meeting in July 2011, a follow-up discussion paper 
reiterated the role of DH officials as mediators rather than moderators: 
 
[DH discussion paper]: ‘The Department has already indicated that it will 
play a role in co-ordinating and publishing information about progress 
organisations have made against the Deal’s pledges. Partners will be 
required to submit annual updates on their progress to the Department 
and this information will be collated for online publication and made 
publicly available. However, the Department will not provide any detailed 




As the extract above illustrates, the institutional design of networks precluded 
scrutiny of information provided by industry actors. This appears to reflect a 
purposeful decision having been made within the government to avoid creating 
a forum in which the reliability of information provided by industry actors (and 
compliance with self-regulatory standards) could be scrutinised and debated. 
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All this suggests that the DH’s role was limited to ensuring that information about 
policy output was made accessible to the public through a web presence. In 
other words, the government actors were to ensure transparency but not 
scrutiny. This function was expected to be performed, as the final sub-section 




While transparency is often used as a synonym for accountability (Bovens 
2007), it is not sufficient to constitute accountability as it does not necessarily 
involve ex post facto processes of explanation, or the possibility of 
consequences (Bovens 2007). As noted in previous sub-sections, the analytical 
lens of metagovernance tools helps explain processes of discursive and 
governmental depoliticization, in which the emergence of partnership as a new 
space of political decision-making was characterised by the displacement of 
responsibility from government. This sub-section explores how political 
governance was replaced with corporate social responsibility (Type 1 
depoliticization). In terms of institutional design, at least two aspects of market-
driven accountability are visible across the data. The first involves discourses 
that present obesity as an issue of collective responsibility, in which consumer 
attitudes would lead to the politicization of corporate activities. The second 
relates to an assumption that NGOs would act as proxies of information, which 
in turn would amplify the reputational risk for non-compliant industry actors. This 
could be conceptualised as societal politicization (Flinders & Wood 2014), 
drawing public attention to self-regulatory commitments made by the food 
industry.  
 
The implicit assumption, evident across the data, was the idea that reputational 
risk would encourage food companies to behave in a more socially responsible 
manner. This followed a market-driven logic, based on the expectation that 
consumers hold corporations accountable through their choices in the market 
(Cashore 2002). This assumes that consumers will express a preference for 
‘responsible’ corporate practices, which translates into politicization in the public 
sphere and the market (Hay 2007). According to this logic, accountability is 
achieved through consumers using their choices to demand high standards of 
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corporate behaviour. Market incentives will then operate to produce public 
goods. Moreover, market accountability relies on the reputational concerns of 
companies with a brand name (or multiple brands) to defend (Börzel and Risse 
2010). In this regard, the more an issue becomes politicised, the greater the 
reputational risk to brand equity. Put simply, the rationale that underpins market 
accountability is that reputational concerns translate into high regulatory 
standards (Busuioc and Lodge 2016). 
 
The discourse of market accountability is visible in key policy statements and 
discussion papers. For example, the report of the Conservative party working 
group implies that reputation-based mechanisms underpin public accountability: 
 
‘While participation would not be mandatory, it would reflect poorly on 
any party – corporate or otherwise – that did not participate when invited 
to do so. The aim of each group would be to develop […] what 
reasonable expectations the rest of society had of them and what 
reasonable actions can be expected of business and other parties […]’. 
 
This logic is also evident in plenary group discussion papers, which states that 
a web presence could be expected to ‘aid the public in finding information on 
the success of the Responsibility Deal’. For example, a paper discussed at the 
first plenary group meeting refers to an expectation of politicised consumer 
attitudes: 
 
‘To a certain extent, we would expect society, in the form of the media 




Following on from this, discussion papers circulated at the third plenary group 
meeting reiterate the importance of monitoring to ‘establishing accountability 
[and] mapping progress’. It continues by stating that a monitoring framework 
has ‘an important role to play in communicating achievements to the public and 
interested stakeholders’. Transparency was expected to underpin this 
framework, with an online register making sure that ‘the public are clear about 
how any progress is being monitored’. 
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The second aspect of market-driven accountability relates to the expectation 
that public health advocacy organisations (described in policy documents as 
NGOs) would operate as watchdogs, asking critical questions and monitoring 
industry reporting. For example, the Conservative party working group framed 
public health advocacy organisations as crucial: 
 
‘To highlight to the public the good work they see being done by 
companies […] to create pressure on laggard businesses as they see 
fit, including those that choose not to participate. Given the high public 
profile of issues likely to be covered by Responsibility Deals, we believe 
it is likely most major business players will want to participate in them’. 
 
As the above extract implies, the institutional design of accountability 
mechanisms envisages that public health organisations will have a dual role 
that impacts on industry participation and compliance. First, these organisations 
are depicted as amplifiers of accountability (Jacobs and Schillemans 2016). In 
other words, reporting is framed as politicising obesity policy (Type 2 
politicization) through advocacy campaigns that monitor corporate practices. As 
stated in this report, NGOs are expected to produce reputational gains through 
raising awareness of ‘good’ corporate behaviour (Busuioc & Lodge 2016). In 
other words, the amplifier function of NGOs would provide a key market 
incentive for high standards of self-regulation. Second, NGOs are framed as a 
trigger (Jacobs & Schillemans 2016) for public accountability. This function is 
comparable to the idea of ‘fire-alarm’ oversight (Héritier and Eckert 2008), in 
which reputational risk could be triggered by ‘naming and shaming’ (Börzel & 
Risse 2010). This informal accountability role is evident in the following extract 
from a public health advocate (who had been involved from an early stage in 
policy discussions) who describes how responsibility for accountability was 
displaced to public health organisations: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘Within the Responsibility Deal, the role of 
government was as a convenor, which is why some of the third sector 
organisations were there actually […] they were looking for the third 
sector to set the agenda and provide the challenge to industry. If 
government weren’t going to provide that challenge [or show] 
leadership, then it had to be from the third sector. I think it’s important to 
see that sort of dynamic. I think in many ways it was an act of faith. At 
the time, ministers and the Department of Health clearly wanted to get 





This quotation captures precisely how government actors aimed to facilitate 
simultaneous processes of (de)politicization. The first part of the above extract 
illustrates the displacement of responsibilities to non-state actors (Type 1 
depoliticization), in which the interviewee highlights both amplifier (via agenda-
setting) and trigger models of public accountability. Moreover, in the second part 
of the extract, the interviewee indicates that public health organisations felt 
compelled to assume accountability responsibilities because government actors 
had withdrawn from this role. 
 
Overall, this section makes clear that network framing and institutional design 
aimed to depoliticise the role of government actors, displacing responsibility to 
consumers and public health organisations for public accountability. Yet, as the 
final section of this chapter explores, this tactic of governmental depoliticization 
created tensions and paradoxes between market-driven accountability and the 
invisibility of political decision-making to the wider public. 
 
5.4 The accountability problem of the responsibility deal 
 
In contrast to the discursive framing of partnership in government policy 
documents as an intrinsically efficient mode of governance, the findings of an 
evaluation conducted by the LSHTM Public Innovation Research Unit (PIRU) 
found little evidence to support claims of policy effectiveness. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the PIRU evaluation focused on the development and 
implementation of industry ‘pledges’, assessed on the ‘additionality’ (based on 
whether actions were attributable to partnership) of industry self-regulation. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the findings of the Food Network evaluation 
underlined that potentially effective policies (such as marketing restrictions and 
sugar reduction) had not been implemented (Knai et al 2015). The evaluation 
noted that industry reporting was ‘inconsistently provided on the RD website 
and mostly unavailable’ (Knai et al 2015: 4). Moreover, it is argued that 
partnership motivated few industry actors to implement self-regulatory 
standards. For example: 
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‘In the case of the RD food pledges, progress reports were mostly 
unavailable, and where provided, very incomplete, making it difficult to 
evaluate whether targets were being met’  
(Knai et al 2015: 9) 
 
Overall, the findings of the PIRU evaluation demonstrate a sizeable rhetoric-
reality gap, between the framing and institutional design of accountability, and 
their operationalization in practice. This section attempts to address this gap by 
considering what might explain the accountability problem of the Responsibility 
Deal. Following a brief overview of the political science literature on the low 
visibility of governance networks to non-participants, the section goes on to 
explore the limited media and political attention to this partnership. The 
remaining sub-sections argue that the paradoxical nature of accountability 
mechanisms was an unanticipated (but predictable) consequence of 
governmental depoliticization. 
 
5.4.1 Attention seekers? Media interest in the Responsibility Deal 
 
For public accountability mechanisms to function, decision-making had to be 
scripted and staged to gain mass media attention. As discussed in the previous 
section, discourses of transparency underpin the assumption that the supply of 
publicly available information would be sufficient to provide the media with 
narratives that could be translated into ‘news’ for a wider public. In other words, 
public accountability depended on a focusing event to attract media attention, 
and a regular supply of information to facilitate continuous tracking of policy 
developments (Boswell 2012). In short, accountability was reliant on information 
supply to produce media attention, in turn politicising this issue and creating 
market incentives for high standards of industry self-regulation. This created a 
paradoxical situation, in which placing decision-making ‘at one remove’ from 
formal institutions (Burnham 2001) limited political or media interest in this 
issue. Writing on network governance in a mediatized politics, Hajer observes 
that governance networks lack the symbolic appeal of formal political 
institutions: 
 
‘While in the modernist repertoire there are clear settings for performing 
politics, network governance is notoriously weak in this respect. It lacks 
both drama and dramaturgy. This is deeply problematic in a society in 
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which politics has come to be inherently mediatized […] all that network 
governance can offer is a meeting room filled with administrators, some 
stakeholders, expert reports, and a folder with minutes and draft 
agreements. This can hardly be made into an interesting story, and is 
therefore neglected by journalists and remains invisible to the general 
public’. 
 
(Hajer 2009: 177) 
 
This extract illustrates the accountability problem of governance networks, in 
which opaque decisional procedures are not easily accessible to external 
scrutiny (Papadopoulos 2003), or indeed provide the media with interesting 
narratives. 
 
This suggests that simultaneously depoliticising accountability mechanisms 
while politicising consumer choice, constituted a problem that required 
assiduous use of metagovernance tools to ensure political and media attention 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2009). However, the RD received a low level of media and 
political attention, despite the efforts of DH officials to generate interest in its 
decisional procedures and policy output. It is important to be clear about this 
analysis. It does not attempt to quantitatively assess media attention, or to 
gauge levels of citizen engagement. Rather, it presents analysis of discussion 
papers to explore perceptions of media attention. The findings suggest DH 
officials encountered barriers to media engagement. 
 
While discussion papers emphasised the ‘positive press coverage’ of the Food 
Network, this discursive framing did not reflect media interest in this policy issue. 
Importantly, the launch of the Responsibility Deal received a low level of press 
coverage, which predominately focused on sporadic events, such as the British 
Heart Foundation and British Medical Association refusing to engage in the RD. 
This is evident in media reports across tabloid and broadsheet national 
newspapers, such as The Guardian, The Times, and The Daily Telegraph. For 
example, the Daily Telegraph headline stated that ‘Charities refused to sign up 
for government’s health drive’ (The Daily Telegraph 2011). The Guardian 
similarly reported that health bodies had ‘walked away’ and ‘refuse to sign up’ 
to the Responsibility Deal (Boseley 2011). 
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Over the next 18 months, discussion papers framed the Responsibility Deal as 
a source of ongoing media attention. For example, a DH press release to 
announce the launch of a calorie reduction pledge in March 2012 (discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 6) attracted muted interest, with The Daily Telegraph 
(The Telegraph 2012) and The Sun (The Sun 2012) focusing less on 
partnership than the self-regulatory commitments of brand names such as Mars 
and Coca Cola. In January 2013, this was followed up with a DH press release 
on industry commitments that received similarly low levels of media attention, 
with press coverage concentrating on comments made by the Parliamentary-
Under Secretary of State for Health, Anna Soubry. Speaking at an industry 
stakeholder event organised by the FDF to publicise further calorie reduction 
efforts, Soubry remarked that ‘you could almost tell somebody’s background by 
their weight […]’. In this case, attempts to politicise industry self-regulation was 
superseded by media interest in reporting the stigmatising comments made by 
a senior politician. 
 
These examples illustrate the barriers faced by DH officials in terms of framing 
the RD as an interesting story that would be likely to elicit media interest. First, 
it is evident that this mode of governance lacked the drama of decision-making 
in parliament, with media attention reflecting an interest in recognisable 
symbols, notably in reporting on brand names and emotive comments made by 
recognisable politicians (Hajer 2009). Second, the piecemeal information 
contained in DH press releases reflected sporadic patterns of government 
reporting, which in turn produced punctuated media and political attention. This 
helps explain both the low visibility of the RD, and the barriers to discursively 
constructing this mode of governance as an interesting story deserving of media 
attention. Moreover, as the following sub-section explores, policy-based 
interviewees did not perceive market-driven accountability mechanisms as 
creating market incentives for high standards of self-regulation. 
 
5.4.3 Market failure, or failure to market?  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the institutional design of the 
Responsibility Deal reflected a purposeful decision to depoliticise the role of 
government, divesting itself of responsibility for monitoring accountability 
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processes. Yet, assumptions that industry compliance would be driven by 
reputational risk, stood in stark contrast to the efforts of DH officials to persuade 
reticent companies to participate. 
 
This process is visible within Food Network action notes, which routinely 
underline the work of DH officials to persuade industry actors to develop self-
regulatory standards through bilateral meetings and trade events. For example, 
a future work programme paper circulated at the ninth steering group meeting 
[December 2012] details the priority of ‘achieving greater awareness of the work 
of the Food Network and sign-up to pledges’. This document recommended 
‘holding regular engagement events open to all partners and potential partners 
to update on progress and drive implementation’. Moreover, the above 
discussion is illustrative of a trend in the data, in which action notes and 
discussion papers placed an increasingly stronger emphasis on the facilitative 
and motivational work of DH officials. 
 
The problem of industry participation is captured in a DH-drafted paper 
circulated at the 6
th
 plenary group meeting in July 2012, bluntly titled ‘Reasons 
to sign-up to the Responsibility Deal’. As might be expected, this document lists 
the reputational and market incentives for participation, arguing that ‘it’s easy 
and free to sign up and shows a public commitment to this work’. While the 
content of this document is unremarkable, the fact it was drafted is revealing 
about the extent to which market-driven accountability mechanisms were 
perceived by government policy actors to have been operationalised. As 
discussed earlier, the institutional design and framing of this governance 
arrangement assumed that depoliticization of accountability processes would 
allow for ‘hands-off’ metagovernance. Yet, it is evident in the discourses and 
assumptions of discussion papers, that DH officials became increasingly hands-
on in persuading industry actors to engage in the Responsibility Deal. In other 
words, the drafting of the ‘incentives’ paper embodied a tacit recognition that 
reputation-based accountability had not translated into concrete accountability 
processes. 
 
This implicit assumption can be contrasted with how policy-based interviewees 
talked about the design of accountability mechanisms. As the following extract 
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from an interview with a mid-ranking civil servant illustrates, decision-making in 
partnership was perceived to have a negligible impact on reputational risk: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘It’s a really difficult thing to do to persuade an 
organisation to do something if they’re the only ones in the sector who 
are going to be doing that. And particularly when it comes to the 
reduction of the palatability of food – we talk about fat, sugar, and salt, 
which we know are things that make food highly palatable – unless 
you’re in a position where you have consumers and the market 
demanding [healthier] products, and that is beamed back into business 
[models], you know, it can be tricky to get them [the food industry] to do 




In the above extract, the interviewee describes the tension between incentives 
to maximize profit through sales of processed foods, and a perception that 
consumers did not demand healthier food products. Consequently, persuading 
industry actors to reformulate HFSS products was a ‘really difficult thing to do’. 
Like the above interviewee, public health advocates and industry 
representatives were similarly critical of market-driven accountability 
mechanisms. For example: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘The government naively believed that industry 
would do the right thing. I think that the whole model of self-regulation is 
intellectually flawed […] it doesn’t really matter how progressive a 
particular actor is. It’s irrelevant, because they [industry actors] can be 
progressive but as soon as they vacate [space] they give away market 
advantage that is going to be filled by competitors […]. Unless you have 
a [policy] measure that ensures everyone behaves in a particular way, 
then you have no control of the market’. 
 
Trade association representative: ‘The thrust of the debate around 
accountability was around holding those who didn’t do it [self-regulation] 
to account. Nobody seemed to give much thought to ‘how do you 
celebrate and reward those who do it?’. So, the companies who 
voluntarily did it – at some cost and risk – felt that they did not get 
rewarded. While those that took the safer option of saying ‘we won’t 
bother because it’s voluntary’, did not seem to get negative PR. So, the 
whole accountability piece did not really seem to work’. 
 
While the extracts above clearly reflect diverging perspectives about self-
regulative policy instruments, both interviewees referred to the failure of market-
driven accountability mechanisms. In the case of the public health advocate, 
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this related to fundamental tensions between market incentives and the 
capacity of industry actors to self-regulate, while the trade association 
representative suggested a lack of reputational gains or losses. While this 
reputational perspective was visible across the interview data, it is worth noting 
that the PIRU evaluation found little evidence that industry actors invested non-
trivial resources into self-regulation. Conversely, the RDFN evaluation reported 
that the majority of self-regulatory commitments were clearly or plausibly 
implemented prior to the RDFN (Knai et al. 2015). Nevertheless, both 
interviewee accounts illustrate that there existed few, if any, market incentives 
for industry actors to set high self-regulatory standards. 
 
5.4.4 Depoliticization, public health advocacy, and the accountability 
paradox 
 
This section explores the paradoxical nature of accountability, using the exit of 
public health organisations from the Responsibility Deal to weave together 
discussions of metagovernance, accountability, and mediatized politics. It 
argues that the withdrawal of public health organisations embodies the paradox 
of governmental strategies to divest itself of policy responsibility, which worked 
to undermine pollicisation of market accountability. 
 
In a statement released on 17
th
 July 2013, public health organisations (Cancer 
Research UK (CRUK), The Faculty of Public Health (FPH), and UK Health 
Forum) formally withdrew from the Responsibility Deal. The drama of the 
withdrawal of multiple high-profile public health organisations (particularly 
CRUK) was an interesting narrative for the media, with The Telegraph (The 
Telegraph 2013) reporting this as a collective resignation to ‘protest […] David 
Cameron’s decision not to introduce a minimum unit price for alcohol’. Indeed, 
the decision not to include minimum unit pricing (MUP) was referred to in the 
formal statement as having ‘fallen victim to a concerted and shameful campaign 
of lobbying by sections of the drinks industry […]’. However, while this exit was 
triggered by the focusing event of the publication of the government’s alcohol 
strategy (HM Government 2012), a separate statement issued by Cancer 
Research UK to the Secretary of State for Health reflects a broader critique of 
this mode of governance. For example: 
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‘It is therefore with regret that we have decided to withdraw from your 
Responsibility Deal. As a result of today’s decision [on MUP], the 
Responsibility Deal remains the only mechanism left to reduce the 
health harms of alcohol. We joined the deal in good faith. We were told 
that this approach would complement Government policy, not replace it. 
The Deal was intended to focus on areas where industry action could be 
more effective and quicker than legislation. However, on its own it 
cannot hope to make a serious contribution to public health’. 
 
(CRUK statement, 17.7.13) 
 
The above extract illustrates a frustration with the displacement of public health 
from a governmental policy responsibility, to partnership with the alcohol (and 
food) industries. Moreover, this statement reinforces a sense that the transfer 
of political decision-making to partnership was used to depoliticise the role of 
government. The opinions expressed above were also put forward in interviews 
with public health advocates, and it is no surprise that responses tended to 
focus (often implicitly) on issues of network framing and institutional design. 
 
In terms of network framing, the data suggests that interviewees perceived the 
shift in the institutional setting of decision-making as a means for accountability 
processes to be transferred to public health organisations. First, the idea that 
the government was committed to achieving less state intervention was overtly 
articulated in many interviews. As one interviewee put it, the government were 
‘ideologically opposed to regulation, and keen to lean on business’. Second, 
many interviewees who had been involved in the Responsibility Deal talked 
about assumptions that public health organisations would take a hands-on 
regulatory role in monitoring industry actors. For example: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘I think there was an expectation that the civil 
society organisations would provide the scrutiny and pushback that was 
needed to ensure that business commitments were robust and 
meaningful. We are not resourced to do that. We didn’t have access to 
the necessary information. You need the government of Department of 
Health ensuring that necessary commercial information is made 
available, so if you are going to be serious about checking progress 
against these commitments that there is a means to do so. I think it was 






In the above extract, the interviewee describes the discourses that were 
employed by the government to frame this institutional arrangement, referring 
to assumptions that public health organisations would perform a watchdog 
function. Yet, as indicated in the above quotation, public health organisations 
did not have the kind of resources to monitor industry self-reporting. More 
specifically, the interviewee implies that this was not simply about financial 
resources, but the adequacy of information reporting. In other words, it was 
suggested that the institutional design of partnership functioned as a barrier to 
operationalizing reputation-based accountability mechanisms. This was also 
the perception of other interviewees, illustrated in the following extracts: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘Even when you had [collective] pledges, there 
was no real incentive for companies to sign-up, because those that did 
sign-up generally seemed to get – or they argued – that they got more 
scrutiny and had to comply with different reporting requirements within 
the Responsibility Deal. Those that decided not to do it didn’t have to fill 
in any of the detail, and didn’t really get any criticism. Some NGOs tried 
to highlight where companies weren’t signing up, but generally it was 
‘just keep your head down’ and nothing would happen to you if you didn’t 
sign-up’. 
 
Public health advocate: ‘[…] there was just annual progress reporting 
every March and that would be published, but with no commentary on 
whether or not that was sufficient progress, what the gaps were, where 
more action was needed, or highlighting the companies that weren’t 
signing up. There was no real [pause], if you didn’t sign-up to it, nothing 
happened to you at all […] it certainly wasn’t the case that government 
was saying: ‘this is what we want you to do, and you are going to do it’ 
[…]. It was disappointing that there was no mechanism for naming and 




In the above extracts, both interviewees hint at the paradoxical nature of 
accountability mechanisms, and similarly reflected that there existed no 
reputational risk for non-compliance or non-participation on the part of food 
companies. As both interviewees help explain, the failure to operationalize 
accountability mechanisms can be traced to the hands-off metagovernance role 
of DH, and the low visibility of partnership in a mediatized politics. First, 
interviewees referred to the limited enthusiasm of government actors to take on 
responsibilities of auditing information, or monitoring the compliance of industry 
actors with rules and codes of conduct (this is illustrated in the quotations above, 
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but also the interview data introduced in the previous page). For example, the 
way in which the first interviewee talked about the government’s symbolic 
approach to accountability, identifying the underprovision of information as 
precluding third party monitoring of industry compliance. This perception was 
evident in the other interview extracts, in which interviewees reflected that there 
were no consequences for industry actors that did not comply with performance 
standards. Second, and linked to this purposeful government strategy to divest 
itself of responsibility, is the limited media and political interest in the policy 
output of the Responsibility Deal. Reflecting this, and as articulated by one 
interviewee, initiatives to generate media attention appeared to have little 
substantive impact on industry actors, with ‘no mechanism for naming and 
shaming’ in instances where information reporting was inadequate.  
 
Overall, it is abundantly clear from the interview data that hands-off tools of 
metagovernance (network framing and institutional design) were used to 
displace responsibility beyond the state. However, as discussed in this section, 
there is little empirical evidence to support the notion that market incentives 
would induce industry actors to adopt high performance standards. In contrast, 
the data reveals tensions between this market logic and depoliticising 
processes that worked to undermine market-driven accountability mechanisms. 
All this suggests that governmental depoliticization (Type 1 depoliticization) had 
predictable consequences for public accountability, in which the government 
framed obesity policy as an issue of consumer choice. Yet, in shifting the arena 
of decision-making from the formal political sphere to informal spaces of 
partnership, this depoliticization worked to undermine public accountability. 
Indeed, this chapter argues that the government’s purposeful use of hands-off 
metagovernance tools produced an accountability paradox, whereby 
depoliticization was at least partially dependent on a continued role for the state 
in politicising the issue of obesity policy and corporate practices of food 
companies. Put simply, while the Coalition government could, in the short-term, 
displace responsibility from the formal political sphere to the public realm, the 
ideological commitment to limited state intervention confounded subsequent 






This chapter set out to explore informal accountability mechanisms, using the 
bridging concept of depoliticization to examine the interplay of governance and 
accountability processes. Through the lens of depoliticization, the chapter 
argued that accountability processes reveal tensions and paradoxes between 
the market logic of reputational risk for industry actors, and the opaque nature 
of decision-making within partnership. In other words, claims of policy 
effectiveness in policy statements contrast sharply with the institutional design 
of the RDFN. 
 
The first part of this chapter illustrated how the use of hands-off 
metagovernance tools reflected a deliberate governmental strategy to 
depoliticise obesity policy. This section outlined the use of hands-off 
metagovernance tools to displace responsibility from the government. More 
specifically, this examined how network framing and institutional design shaped 
governance arrangements in a way that precluded formal responsibilities for the 
DH in monitoring industry self-regulation. In contrast, policy documents and 
interview data reveal an explicit rejection of government responsibility for 
accountability processes. This was reflected in the framing of partnership - as a 
solution to fiscal retrenchment and an ideological commitment of the 
Conservative-led Coalition government to ‘roll back the state’ (Kerr et al, 2011; 
Peck & Tickell 2002) - but also the design of accountability mechanisms that 
restricted the responsibilities of the DH to a web-based transparency role. The 
second empirical section of this chapter then explored the barriers to 
operationalizing market accountability, demonstrating the barriers to 
(de)politicization in a mediatized politics. This outlined the rhetoric-reality gap 
between the framing and design of the Responsibility Deal, and 
operationalization of accountability mechanisms, before moving on to consider 
the invisibility of governance networks in media and political debates (Hajer 
2009). This section explored the tensions and paradoxes that ensued from the 
attempt by government to depoliticise accountability through a shift in decision-
making to the informal political spaces of governance networks. However, the 
analysis here suggests that DH officials involved in the RDFN faced barriers in 
attracting media attention, which fixated on the political drama of ministerial 
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statements and withdrawal of public health bodies. This was visible across 
interviews with public health advocates, in which many associated 
accountability failures with governmental strategies to divest itself of 
responsibility. 
 
What does this mean in terms of partnership as a mode of governance? This 
chapter challenges the rationale which is explicit in official policy statements, 
that partnership between government and food industry actors would mobilize 
commercial sector resources and induce voluntary compliance with high self-
regulatory standards. For example, this logic is reflected in the Responsibility 
Deal launch statement, which frames partnership with commercial sector actors 
as generating ‘more progress, more quickly, with less cost than legislation’ (DH 
2011: 2). More specifically, the idea that industry actors could ‘accelerate the 
progress toward public health goals’ (DH 2011: 2) assumed that the 
depoliticization of formal accountability mechanisms would lead to the 
simultaneous politicization of food industry activities. However, as the findings 
illustrate, this displacement did not enhance policy effectiveness, but instead 
operated to undermine public accountability. As such, this chapter challenges 
the assumption that governments can divest themselves of responsibility 
through a market-driven logic. The analysis of this chapter suggests that 
reputation-based accountability mechanisms are unlikely to produce the kinds 
















Chapter 6. Informal governance and food industry influence: policy 




This chapter draws on the empirical data outlined in the previous chapter to 
examine decisional procedures within the Food Network, and explores these 
processes against the claim that the Responsibility Deal would ‘agree practical 
actions to secure more progress, more quickly, with less cost than legislation’ 
(DH 2011: 2). The chapter also examines policy making in the context of the 
Public Health Commission (introduced in Chapter 4), in which decision-making 
is framed as a discursive and consensus-oriented process. The empirical focus 
of this chapter is to critically assess the assumption that partnerships embed a 
mode of decision-making that could plausibly lead to negotiated agreements 
between the government and food industry actors. This chapter traces decision-
making through the lens of informal governance, defined as the non-codified 
policy settings which are not structured by pre-given sets of rules or formal 
institutions (Tatenhove, Mak, and Liefferink 2006). The empirical data 
presented in this chapter highlights the marked difference between the notion 
of partnership as accountable and visibly deliberative (Hay 2007), and evidence 
that shows that negotiations were conducted in ways that excluded public health 
organisations from decision-making. What the empirical data reveals is that 
discussions were conducted in the back stage of policy making, in which food 
industry actors could shape the ‘rules of the game’ in negotiations less 
constrained by the front stage of steering group meetings. This back stage of 
policy making enabled industry actors to avoid unwelcome performance 
standards and mandated self-regulatory commitments. These findings suggest 
that claims relating to ‘practical actions’ contrast with back stage decision-
making that stymied policy effectiveness, and excluded public health 
organisations from the process. The central argument of this chapter is that the 
flawed institutional design of partnership institutionalised decisional procedures 
in which back stage negotiations undermined policy making in the front stage. 
 
This chapter is divided into five substantive sections. The first section focuses 
on informal governance, and explores concepts that are relevant to exploring 
decisional processes: the interrelationship between front and back stage of 
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policy making. The second section introduces the notion of multiple 
accountabilities disorder (Koppell 2005), outlining tensions between practices 
of account-giving and stakeholder responsiveness. The third and fourth 
sections use two in-depth empirical case studies to trace decision-making 
processes in the Food Network (RDFN) of the Responsibility Deal. The third 
section begins by restating the methodological approach used to analyse 
informal governance, before moving on to explore the back stage negotiations 
over the scope of a collective pledge on calorie reduction, and proposals for 
quantitative performance standards. Using a combination of email 
correspondence between industry representatives and Department of Health 
(DH) officials and meeting documents, these sections demonstrate how key 
decisions were shifted to the back stage of policy making. The findings reveal 
that, in contrast with policy discourses that framed decision-making as effective 
and deliberative, the front stage of meetings functioned to rubber stamp 
decisions that had been pre-negotiated in the back stage. The final section 
explores how interviewees framed informal governance arrangements. It 
argues that back stage processes functioned to break deadlocks between DH 
officials and food industry actors are the predictable consequence of multiple 
accountabilities. 
 
6.2 Informal governance  
 
Informal governance refers to the observed shift in contemporary policy making 
to spheres of decision-making that are not structured by formal rules. The 
academic literature exploring informal governance constitutes a small but 
distinctive sub-field, with much of the research focused on policy making at the 
EU level (Reh 2013; Christiansen and Neuhold 2013;bTatenhove, Mak, and 
Liefferink 2006). However, this concept is closely linked to the literatures on 
deliberative policy analysis (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) and depoliticisation 
(Beveridge 2012) which conceptualise a shift towards informal spaces of politics 
in which there are no agreed upon procedural rules (Hajer 2003: 175). This 
chapter draws on the framework developed by Van Tatenhove, Mak and 
Liefferink (2006: 14) who define informal governance as: 
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‘Those non-codified settings of day-to-day interaction concerning policy 
issues, in which the participation of actors, the formation of coalitions, 
the processes of agenda setting, (preliminary) decision-making and 
implementation are not structured by pre-given sets of rules or formal 
institutions’ 
 
There are two concepts that are central to this framework (Ayres 2017). First, 
informal practices depend on the motives of the actors involved. Van Tatenhove 
et al (2006) provide a heuristic that distinguishes between intent that can be 
either cooperative or conflicting. In cooperative strategies, informal practices 
may focus on developing innovative new rules, which may subsequently be 
formalized. In conflicting strategies, the strategic intent of actors involved is to 
change rules through their critical voice or subverting existing rules. This 
framework is used to analyse the strategic intent of food industry actors to 
undermine the formal political objectives of the Food Network. Second, the 
interplay of informal and formal practices refers to Goffman’s (1959) distinction 
between front stage and back stage: political space as the interaction between 
two regions in which policy making takes place. The notion of performance is 
central to the distinction between front and back stages, in which the front stage 
is where roles are performed to an audience. Drawing on Hajer’s performative 
perspective on governance (see Chapter 2), Tatenhove et al (2006) describe 
back stage processes as taking place in conditions of institutional ambiguity in 
which there are no agreed upon norms and rules that determine who is 
responsible, and what form of accountability is to be expected (Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005). In the back stage, actors talk about what is going on frontstage 
and reveal facts that would not be reproduced to an external audience (Wodak 
2009). Goffman (1959: 112) observed that ‘the back region is the place where 
the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a 
matter of course’. In contrast to the codified rules of the front stage, informal 
practices in the back stage are less constrained by formal rules. Van Tatenhove 
et al (2006) describe the front stage as rule-directed (provided by codified rules) 
and back stage as rule-altering in which the rules of the game are inherently 
less clear and the roles of actors not pre-given. This corresponds to Beck’s 
(Beck 1994) notion of sub-politicisation, which conceptualises rule-altering 
politics as a kind of meta-politics (politics of politics) in which actors alter the 
rules of the game. 
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This chapter examines the impact of informal governance in relation to policy 
effectiveness and deliberation. Before moving on to consider these dimensions, 
the chapter considers the inclusion of industry actors in rule-altering practices. 
This section explores the ways in which the framing of partnership as 
collaborative was operationalized in the substantive conception of 
accountability as stakeholder responsiveness (Koppell 2005). 
 
6.3 Decision-making and the challenge of ‘Multiple accountabilities 
disorder’ 
 
In a widely-cited paper, Koppell (2005) argues that the image of accountability 
as a normative standard of governance masks disagreement about how the 
concept is operationalized in practice. This can lead to fuzzy accountability 
(Bache et al. 2015) in which contradictions and tensions exist between 
dimensions of accountability. In Koppell’s words, competing expectations of its 
operative definition give rise to multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD) in which 
public officials attempt to mix together different types of accountability (in 
Koppell’s typology, the five dimensions include transparency, liability, 
controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness). In attempting to reconcile 
these dimensions, accountability resembles a ‘bureaucratic version of Twister’ 
(Koppell 2005: 99) in which policy makers may be faced with the irreconcilable 
expectations of transparency, account-giving and responsiveness. Having 
described governmental strategies to depoliticise accountability mechanisms in 
the previous chapter, this section uses interview data to explore civil servant 
interviewees’ perceptions about partnership working. 
 
6.3.1 Accountability as responsiveness 
 
A pattern of interviews with civil servants was the tendency of interviewees, 
when asked to describe what they felt was distinctive about this mode of 
governance, to frame partnership working in terms of responsiveness to 
stakeholders. This is illustrated in the following quotation in which the 
interviewee framed interaction with food industry actors: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘What is important to me about partnership 
working is being candid, honest and transparent about what is needed. 
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I often have conversations with stakeholders where I know we have a 
completely different opinion about what the right way to do something 
is. And I’m going to do that because that’s what Ministers want us [civil 
servants] to do […] my conversations with partners is about ‘how do we 




In the above extract, the interviewee conceptualises partnership working in 
terms of balancing the interests of industry actors with public health aims. It is 
important to note how the interviewee describes accountability as a function of 
departmental hierarchy, in which responsiveness is framed as operationalizing 
and implementing policies established by ministers. Their task was to take 
partnership ideas and turn them into workable (or meaningful) policies. 
Moreover, it is evident in the following extract that this interviewee interpreted 
having conversations as involving the direct participation of industry actors in 
policy formulation. For example:  
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think what we will be doing in the coming 
weeks is working with those [industry] partners that are going to be 
critical [to the obesity strategy] and having conversations with them 
about what part they think they are going to play and what will be the 
right way of us working through partnerships with them’ 
 
This highlights the assumption that policies will be negotiated between 
government and the food industry. Like the above interviewee, most civil 
servants interviewed suggested that industry actors should have a role in 
decision-making. Moreover, the notion of the food industry as rule-makers was 
framed in interviews as indistinguishable from the assumption among 
interviewees, that obesity policy ought to be formulated in partnership. This view 
is captured in the following quotation: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘As opposed to…? This is a difficult question 
because I don’t do anything that’s not in partnership. It’s a bit like; how 
would I do it if I didn’t do it in partnerships? I wouldn’t…I just wouldn’t’. 
 
This suggests that partnership narratives had undergone a process of 
discursive institutionalisation, used to conceptualize the policy process and 
embedded in organizational practices (Hajer 2009). Yet, while the interview data 
illustrates the perception among civil servants that partnership working 
 146 
institutionalised an accountability to industry actors as co-producers of policies, 
it is interesting that civil servants that were interviewed were equivocal about 
what the RD had achieved in terms of public health. For example: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘Don’t forget that it [Responsibility Deal] was 
under a Coalition government. I mean, it’s not been closed down yet; but 
how we go forward working with industry is part of the childhood obesity 
strategy […] the voluntary partnership worked well but in some areas it 
didn’t go far enough, such as on [marketing] promotions where we didn’t 
get any voluntary agreement. You know, there are some areas where 
it’s not the answer, I think. 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think the new approach [focused on 
childhood obesity] has learned from the Responsibility deal. I mean, the 
RD [sic] certainly had some very significant successes, but I think it was 
also recognised that there were things that could be improved. And one 
of them was this question of benchmarking […] what have they done by 
signing up to the Responsibility Deal that they wouldn’t have done 
anyway. And there was a bit of a lack of transparency because of the 
absence of benchmarking at the outset’. 
 
It is important to note that the Responsibility Deal remained a very sensitive 
area for the DH and it is clear from the above quotations that interviewees used 
time horizons to construct a boundary between past governance and current 
policy strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3, this partnership was referred to as 
having become a toxic policy, and in this sense, it is unsurprising that civil 
servant interviewees emphasised what they perceived as its policy successes. 
However, the above quotations illustrate tensions between the notion of co-
production, and the perception among interviewees that partnership working 
was not particularly effective in negotiating voluntary agreements between 
government and the food industry. As the second quotation underlines, 
information reporting mechanisms were referred to as having failed to produce 
high standards of corporate behaviour. While the failure of accountability 
mechanisms can be traced to attempts by the Coalition government to displace 
responsibility beyond the state, the following sections demonstrate that policy 






6.4 Deliberative ideals and back stage deals: industry influence over 
the drafting of voluntary commitments in the Food Network 
 
While civil servant interviewees reflected that the Responsibility Deal had not 
achieved the policy aims that had been claimed in policy statements, the 
interview data was less clear about why interviewees felt that this was the case. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, policy effectiveness was presented as 
being clearly related to the depoliticisation of accountability mechanisms. Yet, I 
was interested in what influence industry actors had exercised over information 
reporting requirements and the framing of voluntary commitments. FOI requests 
were submitted to the DH that generated email correspondence between FDF 
representatives and policy makers over a two-year period (April 2010 – March 
2012). These documents could then be used to trace the interplay between the 
front stage of steering group meetings, and decision-making in back stage email 
conversations between industry actors and DH officials. First, it is important to 
understand policy claims made about partnerships in the institutional design of 
the Food Network, conceived in broad terms as an attempt to get certain 
meanings to ‘stick’ in informal and formal practice (Lowndes and Pratchett 
2014). 
 
6.4.1 Institutional design  
 
In its recommendations, the Public Health Commission report stated that a 
future Responsibility Deal should embody a decisive shift away from traditional 
forms of regulation towards regulation built on normative legitimacy. It argued 
that industry would engage in partnership because ‘many business leaders 
believe that responding to wider social and environmental challenges is simply 
the right thing to do’. This report framed the role of government as 
metagoverning networks, organizing collaborative dialogues and negotiating 
roles and responsibilities. The form that decision-making would take was 
expected to be deliberative and consensus-oriented: 
 
‘For example, a Responsibility Deal in obesity would have to tease out 
how different factors such as the role of regular exercise, the 
composition of various food products, and education in healthy eating 
might combine to address the problem. The Responsibility Deal process 
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would then have to negotiate who would do what in each area […] The 
process would be discursive and companies would therefore have an 
opportunity to argue their case for why certain expectations were 
realistic or otherwise. The process would also be designed to bring 
pressure on other parties to play their respective roles and focus on 
outcomes […] regular meetings of the forum would also help to ensure 
that there was a shared sense, among all participants, of the need to 
deliver on their part of the contract’. 
 
(Public Health Commission, 2008:10) 
 
This recommendation has two important dimensions. First, the report frames 
partnership working as a deliberative process that includes affected interests, 
and facilitates discursive interactions that enable and promote the exchange of 
arguments (Landwehr and Holzinger 2010). It assumes that deliberation would 
lead actors to seek a reasoned consensus (Risse 2004), in which coordinative 
pressures (the presence of a requirement to come to a collectively binding 
decision) could be expected to facilitate compromise and produce informed 
rational decisions (Hendriks 2009). This framing aligns with its definition in the 
academic literature on deliberative democracy, as a communicative process 
that aligns with normative ideals of reciprocity and reasonable dialogue (Fung 
2006; Gutmann and Thompson 1998). As the report argues, meetings would 
take place in spaces of politics that induce reflective decision-making (Dryzek 
and Hendriks 2012), reflecting the Habermasian ideal of a forum in which the 
force of the better argument prevails (Habermas 1984). At the first plenary group 
(PG) meeting of the Responsibility Deal in September 2010 a discussion paper 
set out the aims of partnership working, reproducing the idea that decision-
making would embody deliberative ideals of transparency and inclusiveness: 
 
[PG Meeting 1]: ‘A Public Health Responsibility Deal presents an 
opportunity to reframe the relationship between Government, business, 
NGOs, local government and the public in tackling the challenges facing 
public health […]’ 
 
[PG Meeting 1] ‘The strength of the Deal’s partnership will lie in the 
diversity of organisations that it brings together – public sector, 
commercial and charitable – and for it to be successful we need to trust 
each other. We therefore hope that participants in this venture will be 
willing to adopt the following working principles 
 
• To support the initiative publicly and not seek to undermine the 
approach 
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• To recognise that we are approaching this from different 
perspectives – this is the strength of the partnership 
• To recognise that there will be differences of opinion – we need to 
be willing to consider and agree compromise approaches’ 
 
(Department of Health 2010a) 
 
As the above extracts illustrate, the institutional design of the Responsibility 
Deal is framed as a process of collective decision-making in which government, 
civil society and business actors consider arguments in view of the collective 
good. Indeed, as the working principles of this document underline, it is 
assumed that justificatory and coordinative pressures will enable compromise. 
This rationale is also evident in a discussion paper circulated at the first meeting 
of the Food Network Steering Group (RDFN) in March 2011:  
 
[RDFN 1]: Task-specific working groups will be convened to deliver 
products commission by the Steering Group […] Outputs from the 
working groups will be tested with a wider range of external partners 
through the e-Food network (either electronically or via focused events) 
before being considered by the Steering Group and put to the RD 
Plenary Group. 
 
[RDFN 1]: The final makeup of each working group will vary depending 
on the needs of the workstream but will: 
 
• Reflect the need for a high level of involvement of all sectors of 
business, as well as the role of other partners such as NGOs and 
professional bodies embedded in the overall RD approach; 
• Be expected to include representation from a cross-section of 
partner organisations to include technical and broader policy input 
from industry; 
• Be proposed by the Chair and Secretariat following discussion and 
calls for expertise, as appropriate, and agreed with the Steering 
Group. 
 
Working arrangements will be flexed to ensure an appropriate balance 
between development and review of draft outputs, and may be carried 
out through a mix of physical meetings and/or electronic forums’. 
 
(Department of Health 2011b)  
 
Like the first PG meeting, the documents circulated at the RDFN frame decision-
making as a discursive and consensus-oriented process, in which affected 
interests would be included in policy decisions. Moreover, the RDFN terms of 
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reference also illustrate the privileging of commercial sector interests in 
decisional procedures, with working groups requiring ‘high-level involvement’ 
from all sectors of the food industry. 
 
In terms of formal design, the Responsibility Deal was constituted by five issue 
networks: food; alcohol; physical activity; health at work; and behaviour change. 
Interactions were structured around quarterly face-to-face steering group and 
plenary meetings that would collectively formulate and implement voluntary 
commitments. This represented the front stage of policy making, providing an 
institutional setting in which roles could be performed to an external audience 
through partnership documents that were publicly accessible via the 
Department of Health website. 
 
6.4.2 Decision-making in the Food Network 
 
This section explores the decision-making processes within the RDFN that were 
directed towards collectively drafting a performance standard on calorie 
reduction (CR). It reconstructs policy making practices using a synthesis of 
steering group meeting documents, and analysis of documents generated from 
FOI requests that included sequential drafts of CR commitments and 
correspondence between FDF officials and DH officials. The findings suggest 
that informal practices in the back stage of decision-making subverted the public 
aims of this meta-regulatory framework. 
 
Front stage decision-making 
 
At the first meeting of the RDFN, a future work discussion paper stated that 
policy discussions would focus on collectively drafting a CR ‘pledge’, framed in 
the document as ‘having the potential to deliver real public health benefits in a 
way that draws public attention to the industry contribution’ (Department of 
Health 2011c). In the discourse of the Responsibility Deal, the language of 
pledge-making referred to internal (individual pledges) and sectoral (collective 
pledges) commitments that industry actors could make in support of the 
Responsibility Deal. As Table 6.1 (below) outlines, the notion of an individual 
pledge incentivised companies to adopt internal performance standards and 
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codes of conduct. By contrast, a collective pledge required the RDFN to reach 
a binding decision among participants, which included representatives from 
public health organisations (CRUK and FPH), trade associations (such as the 
FDF), and individual companies (Mars UK and Tesco). 
 
Table 6.1 The definition of individual and collective pledges as framed in the 
RD policy statement  
Individual 
pledges 
[…] are specific to a particular organisation or sub-group within a 
sector, and have been developed by them and approved by the 
relevant network chairs and the Department of Health. Making an 
individual pledge gives an organisation the opportunity to 
demonstrate where they can be leaders in their sector by going further 
than collective action can at present, or to make a commitment in an 




[…] represent the collectively agreed action that members of a given 
sector will take in support of a particular core commitment. All partners 
have signed up to deliver at least one of the collective pledges – some 
have signed up to many more. These pledges have been designed 
and developed by the networks, and approved by the relevant 
network chairs and the department of Health 
Source: (Department of Health 2011a: 5)  
 
 
The attempt to design a flexible model of meta-regulation rather than structure 
decision-making according to pre-given rules or standards, is captured in the 
following interview quotations: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘The high-level view was that [the Coalition 
government] were not going to use regulation and legislation as a policy 
instrument - you were going to use voluntary agreements. What those 
voluntary agreements were was up for discussion, but because they 
were voluntary, they were by necessity only going to be undertaken by 
the food industry if they felt it was in their interests to do so. And I think 
that’s [pause] I’m not criticising them for that. That’s how companies are 
set up; they are set up to act in their own interest’. 
 
Public health advocate: ‘[…] it was almost, ‘OK, what do we want to do, 
and what can industry agree to do’ […] I think that shifted to some extent 
as the Responsibility Deal evolved, but it was certainly the case that it 
wasn’t so much the government saying, ‘this is what we want you to do 




The above extracts demonstrate there is a clear assumption that industry actors 
had significant influence in front stage decision-making. Indeed, both 
interviewees appear to position industry as exercising a veto on policies that did 
not align with their political or economic strategies. Yet, as the following sub-
section unpacks, corporate influence was exercised in back stage policy 
making.  
 
6.4.3 Back stage deals: reconstructing the drafting process  
 
The indicative timeline for implementing the CR pledge, as set out in the future 
work paper, was to announce this work in May 2011 and launch the pledge in 
Spring 2012. In the context of governmental strategies to displace accountability 
to the market, coordinative and time pressures appear to have been purposeful 
tactics in creating external pressures to reach a collective agreement. 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the institutional design of the RD was 
based on reputation-based accountability mechanisms that was assumed 
would create incentives for industry actors to agree ‘practical actions’. However, 
the development of this pledge reveals the rhetoric-reality gap between 
deliberative ideals and back stage deals. 
 
As a key agenda item of the second meeting of RDFN in June 2011, proposals 
for the development of a CR pledge were discussed among attendees. This 
discussion was contextualised by an expert report prepared by the 
Carbohydrates Working Group of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition 
(SACN)
8
. A paper on the proposed work programme also framed the pledge as 
an opportunity for the food industry to work with the DH secretariat. Specifically, 
both the SACN report and work programme discussion paper underline the 
collective role of the food industry in reducing calorie intake at the population 
level. This is illustrated in the following extract from the discussion paper: 
 
                                                
8
 The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN) is an advisory committee set up to 
provide scientific advice on, and risk assessment of, nutrition and health related issues. It advises 
the governments of all UK countries and is supported by a Public Health England (an executive 
agency of the Department of Health) secretariat. 
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[RDFN 2]: […] information to consumers will only ever be fully effective 
in helping individuals to reduce calorie intake if they are complemented 
by new far-reaching action by business […] in simple terms, ‘supply-side 
action’ refers to measures by business that enables individuals to 
reduce their calorie intake without needing to make dramatic, or 
sometimes even conscious changes to their dietary habits’. 
 
It is important to note that, in framing calorie intake in terms of ‘upstream’ (as 
opposed to downstream individual-level) drivers, these documents located 
responsibility with food industry actors as ‘fixers’ of the problem. In other words, 
this framing categorized industry practices (and not individual ‘lifestyle choice’) 
as the dimension that the pledge ought to focus on. This is a critical point, as 
this framed the work of RDFN as structured by a focus on market strategies, 
such as marketing practices and the manufacture of HFSS products. Following 
the second RDFN meeting, the DH Secretariat circulated a pledge outline that 
framed the substantive policy issue and corresponding responsibilities of the 
food industry. The proposed wording of the pledge was: 
 
[Food Network 3]: ‘We recognise the need to reduce the population’s 
calorie intake by 5 billion calories (kcal) per day. We will encourage our 
customers to eat and drink fewer calories through actions such as 
product reformulation, portion control, and actions to shift the balance of 
promotions toward lower calorie options. We will monitor and report on 




This draft developed the idea that the food industry ought to be assigned 
responsibility for population-level drivers of obesity, underlining marketing 
practices and reformulation as areas for collective agreement. Yet, as this 
discussion paper states, revisions had already been made to the pledge outline, 
indicated in italics (see above). For example, the paper notes that ‘responsible 
promotions’ had been revised to ‘actions to shift the balance of promotions 
toward lower calorie options’ in response to feedback received by the DH 
Secretariat between June – September 2011. In addition, a proposed set of 
‘supporting principles’ – a formal set of norms and practices to guide industry 
activities – had also been substantively revised. This included the deletion of a 
specification for supply-side commitments to have a population-level impact. 
Table 6.2 comparatively summarises the substantive changes made to 
supporting principles in the three-month period between the second and third 
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RDFN meetings. Text in bold represents supporting principles that were 
deleted between June – September, and text that is underlined represents 
principles that were added during this period. 
 









1. Should be new or significantly enhance existing activity. 
2. Should preserve or improve overall nutritional profile  
3. Should not contribute to inequalities  
4. Should be typically long term and sustained, unless part of 
a planned pilot 
5. Should be carried out on a sufficient scale to make 
population-level impact (e.g. should not be so small as to 
invite criticism or ridicule) 
6. Should complement and not substitute for a collective 
pledge  
7. Should be developed in a way which is responsible and 





1. Should be new or significantly enhance existing activity  
2. Should reduce where possible the salt, saturated fat or sugar 
(NMES) content of the product 
3. Should seek to deliver long term and sustained progress 
4. Should be carried out on a sufficient scale to make a significant 
impact 
5. Should be developed in way that embraces the spirit of the 
Responsibility Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid 
the potential for unintended consequences, including the 
likelihood of exacerbating health inequalities 




The discussion paper notes that the pledge outline had been circulated to RDFN 
members for comments on 10
th
 August. Email correspondence, accessed via 
an FOI request for feedback received by the DH Secretariat, reveals that 
substantive changes were made by both public health organisations and 
individual companies. For example, feedback from CRUK suggested replacing 
‘people’ with ‘our customers’ as a means of framing the pledge to resonate with 
the food industry. It is also clear from industry feedback that there was an issue 
with the framing of industry commitments as new activities. This is highlighted 
in the feedback from Mars UK, which underlines a concern with ‘the specific 
emphasis on “new” activities’, given what it claims are ‘incredibly complex’ 
challenges to reformulating products and ‘changes’ to calorie content. Perhaps 
the most significant feedback was received from the FDF, which was received 




(and approximately two weeks later than feedback from other RDFN members). 
In an email sent to the Secretariat dated 8
th
 September, the FDF Director 
General (DG) emphasised ‘significant concerns about the draft pledge and 
supporting principles as they stand’. While the email was framed in a way that 
underlined the corporate social responsibility of FDF members and a collective 
ethos of partnership working, it signalled strong industry opposition to the 
pledge outline and supporting principles. These concerns are illustrated in the 
following email extract: 
 
[FDF email 1]: ‘Ultimately, progress in this area will only be made if 
individuals achieve an appropriate calorie balance (and many of our 
members feel, notwithstanding their responsibility to make a 
contribution, that the challenge needs to be rooted in calorie balance 
rather than focusing solely on calorie reduction). A focus on the 
responsibility of the individual must be at the heart of the calorie 
reduction challenge and embedded into supporting action and pledges 
responding to the challenge’. 
 
This attempt to reframe the pledge toward the ‘lifestyle choice’ of individuals, 
captures the evident concern within the FDF that companies could be expected 
to implement voluntary mechanisms that placed limits on their core business 
model (increasing consumption of processed foods). Table 6.2 illustrates the 
concerns of FDF members (which include transnational companies such as 
Coca-Cola, Kellogg’s, Mondelez, Pepsico and Unilever), highlighting specific 
comments relating to the pledge outline and supporting principles. This 
highlights opposition to the 5 billion target for calorie reduction, and issues with 
the phrasing of supporting principles. For example, feedback on the pledge 
outline suggests that FDF members were not supportive of proactively 
encouraging consumers to eat less processed food, which it is claimed would 
limit growth strategies. All this suggests that collective agreement would not be 
reached between the DH Secretariat and FDF based on the first draft of the CR 
pledge. 
 
It is important to note that the concerns articulated by FDF and Mars UK did not 
translate into substantive revisions in the short-term. Indeed, the pledge outline 
remained substantively unchanged in documents circulated at the third RDFN 
meeting in September 2011. This meeting was marked by the attendance of 
Andrew Lansley, the Secretary of State for Health, who joined the meeting to 
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persuade the food industry to consider supply-side actions. As Lansley stated, 
the pledge was ‘not simply about having lower calorie options, but was instead 
about shifting the whole offering in a healthier direction’. 
 
 
Table 6.3 FDF feedback to DH Secretariat regarding pledge outline and supporting 
principles 
 
Scientific underpinning  ‘Members believe that the evidence 
underpinning the calorie challenge should be 
made clearer – both in terms of the 5 billion 
calories headline and the emphasis on calories 
in as apparently a more significant factor than 
calories out […]’ 
Pledge outline ‘Some members also pointed out where they 
may be constrained in what they could offer in 
terms of calorie reduction, they would wish to 
consider contributing in other ways e.g. 
promoting physical activity.’ 
 
In general, members were uncomfortable with 
the use of the word ‘encourage’ which appeared 
to suggest that companies would be expected to 
tell consumers to eat less of their products.’ 
Supporting principles 
 
2. Should not increase the salt, 
saturated fat or sugar (NMES) 
content of the product 
 
 
‘Members reiterated that product reformulation 
will not necessarily result in a reduction in 
calories. Neither salt nor saturated fat reduction 
are linked to calorie reduction […] the 
Department needs to be clear about 
prioritisation and recognise that businesses also 
need both to prioritise investment, and to 
manage consumer acceptance of reformulation 
over time. 
 
3. Should seek to deliver long 
term and sustained changes 
 
4. Should be carried out on a 
sufficient scale to make a 
significant public health impact 
‘Members felt that these principles were 
unhelpful as drafted […] they also send the 
wrong message to larger businesses and may 
prevent them taking part – for example, small 
changes may have a significant public health 
impact 
Source: FOI request for documents relating to development of Calorie 




There are two aspects of the decision-making process that are important to 
note. First, it is clear the front stage setting of face-to-face RDFN meetings was 
facilitated by informal back stage negotiations. This is apparent in the circulation 
by the DH Secretariat of a pledge outline with the aim of receiving feedback in 
advance of the third RDFN meeting in September. Moreover, this informal back 
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stage was a purposeful feature of the RDFN institutional design, in which the 
proposed terms of reference explicitly referred to electronic communications as 
a key channel of access to DH officials. This was conceptualised as an ‘e-Food 
Network’ that was described in this document as having a ‘key role in ensuring 
that the widest possible range of players […] are able to take part in the work of 
the RDFN. In other words, back stage negotiations were formally sanctioned by 
the DH Secretariat. This notion draws on the framework adopted by Tatenhove 
et al (2006), which distinguish between a formally sanctioned back stage, and 
sub-politics that deliberately attempt to subvert formal rules. While the notion of 
formally sanctioned back stage may appear paradoxical (Tatenhove et al 2006), 
this describes informal practices that are not codified in formal rules but are 
initiated by formal institutions. In this instance, back stage decision-making was 
a feature of the institutional design of the RDFN. This is illustrated in the 
following extract from the terms of reference document: 
  
[RDFN 1]: To maximise dissemination of information about participation 
and engagement in the Network’s activities, it is suggested that these 
formal arrangements are supplemented by: 
 
• Increased communication in the form of regular, usually monthly, 
stakeholder bulletins within and beyond the e-Food Network […]; 
• The opportunity for the wider Network to communicate with the 
various groups via a single Food Network mailbox: 
foodnetwork@dh.gsi.gov.uk 
• Additional interfaces managed by DH officials to facilitate discussion 




As highlighted above, the use of email is framed as a complement to formal 
governing arrangements, helping to facilitate discussion between the DH 
Secretariat and network members. Second, it appears that the Secretary of 
State for Health believed that a hands-on approach to metagovernance would 
persuade industry actors to, in his words, ‘turn towards delivery’ of the pledge 
(Department of Health 2011e). As stated in the action note for the September 
RDFN meeting, this was to be achieved through further bilateral discussions, 
which, as discussed in this sub-section, was taking place in the back stage of 
email discussions. Despite this optimism, this meeting marked something of a 
watershed in the decision-making process. 
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Industry influence in back stage negotiations 
 
Following these preliminary interactions between the DH Secretariat and the 
FDF, back stage negotiations became increasingly fraught in the period 
between October 2011 – February 2012. While it is beyond the scope of this 
research to explore the potentially divergent positions of industry actors, the 
FDF emails provide an indication of corporate influence in back stage 
processes. This sub-section explores the interplay between front and back 
stage decision-making in the lead up to the launch of a pledge on CR. 
 
In an email to the DH Secretariat on 21
st
 October, the FDF DG emphasised 
‘fundamental issues’ that would preclude engagement in pledge 
implementation. This email stated that it was ‘not offering draft suggestions at 
this stage’ due to the claimed opposition of its members to the pledge outline 
and supporting principles. This email notes the constructive tone of a bilateral 
meeting (back stage) convened with DH officials, but reiterates strong criticism 
of the draft: 
 
[FDF email 2]: ‘Our understanding was that the Department of Health 
was keen to encourage a broad base of contributions from across the 
industry […] But to mandate which types of activities are deemed 
acceptable or to exclude actions such as extending consumer choice by 
offering lower calorie options appears to us both wholly counter-
productive to run counter to the principle of personal responsibility which 
we understand to be at the heart of the Government’s approach’. 
 
This email reiterates the policy position that responsibility should be located with 
individuals for ‘lifestyle choice’, which attempted to reframe policy discussions 
away from supply-side practices employed by processed food companies to sell 
their products. Moreover, this personal responsibility frame was used as a 
justification for rejecting the pledge in its current form. This discourse is made 
explicit in later sections of the email: 
 
[FDF email 2]: ‘Our understanding is that the aim of the pledge is to 
provide a framework for contributions from the food industry as one part 
of the response to a broad-based calorie challenge. The ultimate aim, of 
course, of the calorie reduction challenge is a net reduction in the 
number of calories consumed by individuals and this is not something 
industry can deliver’. 
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Whilst we are supportive of a calorie reduction pledge, we would have 
fundamental difficulty with any proposition that appears to require 
business to inhibit their commercial strategies for growth […] when we 
met you said that this was not the Department’s intention and that you 
would produce wording that made this clear’. 
 
The above email extracts capture the interplay between front stage policy 
discussions about the legitimate aims of a pledge on calorie reduction, and a 
back stage of bilateral meetings and email communication in which DH officials 
are claimed to have committed to rephrasing the pledge in response to industry 
feedback. At the fourth RDFN meeting in November, the DH Secretariat 
circulated a precis of the decision-making process. This updated the ‘state of 
play on calorie reduction’, stating that it was important to reach a collectively 
binding decision and ‘resolve remaining issues on the wording of the pledge’ 
through further negotiations with trade associations and companies. It is also 
noted in the action note for this meeting that a revised pledge outline was to be 
distributed to network members for feedback and comments. This was a 
significant juncture in the decision-making process, indicating a tacit 
acknowledgment from the DH Secretariat that reaching collective agreement 
would require concessions in terms of the rules and discourses of the pledge. 
 
A revised pledge outline was circulated to network members on 3
rd
 October. 
This included revisions to supporting principles made in the period between the 
September RDFN meeting. Crucially, the first principle (that actions should be 
new or significantly enhance activity) had been deleted. Although it proved 
impossible to locate when this decision was made, this reproduced the framing 
evident in feedback from Mars UK (see above) relating to the apparent 
complexity of reformulating HFSS products. While this deletion marked an 
important step in industry attempts to minimise discourses that were perceived 
as threatening market strategies for growth, the circulation of this pledge outline 
provided an opportunity for industry actors to lobby for substantive and far 
reaching revisions. As Table 6.4 summarises, supporting principles were 




Table 6.4 Revisions to supporting principles, October 2011 – February 2012  
November 1. Seek to deliver long-term and sustained changes in energy intake 
2. be carried out on a sufficient scale to make a significant impact 
on energy intake 
Seek to deliver [or builds up to] action [which seeks to deliver change] 
on a scale commensurate with the scale of the calorie reduction 
challenge, taking account of the size of the business’ operations [and 
technical constraints / possibilities] 
3. Be developed in a way which embraces the spirit of the Responsibility 
Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid the potential for 
unintended consequences, including the likelihood of exacerbating 
health inequalities  
4. Additionally reduce where possible the salt, saturated fat or sugar 
(NMES) content of the product 
January 1. Seek to deliver long-term and sustained changes in energy intake 
2. Include measures linked as closely as possible to the company’s core 
business 
3. Be developed in a way that embraces the spirit of the Responsibility 
Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid the potential for 
unintended consequences, including the likelihood of exacerbating 
health inequalities 
4. Additionally, reduce, where possible, the salt and/or saturated fat 
content of the product 
January  
[2nd draft] 
1. Seek to deliver long-term and sustained reductions in energy intake 
2. Include measures linked as closely as possible to the company’s 
core business 
3. Be developed in a way that embraces the spirit of the Responsibility 
Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid the potential for 
unintended consequences, including the likelihood of exacerbating 
health inequalities 
4. Additionally, not conflict with, and if possible work to reduce the salt 
and/or saturated fat content of the product 
February  1. Seek to deliver long-term and sustained reductions in energy intake 
2. Include measures linked to the company’s core business 
3. Be developed in a way which embraces the spirit of the Responsibility 
Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid the potential for 
unintended consequences, including the likelihood of exacerbating 
health inequalities 
4. Not conflict with, and if possible support work to reduce the salt and / 
or saturated fat content of products. 
Source: FOI request for documents relating to development of Calorie Reduction 




The scale and scope of the revisions made to supporting principles underlines 
two aspects of the decision-making process. First, it is evident from the scale of 
(re)contextualisation that the DH Secretariat were willing to reassess the 
rationale of the pledge in order to reach a collectively binding decision. For 
example, the principle that voluntary commitments should be ‘carried out on a 
sufficient scale’ was deleted, despite how crucial this external standard was for 
the stated aim of reducing population-level calorie intake through addressing 
 161 
‘upstream’ drivers of obesity. Similarly, the underlined text in Table 6.4 
illustrates the recontextualisation of principles to embed interpretive flexibility, 
such as the substitution of a commitment to reduce salt and saturated fat 
content, with the possibility of supporting reformulation where possible. Second, 
this recontextualisation illustrates the extent to which revisions aligned with 
(although not limited to) the feedback received from the FDF. This is particularly 
evident in the deletion of language that required voluntary commitments to be 
closely linked to the company’s core business, which aligns with FDF opposition 
to policies that threaten to inhibit the commercial strategies for growth of its 
members. 
 
This pattern was also evident in the recontextualisation of the pledge outline, 
summarised in Table 6.5. For example, the commitment to reduce population-
level calorie intake by 5 billion calories per day, is reframed to attribute 
responsibility to individuals. This is a subtle change in framing, but has the 
discursive impact of minimising the contribution of industry actors. As discussed 
above, these revisions are closely linked to FDF feedback, which stated that the 
calorie reduction challenge (as framed in August 2011) was ‘not something 
industry can deliver’.  
 
The implications of this subtle reframing are apparent in other areas of the 
pledge outline, such as deleted references to promotion and the addition of 
education and information as a performance standard that industry actors 
should adopt. Moreover, as Table 6.6 illustrates, this framing was reproduced 
in the first draft of a subsequent pledge on saturated fat reduction (purple 
italics is utilised to highlight identical words/phrasing). This implies that, in 
shaping the policy on calorie reduction, industry actors constituted the rules of 
the game structuring voluntary commitments more broadly. The outcome of 
decision-making therefore had the effect of institutionalising a discursive path 
dependency (Hay 2016), in which industry interests were promoted through the 
reproduction of this pledge template. These discourses, then, became path 





Table 6.5 Revision to pledge outline, October 2011 – January 2012  
November  We recognise the need to reduce the population’s energy intake 
by 5 billion calories (kcal) per day. We recognise the need to assist 
the population to reduce its energy intake by 5 billion calories (kcal) per 
day. We will encourage and enable our customers to eat and drink 
fewer calories through actions such as product / menu reformulation, 
portion control, and actions to shift the balance of promotions the 
marketing mix toward lower calorie options. We will monitor and report 




We recognise the need to assist the population to reduce its energy 
intake by 5 billion calories (kcal) per day. We will support and enable 
our customers to eat and drink fewer calories through actions such as 
product / menu reformulation, portion control, and actions to shift the 
marketing mix toward lower calorie options. We will monitor and report 
on our progress on an annual basis. 
January 
[2nd draft] 
Recognising that the Call to Action on obesity in England set out the 
importance of action on obesity, and issued a challenge to the 
population to reduce its total calorie consumption by 5 billion calories 
(kcal) per day, 
 
we will support and enable our customers to eat and drink fewer 
calories through actions such as product / menu reformulation, 
reviewing portion sizes, education and information, and actions to shift 
the marketing mix towards lower calorie options. We will monitor and 
report on our actions on an annual basis. 
Source: FOI request for documents relating to development of Calorie 




Table 6.6 Illustrative example of discursive path dependence: the phrasing 




We will support and enable our customers to eat and drink 
fewer calories through actions such as product / menu 
reformulation, reviewing portion sizes, education and 
information, and actions to shift the marketing mix towards 
lower calorie options. We will monitor and report on our 
actions on an annual basis. 
Saturated Fat 
 
We will support and enable people to consume less 
saturated fat through actions such as product / menu 
reformulation, reviewing portion sizes, education and 
information incentivising consumers to choose healthier 
options. We will monitor and report on our actions on an 
annual basis. Progress in reducing people’s saturated fat 
intakes will be measured via the National Diet and Nutrition 
Survey. 






Moreover, a large volume of this recontextualisation occurred over a four-month 
period between RDFN meetings in November 2011 and February 2012. As 
Table 6.4 and 6.5 summarise, the pledge outline and supporting principles were 
significantly reworked in two drafts over the course of January. In other words, 
key decisions were taken in the back stage of informal governance 
arrangements. This sentiment is illustrated in the following quotations from 
public health advocates involved in decision-making processes: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘We had our doubts about the process […] but 
we decided to go along to discussions with an open mind. We were 
really disappointed to learn that the majority of voluntary pledges and 
framework for partnership with industry had already been decided 
before we met. We didn’t feel that it was a pure collaborative approach 
or operating under rules of good governance. We weren’t really being 
engaged, we were being invited to rubberstamp something’ 
 
Public health advocate: ‘So, you know, I can’t say how things were 
affected in closed meetings but the person from Mars who was on the 
Food Network Steering Group [pause] I mean, she was a very, very 
senior Mars person. They were throwing their big guns at this. They 
weren’t sending their director of policy, they were sending their 




The above extracts illustrate a widespread view among public health advocate 
interviewees, that the real decisions were made in a closed back stage. This is 
captured in the perception that the formal setting face-to-face meetings simply 
functioned to rubberstamp policy decisions that had been reached through 
bilateral negotiations with industry actors. All this suggests that the deliberative 
ideas expressed in policy statements and working papers had not been 
translated into practice. Instead, informal governance arrangements were used 
by industry actors to subvert the aims of the CR pledge. This argument is 
developed in the following sub-section, which explores parallel negotiations 






6.5 Multiple accountabilities: negotiating the RDFN monitoring 
framework 
 
The issue of how voluntary commitments should be monitored was a key 
agenda item at the PG meeting in September 2010, at which it was agreed that 
it was crucial to have a monitoring framework in place to demonstrate the policy 
effectiveness of the Responsibility Deal. A working paper on monitoring and 
evaluation was circulated to PG members for discussion at the third meeting in 
January 2011. This document posed the rhetorical question of why the RD 
needed a monitoring framework: 
 
[PG 3]: ‘Monitoring is key to establishing accountability, mapping 
progress and confirming that actions organisations have pledged to take 
have been completed. It also has an important role to play in 
communicating achievements to the public and interested stakeholders’. 
 
This highlights the crucial role of information reporting, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, was a core feature of the institutional design of the RD. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this was also a feature of policy discussions in the RDFN, where 
monitoring requirements were discussed as part of negotiations over the CR 
pledge. As described in the previous section, a discussion paper circulated at 
the third RDFN meeting in September 2011 provided a pledge outline and 
supporting principles, but also included a draft monitoring framework. The 
quantitative section of this framework is reproduced in Figure 6.1. Importantly, 
this draft framework, which built on a stakeholder workshop in April, included 
performance standards for: the percentage of reformulated products; 
percentage of products that have reduced portion size; and the proportion of 
overall marketing budget allocated to encourage consumers to eat and drink 
fewer calories. This performance information was consistent with the stated aim 
of the pledge to reduce population level intake through supply-side action. 
 
Given that FDF feedback indicated a strong opposition among its members to 
a calorie reduction target, it is perhaps unsurprising that comments received by 




[FDF email 2]: […] We have made this point before – which I know you 
understand – that often quantitative data in this area will be commercially 
sensitive. For instance it is unrealistic to expect companies to disclose 
their marketing budgets or strategies in the promotion sub-section. If 
companies are prepared to share information with DH on changes to 
promotional activity then they would be more likely to do so in Section C 
which captures qualitative information […] Companies will also be 
nervous about answering the second and third parts of the New Product 
Development sub-section on replacement products as these could 
provide clues to competitors on their marketing strategies. Similarly, 
companies are reluctant to declare the direction and focus of their 
research and development budgets 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Monitoring framework circulated to RDFN [September 2011] 
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Figure 6.2 Monitoring framework 
circulated to RDFN [November 2011] 
Source: FOI request for documents 
relating to development of Calorie 
Reduction pledge [see Appendix IV]  
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This opposition to quantitative performance standards was also emphasised in 
feedback from Mars UK in August 2011, which framed quantitative reporting as 
an additional hurdle for reformulation work. For example: 
 
[Mars UK email]: ‘We believe that the 5 billion calorie reduction can be 
measured across the industry as a whole and the Government will be 
able to highlight strong case studies in its annual reports. As a company, 
Mars will undoubtedly be able to contribute strong stories to those case 
studies. However, the Government should avoid trying to take a brand 
by brand or company by company approach to calorie reduction in its 
annual reporting […] 
 
The feedback from both FDF and Mars UK underline that mandated quantitative 
performance standards received limited support from industry actors, in which 
a strong preference was expressed for narrative forms of information reporting. 
While it is difficult to reconstruct when the decision was made, Figure 6.2 
reproduces the draft monitoring framework that was circulated to network 
members in November. As the Figure highlights, the template was substantively 
revised, with strikethrough used by the DH Secretariat to highlight the 
quantitative performance standards that had been deleted from the monitoring 
framework. This draft also removed text that framed the aim of the CR pledge 
to implement a net reduction in calories per capita sold in aggregate. This 
recontextualisation shifted information reporting to much less stringent 
qualitative standards, which asked industry actors to submit a narrative 
summary of progress. This was crucial in altering the rules of the game, 
destabilizing the design of accountability mechanisms based on information 
transparency. While it is difficult to reconstruct the decision-making process, 
revisions to the monitoring framework aligned with the preferences of industry 
actors as stated in the back stage of communications with the DH Secretariat. 
 
The removal of quantitative standards also captures practices that embodied 
distinct dimensions of accountability, and is perhaps the most obvious instance 
of MAD (Koppell 2005). On the one hand, civil servants described stakeholder 
responsiveness as intrinsic to partnership working, in which industry actors 
ought to be involved in policy formulation. It is also worth noting that 
interviewees frequently indicated that a consensus decision had to be reached 
with industry actors. For example: 
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Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘What we were asking them [industry] is, ‘how 
are we going to do this? And how are we going to do it?’. If you’ve got a 
voluntary mechanism and industry have to buy into it, there’s no point in 
just saying ‘do this’ […] Nobody would ever suggest that in a voluntary 
scheme that you can do it without negotiation’. 
 
 
As the above quotation highlights, the design of the RDFN institutionalised 
discursive practices that embedded a requirement to reach consensus with 
industry actors. On the other hand, this image of accountability appears to have 
subverted the operationalization of accountability mechanisms that were framed 
as central to the institutional design of the RD. The tensions between these 
dimensions of partnership working resembled something akin to Koppell’s 
(2005: 99) image of a ‘bureaucratic game of twister’ in which civil servants were 
expected to reconcile demands of governing meta-regulation and co-
constructing policy with the food industry. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the interview data implies that the monitoring framework was constructed to 
avoid being prescriptive. However, this seems to understate the explicit aim of 
this pledge to reduce population-level calorie intake and the performance 
standards that were drafted to achieve this policy objective. Moreover, this in-
depth process tracing of decision-making in the RDFN demonstrates that DH 
officials responded to industry concerns in an informal back stage of decision-
making. It is this reliance on back stage negotiations that the final section of the 
chapter explores in greater detail. 
 
6.6 Implications for partnership working 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that key decisions were made in an informal 
back stage. It argues that the output of the RDFN shifted away from the rhetoric 
of population-level interventions, towards policies that aligned with the stated 
preferences of industry actors. This section argues that an over-reliance on 
back stage negotiations undermined the RD in two central dimensions: the 
assumption that partnership working would produce effective policies; and 
discourses that decision-making would embody deliberative ideals. 
 
First, the rationale for the RD was that it would agree practical actions more 
efficiently than would otherwise be possible using traditional forms of regulation. 
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Yet, the analysis of this chapter suggests that negotiations drifted towards 
lowest common denominator collective agreements that contradicted and 
subverted the policy objectives framed in policy statements and working papers. 
This is illustrated in the following quotation, in which the interviewee questioned 
the policy effectiveness of voluntary commitments: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘Overall, I think there was, I suppose, two issues. 
[First] what you ended up with was pledges that were often very vague 
and wish-washy and didn’t mean anything, because they were the only 
ones that industry would agree to. [Second] The calorie [reduction] 
pledge was a particular example of [pause] just a very broad 
[commitment] to reduce calories, and so you ended up with some 
commitments that would be quite specific about reducing fat and sugar, 
and others that would just state that they were going to do some kind of 
education initiative’. 
 
This illustrates there is a clear assumption that consensus on this pledge could 
only be reached through the DH making substantive changes to the scope and 
aims of voluntary commitments. Moreover, it is implied that industry actors used 
a de facto veto over decision-making to block proposals that threatened their 
growth strategies. For many this process involved, as one interviewee put it, a 
high degree of coordination across the food industry to block RDFN policies. All 
this suggests that back stage processes functioned as an informal governance 
space that aimed to ‘escape deadlock’ (Héritier 1999). Yet, this political impasse 
could only be broken through back stage processes that undermined the front 
stage public health aims of the RDFN. Indeed, the empirical case studies 
provide no evidence to support the notion that back stage policy making was 
marked by phases of bargaining or compromise from industry actors. In 
contrast, informal practices embodied many of the tensions and contradictions 
of partnership working, in which the rules of the game were re-shaped to reach 
a collectively binding agreement. In practice, agreeing practical actions meant 
subverting public health objectives to avoid confrontation with the food industry. 
This dynamic is nicely captured in the following extract, take from an interview 
with a public health advocate involved in decision-making:  
 
Public health advocate: ‘There was a closeness as a consequence of 
the Responsibility Deal, but that almost wasn’t intentional on the part of 
some officials and maybe even some Ministers [because] they wanted 
it to be seen as a success. But, you’re getting industry [involved] and it 
was that initial framing that I felt uncomfortable about, you know, 
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bringing them to the table. But what could you do? I think that’s just the 
wrong starting point for the conversation […] the starting point should 
have been an ambition to reduce population-level consumption […]’ 
 
Like the above interviewee, many public health advocates and academic 
researchers linked the limited policy effectiveness of the RDFN to the 
construction of industry actors as co-producers of policy. Yet, as the interviewee 
notes, this institutional design created a dynamic in which the DH relied on 
collective agreement to demonstrate the ‘success’ of the RD. As one academic 
researcher observed during an interview, this institutionalised a dynamic in 
which ‘partnership is an end in itself and doesn’t necessarily produce good 
[public] health outcomes’. 
 
Second, the over-reliance on back stage politics produced a paradoxical 
situation, in which deliberative ideals were not institutionalised in discursive 
practice. While policy statements framed partnership working as producing 
informed rational decisions that included affected interests, the interview data 
consistently reveal a different image of decision-making. For example: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘The Responsibility Deal has been more of a 
public-private partnership between government and industry – they were 
the two major actors. NGOs were kind of involved on the periphery, but 
we weren’t actually influential or important to the success of the 
Responsibility Deal. That was certainly the perception […] they weren’t 
interested in what we had to contribute’. 
 
This illustrates a wider pattern in the interview data that the Coalition 
government (if not the DH Secretariat) expected NGOs to perform a watchdog 
function, as outlined in the previous chapter. The consequence of this, as the 
above quotation illustrates, was the development of decisional processes in 
which the government and industry engaged in bilateral negotiations. The image 
that emerges is therefore one that diverges significantly from the deliberative 









This chapter argues that informal spaces of governance allowed industry actors 
to shape the rules of the game in ways that aligned policy aims with their 
economic interests. It contrasts the framing of partnership working as 
deliberative and consensus-oriented, with practices that stymied policy 
effectiveness and excluded public health organisations. While documents 
framed the design of RDFN as a mechanism to reach consensual agreement, 
this analysis demonstrates that key decisions were made in informal interaction 
between the DH Secretariat and industry actors. Overall, the empirical findings 
of this chapter problematise the image of partnership working as collaborative 
and consensus-oriented. 
 
First, and conceptually, the institutional design of RDFN is conceptualised as a 
form of informal governance, defined as ‘non-codified settings […] in which 
decision-making is not structured by pre-given sets of rules or formal institutions’ 
(Tatenhove et al 2006: 14). Two concepts are central to this framework: First, 
whether informal practices are cooperative or conflicting; and the distinction 
between a front and back stage of policy making. The second section then 
introduces Koppell’s (2005) notion of multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD) 
as a lens to explore the pressures faced by policy makers in reconciling multiple 
dimensions of accountability. Drawing on data from interviews conducted with 
civil servants, this section argues that assumptions about responsiveness to 
industry actors appeared to have undergone a process of discursive 
institutionalisation, becoming embedded in organizational practices (Hajer 
2009). However, the interview data also illustrates the perception among 
interviewees that the RDFN had not been particularly effective in negotiating 
voluntary agreements with the food industry. The third section attempts to 
unpack this ‘puzzle’, using an in-depth reconstruction of the Calorie Reduction 
(CR) pledge to trace the interplay between front stage steering group meetings 
and a ‘sanctioned’ back stage between the DH Secretariat and network 
members. This reconstructs decisional processes in precise detail, using 
documents generated from FOI requests and email correspondence between 
FDF officials and the DH Secretariat, to outline the extent of industry influence 
over the drafting of this pledge. This analysis demonstrates that back stage 
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deals between industry actors and the DH subverted policy aims made in the 
front stage of RDFN meetings. The fourth section develops this analysis further, 
using an empirical case study of the RDFN monitoring framework to 
demonstrate how industry actors were able to shape the ‘rules of the game’. 
Moreover, the negotiation of performance standards constitutes the 
‘bureaucratic game of twister’ faced by the DH Secretariat, in which it was 
expected to reconcile its role as a metagovernor with a responsiveness to 
industry as rule-makers in decisional processes. The final section discusses the 
implications for partnership working, highlighting that negotiations drifted 
towards lowest common denominator solutions that subverted the policy aims 
of the RDFN. It argues that back stage processes ostensibly functioned as an 
informal space to break the impasse between the DH and food industry. Yet, it 
is evident that this ‘escape from deadlock’ (Héritier 1999) undermined the very 
public health rationale of the RDFN. 
 
These empirical findings challenge the explicit rationale for the RD, that 
partnership would generate practical actions that achieved ‘more progress, 
more quickly’ (DH 2011: 2). In contrast to the deliberative ideals used to justify 
partnership as an effective mode of governance, the empirical case studies 
illustrate key policy decisions being made in the back stage of policy making. 
These processes not only delayed the implementation of voluntary 
commitments, but demonstrably show that industry actors blocked progress of 
policies that threatened their economic interests. Between them, the findings 
presented in Chapters 5 – 6 challenges key assumptions of both the academic 
literature on governance networks, but also policy claims made by the Coalition 
government about what partnership working could achieve in obesity policy. As 
the following chapter explains, political decision-making in the RD was not 









Chapter 7. The politics of food and obesity policy in Scotland: Scope for 
divergence? 
  
7.1 Introduction  
 
A central dimension of debates on devolution has been the extent to which this 
has created the space for policy divergence between the UK government (which 
also functions as the government of England) and the devolved administrations. 
Health policy is one of the most significant areas to be devolved (Woods 2004), 
and has been the focus of analyses of its impact in specific health issues, but 
also as a high-profile policy area that makes visible broader processes of 
devolution. To date, analyses have tended to focus on health care policies as 
resulting in ‘policy divergence that matters’ (Greer 2008). This assessment of 
territorial variations in health systems has been used to support the idea of 
devolution as a ‘policy laboratory’ (Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn 2012) in 
which political devolution has led to a distinctive ‘Scottish policy style’ (Keating, 
Cairney, and Hepburn 2009; Cairney 2008; Greer and Jarman 2008; Mooney, 
Scott, and Williams 2006; Bradbury and Mitchell 2005). While devolution has 
been studied through the analytical lens of health care reform (Greer 2004), this 
has broadened over the past decade to focus on divergence in public health 
policies (Smith et al. 2009). In relation to unhealthy commodity industries, recent 
analyses have explored the lobbying strategies of alcohol industry actors in 
policy debates related to minimum unit pricing (MUP) (Holden and Hawkins 
2013; McCambridge, Hawkins, and Holden 2013; Holden, Hawkins, and 
McCambridge 2012), and the introduction of smoke-free legislation (Cairney 
2008). As Smith and Hellowell (2012) suggest, post-devolution approaches to 
public health are more complex than divergence narratives imply. Notably, while 
divergence was evident in Scotland in relation to smoke free legislation 
introduced in 2006, the whole of the UK had implemented similar bans by the 
July 2007. Yet, in being the first region in the UK to implement smoke-free public 
places and persisting with MUP despite a protracted legal challenge made by 
the Scotch Whisky Association (Smith and Collin 2013; Katikireddi et al. 2014), 
policy makers in Scotland have demonstrated an acceptance of the need for a 
more interventionist approach in specific areas of health policy that are 
associated with commercial sector practices. 
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This chapter explores food and obesity policy as a key issue of public health 
policy that has received markedly less scholarly attention than post-devolution 
tobacco and alcohol policy. This draws on an analysis of various texts, including 
policy statements, discussion papers and minutes of meetings between policy 
makers and non-state actors, in addition to interviews with civil servants, public 
health actors and food industry actors. In doing so, it assesses the impact of 
Machinery of Government (MoG) changes at the devolved level, revisiting policy 
debates on the re-aggregation of policy functions from the Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) and the operationalization of partnership between the SNP 
government and food industry actors. In contrast to post-devolution changes in 
tobacco and alcohol, approaches in food and obesity policy appear remarkably 
consistent at UK and devolved level. Taking this ‘puzzle’ as its starting point, 
this chapter provides a detailed account of the policy landscape post-2010 that 
attempts to explain why policy convergence is a more striking feature of obesity 
policy. This analysis presents a complex picture of policy translation and lesson 
drawing, in which MoG changes led to institutional divergence in England, but 
policy convergence in partnership approaches. The key argument of this 
chapter is that policy developments at the UK administrative level had the effect 
of restructuring the devolved political context. The consequence of this temporal 
policy dimension, was that policy makers in Scotland were constrained in 
pursuing mandated performance standards for HFSS products. Moreover, it is 
evident that corporate strategies played an important role in creating barriers to 
policy divergence in both reformulation targets and proposals for a self-
regulatory code on marketing practices. 
 
In order to explore these processes, this chapter draws on both the multi-level 
governance (MLG) perspective and temporal dimensions of political decision-
making. As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of MLG has been used within 
the political sciences to explore interaction between sub-national, national, and 
supra-national administrative levels (Hooghe and Marks 2003). In this chapter, 
MLG is used to conceptualise how the institutionalisation of Type II bodies (that 
describes task-specific governing arrangements) reduced and restructured 
policy space at the regional level. More specifically, the analysis draws on 
Skelcher’s (Skelcher 2005) claim that network forms of governance (such as 
partnerships) are likely to create functional overlaps across administrative 
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boundaries. This notion of overlap is linked to the ‘politics of time’ (Pierson 
2004), and the implications of timing and sequence in imposing constraints on 
political decision-making (Dussauge-Laguna 2012; Howlett 2009; Pollitt 2008). 
This brings together the actor-centredness of MLG and temporal dimensions to 
explore how corporate actors exploit opportunities for policy influence as they 
move across traditional spheres of political authority (Fooks et al. 2017). The 
aim of this chapter is to analyse the transfer of ideas and practices across 
institutional settings (Coen 2007). As such this analysis draws attention to the 
role of food industry actors in the transfer of norms and standards (Ladi 2011) 
across jurisdictional levels. This moves away from the state-centric focus 
implicit in the concept of centre-periphery policy transfer (Stone 2012). In doing 
so, it attempts to make a distinctive contribution to the existing literature on post-
devolution policy change through a focus on the role of corporate actors in the 
transnational spread of norms and rules. In addition, this chapter extends the 
concept of informal governance (Ayres 2017) to the Scottish policy context, 
while also drawing on the related notion of institutional ambiguity (as discussed 
in Chapter 2). 
 
The chapter is structured into three substantive parts. The section explores how 
the dislocation of UK-wide food standards required the creation of a stand-alone 
public body in Scotland. This conceptualises the transfer of policy functions from 
the FSA as creating an ‘institutional void’ (Hajer 2003) in the rules governing 
food policy that led to a reassessment of the institutional basis of food 
standards. Importantly, the timescale of this response to this void led to the 
institutional dislocation of obesity policy that had previously been shared with 
the FSA (as discussed in Chapter 4). The second section concentrates on 
partnership working in Scotland. This focuses on interviewee perceptions about 
the political context, highlighting the overlap of RDFN commitments at the 
devolved level. This is followed by an analysis of the institutional design of 
partnership and subsequent lobbying strategies of food industry actors. In 
particular, the data reveals that trade associations opposed proposals for a 
meta-regulatory framework of ‘mandated’ performance standards related to 
product reformulation (Coglianese and Mendelson 2010). The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of exploratory discussions between the Scottish 
government, British Standards Institute, and industry actors around the 
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development of a voluntary standard on responsible marketing. Drawing on 
interview data and documents generated using FOI requests, this section 
argues that the failure to even initiate a dialogue with food companies over a 
self-regulatory code reflects the limits of partnership working over issues in 
which fundamental tensions exist between profit motive and public health. 
 
7.2 Policy making in an institutional void: Public bodies reform and the 
design of collaborative spaces 
 
While scholarly research has focused on the impact of the Coalition 
government’s public bodies reform on the sphere of delegated governance ( 
Flinders et al 2014; Durose et al. 2015), less attention has been given to the 
impact of this reform on policy making at the devolved level. This section draws 
attention to the ‘institutional void’ created in the Scottish polity by the Coalition 
government’s transfer of policy functions from the FSA (see Chapter 4). 
 
7.2.1 Devolved policy making in a dislocated polity: The institutional 
breakdown of the Food Standards Agency 
 
A feature of the Labour government’s ‘modernising’ agenda in its first term was, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the delegation of policy functions to the FSA in all 
four UK regions, which required a Sewel motion that gave Scottish 
Parliamentary consent for Westminster to legislate in the devolved area of food 
policy (Cairney & Keating 2004). The UK-wide approach reflected a consensus, 
noted in The Food Standards Agency White Paper (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, and Food 1998), that this policy area should be governed by a 
common framework of standards (Cairney 2008). This was reflected in the Food 
Standard Act 1999, which established the FSA on a UK-wide basis. This 
structure meant that decisions were coordinated across the FSA headquarters 
and operational centre in England, and regional branches in all three devolved 
administrations. This could be characterised as a polycentric model of 
governance in which decisions were made on a UK-basis and codified rules 
about the collective appointment of the FSA Chair and Deputy Chair by all four 
administrations. In other words, the FSA reflected an attempt by the Labour 
government to respond to policy issues that cut across traditional jurisdictional 
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boundaries, creating a multi-centred institutional framework focused on 
regulatory harmonization. In Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) two-fold typology of 
MLG, the FSA existed at the boundary between Type I and Type II. An arms-
length body with delegated functions in relation to food policy the FSA is clearly 
a task-specific jurisdiction (Type II). However, the FSA also embodied a durable, 
UK-wide architecture with linkages to government departments (Type I). This 
fluid model of governance is crucial to understanding how public bodies reform 
refracted an ‘institutional void’ that disrupted the food policy architecture in 
Scotland. 
 
The view among civil servant interviewees was that the transfer of policy 
functions to the DH had severely disrupted the multi-level governance of food 
standards that had been a durable feature of post-devolution policy making. As 
the following interviewee reflects, the Coalition government’s public bodies 
reform had implications for the fluid governance model that characterized UK 
food standards: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think there was maybe an expectation that 
the devolved countries would follow suit and mirror these changes. And, 
in fact, that happened to an extent in Wales, with nutritional 
responsibilities moving [to the Welsh government]. But in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland, the ministers decided not to make any changes to 
the FSA. So that was really the start of this divergence in the policy 
landscape, which we worked with but was never ideal because, for 
example, we then had a UK Board for the FSA that basically had 
different responsibilities in different places and I suppose we lost the 
cohesion of one organisation leading on all these things. That’s when 
some of these responsibilities were returned to ministerial departments 
at a UK level. That changed the dynamic I suppose from the FSA, which 
had been a non-ministerial department.’ 
 
The above quotation illustrates the process in which the transfer of nutrition 
policy to the DH appeared to have dislocated the rules and operational routines 
that glued together decision making across the network of FSA bodies. In other 
words, interdependencies and institutional linkages in food standards meant 
that reforms in Westminster restructured the policy domain at the devolved level 
(Skelcher 2005). As the interviewee describes, the transfer of policy functions 
under the Coalition government produced divergence across UK 
administrations with implications for policy coherence. Yet while it is suggested 
that a voluntary centre-periphery transfer was expected to take place, policy 
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making in this institutional void did not follow this pattern of ad hoc emulation. 
Instead, the SNP government pursued an approach connected to negative 
lesson drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). 
 
In contrast with the presumption that ‘bureau shuffling’ would also take place 
across devolved administrations, the response of the Scottish government to 
this emerging institutional void was to explore what a legitimate response to this 
pressing problem might look like. This process was marked by conditions of 
institutional ambiguity in which there existed no agreed-upon procedures or 
constitutional rules that predetermined how the Scottish government should 
respond (Hajer & Versteeg 2005). This could be at least partially attributed to 
the fact that a Sewel motion had been passed by the Scottish Executive in 1999 
that granted the UK government competence in the devolved area of food policy 
(Cairney and Keating 2004). Consequently, while the Scottish executive (from 
May 2007, the Scottish government) had the competence to withdraw from this 
institutional arrangement, this was not used in practice. Accordingly, there were 
no generally accepted rules according to which political action should proceed.  
 
This institutional arrangement appeared relatively stable until the formation of 
the Coalition government in 2010, leading to use of MoG as a tool to transfer 
policy functions from the FSA. In response to this institutional ambiguity, the 
Scottish government convened an Expert Advisory Group in July 2011 to 
assess the feasibility of an independent arms-length Food Standards Agency at 
the devolved level. Chaired by Jim Scudamore, former UK Chief Veterinary 
Officer and Professor at Liverpool University, the Expert Group published its 
final report in March 2012. The report recommended that policy functions 
relating to food safety and nutrition should continue to be delegated at arms-
length from central government, particularly given the impact of diet-related ill 
health in Scotland. Moreover, the majority view among the Expert Group was 
that an independent body would best serve long-term policy and political 
interests (Scudamore 2012). 
 
Following the publication of the Scudamore review, a press release issued in 
June 2012 by the Scottish government detailed that the recommendations of 
the Expert Group had been accepted. While the introduction of legislation was 
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delayed by the horsemeat scandal in January 2013, with Scudamore asked to 
chair an Expert Group exploring issues of food safety, the Food (Scotland) Bill 
was introduced to the Scottish Parliament in March 2014. The Food (Scotland) 
Act was subsequently passed in January 2015, which established Food 
Standards Scotland (FSS) as a non-ministerial department with statutory duties 
to improve dietary health. In contrast to the decision of the Coalition government 
to transfer policy functions from the FSA, this legislative decision ensured that 
nutrition and labelling policy were a core remit of FSS. Indeed, the divergent 
approach to food standards can be conceptualised as both a case of negative 
lesson drawing from contemporaneous public bodies reform, and policy 
borrowing from the institutional legacy of the FSA. This decision reflects the 
significance of the temporal dimension in policy making, in which the Scottish 
government looked to draw lessons from the past (Stone 2017). However, as 
the following sub-section discusses, temporal aspects of this divergent 
approach had significant implications for partnership working in Scotland. 
 
7.3 Multi-level politics: partnership at the devolved level 
 
This section explores the policies of the SNP government in the political context 
of the Responsibility Deal. The first sub-section provides a brief overview of the 
policy landscape after the 2010 general election, which indicates that the SNP 
government was committed to implementing mandated performance standards 
relating to reformulation of HFSS products. In order to develop this line of 
argument, the second part of this section draws upon analysis of meeting notes, 
email correspondence and interview data, to reconstruct negotiations between 
policy makers and industry actors in taking forward proposals for a meta-
regulatory framework of performance standards. This assesses industry 
strategies to undermine proposals for mandated reformulation targets, 
underlining the significant opposition to policy approaches that diverged from 
the accountability mechanisms of the RDFN (see Chapter 5 – 6). This analysis 
helps to explain the role of industry actors in transferring practices between 




7.3.1 The policy landscape 
  
The Route Map document outlined the first strategy of the minority SNP 
government (2007 – 2011) to focus on diet-related ill health in Scotland. 
Released in February 2010, the document provided a policy framework that 
made strong rhetorical commitments to addressing the wider social and 
economic determinants of diet-related ill health. This is reflected in the foreword 
to the Route Map document: 
 
‘Overweight and obesity cannot be tackled by just relying on individuals 
to change their behaviour as the factors that contribute to gaining weight 
have been woven into the very fabric of our lifestyles to such an extent 
that weight gain is almost inevitable in todays society’  
 
(Scottish government 2010a) 
 
This policy statement conceptualized the obesogenic environment using a food 
systems model, first developed as part of the UK government Office for 
Sciences’ Foresight project
9
 on obesity (Butland et al. 2007). The Foresight 
report underlined the paradigm shift required to tackle the ‘abundance of energy 
dense food’, a recommendation that was reiterated in the Route Map. As the 
following interviewee involved in the drafting of the Route Map document noted: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘We knew the Foresight had said that this is 
not something that’s about personal choice, this is not something that’s 
just about physical activity. You have to look at the obesogenic 
environment’. 
 
This framing of the structural drivers of diet-related ill health in the Route Map 
is linked to a commitment to reduce energy intake at a population level, placing 
an emphasis on reducing demand for HFSS foods (Scottish Government 
2010a). While references are made to controlling exposure to high calorie food 
and drinks, the document does not specify precisely how this will be achieved. 
 
                                                
9
 The Foresight Programme was launched in 1997 by the Labour government with the aim of 
scenario modelling policy areas with a strong scientific component. Foresight Obesities, 
commissioned and produced in 2007, examined sustainable policy responses to obesity over the 
next 40 years, involving academic researchers from a range of disciplines. 
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In addition, it is clear from the interviews that many civil servants believed its 
recommendations should be taken forward in partnership with the food industry. 
In some sense, the preference to incorporate non-state actors in decision 
making refers to the notion of a cooperative and consultative model of 
governance that the Scottish government have promoted as a ‘Scottish 
approach’ to policy making (Cairney et al 2016). The idea of a distinctive policy 
making approach was an ideational feature of how many civil servants referred 
to doing politics: 
 
Senior civil servant [Scotland]: ‘Our previous Permanent Secretary [Sir 
John Elvidge] came up with something called the ‘Scottish approach’ of 
how we would deal with things. And the approach involved a lot of 
partnership. It was an intrinsic part of it [pause] an important part of it 
because we’re a small place.’ 
 
Moreover, the interview data also suggests that the more specific idea of 
partnership working with the food industry was recognised among civil servants 
as constitutive of the political context. This view is captured in the following 
quotation, in which the interviewee talked about the preference for 
accommodative approaches to decision making: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think giving the food and drink industry an 
opportunity to do the work that we need them to do on a voluntary basis 
is an absolutely necessary first step’. 
 
This suggests that, similar to the UK context, partnership was framed in 
opposition to traditions forms of regulation. This distinction between hierarchical 
control and the voluntary basis of partnership was overtly articulated in 
interviews with Scottish civil servants, as the following quotation demonstrates: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think it does influence where we go […] it will 
always be the first option to be pursued. Partnership has to fail before 
we will move on to something that is more regulatory’. 
 
This suggests that civil servants linked the idea of partnership to the meta-
narrative of an accommodative ‘Scottish approach’ to policy making, but also to 
more narrow policy discourses that linked partnership working with voluntary 
self-regulation. In other words, interviewees talked about regulatory frameworks 
using a recurring dyadic contrast of traditional state regulation and voluntary 
self-regulation. Yet while regulation was often framed in terms of this dichotomy, 
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the following sub-section suggests a more complex account of partnership 
working that illustrates the Scottish government’s distinct approach to meta-
governance. 
 
7.3.2  Meta-governance 
 
The recommendations of the Route Map were to be taken forward in cross-
directorate policy forums, bringing together ministers and industry actors, 
including representatives from both UK and regional trade bodies. This took the 
form of a Joint Obesity Group (JOG) chaired by the deputy First Minister, Nicola 
Sturgeon, intended to carve out space for high-level policy discussions across 
government directorates, NHS regional boards and the trade bodies, such as 
the British Retail Consortium (BRC) and Food and Drink Federation (FDF). The 
politico-strategic purpose of this forum was to be translated into practical action 
through the Food Implementation Group (FIG), in which trade bodies were given 
a central role in decision making alongside decision makers from the health 
directorate. Indeed, at its first meeting the remit for this group is framed as 
formulating policies with industry actors. For example, the document states that 
‘the intention was to start with a blank canvas which the Scottish government 
would develop hand-in-hand with the food industry’ (Scottish Government 
2010b). In addition, with the staging of high-level policy discussion concluding 
in January 2011, responsibility for food and obesity policy was delegated to FIG. 
 
Although the FIG followed the same institutional ‘script’ (Hajer 2005) as the 
Food Network, framing decision making as a collaborative process with industry 
actors, it is evident from interviews with policy-based individuals that partnership 
was going to lead to distinct policies in relation to food and obesity. For example: 
 
Senior civil servant: ‘We knew about the Responsibility Deal. We were 
mindful of trying to learn from obvious mistakes, and because of the 
politics here, we wanted it to be Scottish rather than just be an adjunct 
to something developed 400 miles south of us […]’ 
 
In the extract above, there is a clear assumption that a ‘Scottish approach’ 
should avoid the perceived failures of the Food Network. This differentiation was 
most clear in the interest of decision-makers in state oversight of industry self-
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regulation using a regulatory framework developed by the FSA. The framework, 
which was commissioned under the UK Labour government in its third term 
(2005 – 2010), made various recommendations to reduce the saturated fat and 
energy density of HFSS food and beverages. Modelled on the mandated 
approach for salt reduction, the FSA framework set out targets for HFSS product 
categories. For example, targets for soft drinks included a 4% reduction in the 
level of added sugar, and 10% reduction in the saturated fat content of 
chocolate confectionary. In contrast to the ‘complex undergrowth’ (Curtin 2007) 
of voluntary self-reporting within the Food Network, the use of an external set 
of performance standards implies that decision makers in Scotland were more 
comfortable with a meta-governance role that focused efforts on developing a 
mandated regulative framework to encourage industry self-regulation. Yet, the 
following section suggests that scope for policy divergence through the meta-
regulation of performance standards was constrained by the political strategies 
of food industry actors. 
 
7.3.3 Interviewee perceptions about policy legacies and political 
‘contexts’ 
 
In this section, we will see that, while performance standards under meta-
regulation increased the scope for a more stringent meta-regulative framework, 
policy divergence was constrained by the transfer of practices from industry 
actors participating in the Food Network. However, the transfer of practices 
between institutional levels was also dependent on the political context in 
Scotland. Before moving on to explore the political strategies of industry actors, 
the section begins by examining key aspects of this ‘context’. 
 
The first aspect of this, was the widespread perception among policy-based 
interviewees that the operationalization of partnerships under the Coalition 
government had restructured policy space at the devolved level. It is clear from 
the dates of stakeholder meetings that the Secretary of State for Health, Andrew 
Lansley, operationalized the Responsibility Deal network in a short time horizon. 
Following the implementation of MoG changes in July 2010, he chaired the 
inaugural plenary group meeting in September 2010. The action note for this 
meeting notes that the Secretary of State ‘set out his vision’ for the working 
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routines and aims of the partnership, and records early 2011 as the scheduled 
launch of the Responsibility Deal. This is a critical point, as the very experience 
of collaboration between the DH and industry actors constructed a set of 
agreed-upon norms and rules that constrained policy choices at the devolved 
level. As the following interviewees describe, temporal aspects were crucial in 
structuring the political and institutional context of food and obesity policy: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘The Responsibility Deal was guiding the food 
industry’s public affairs strategy because it was UK-wide policy. So, if 
the Deal was talking about reformulation, then we would come along and 
say [to food industry actors]: well what about reformulation? The 
companies would naturally say, ‘well, we’re already doing this in relation 
to the Responsibility Deal’ […] We really had no option but to accept 
what was happening, and that meant our policies had to work in the 
context of the Responsibility Deal. It had to complement what they were 
doing’. 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘The Responsibility Deal was the big ticket as 
it was UK-wide, and so we were very conscious that it was going on. We 
didn’t have much influence over it at all […] Part of our discussions with 
colleagues [in DH] was finding out what was going on with the 
Responsibility Deal and where it was going. We would look for the gaps, 





As the extracts above illustrate, civil servants perceived that the 
operationalization of partnership under the Coalition government had functioned 
to restructure policy space at the devolved level (Skelcher 2005). In this case, 
both interviewees talk about working within the policy trajectory of RDFN 
negotiations of the Calorie Reduction pledge (discussed in Chapter 6) was an 
initial focus of steering group meetings) rather than exploring possible 
alternatives. Both extracts highlight that reformulation was viewed as the 
‘context’ in which FIG operated. In other words, temporal aspects were 
described as having significant implications for divergent policy approaches. 
Moreover, this perception of having to align with the Food Network’s policy 
trajectory was translated into positions taken by decision makers in meetings 
with industry actors. This is illustrated in the action note of the first FIG meeting: 
 
[FIG01]: ‘We noted that structural changes at the UK level had affected 
specific commitments since its publication. SG [Scottish government] 
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was open to adapting phrasing of the energy-in commitments, for 
example, to reflect changes to the Food Standards Agency. We agreed 
that it would be important to link into the work in England on the 
Responsibility Deal […]’. 
 
All this suggests that the timing of political developments was perceived by 
decision makers (and documented in meetings with industry actors) as 
constituting the institutional and political context at the devolved level, in which 
partnership working was shaped by policy developments within the RD. 
 
The second dimension relates to the breakdown of the FSA, in which the 
Scottish government responded to this ‘institutional void’ by creating a non-
ministerial arms-length body in Scotland. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, delays in bringing forward legislation to establish FSS meant that policy 
responsibility was placed with FIG (located within the Public Health Division) 
between 2012 – 2015. This transfer of policy functions is described in the 
following quotation: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘In terms of what we were taking forward from 
the Route Map, there was reformulation, and there was a group [FIG] 
that was set up to take that forward […] in terms of this approach, the 
Food Standards Agency would have been the natural choice for doing a 
lot of the industry engagement. But, there was a split down south, and 
we ended up having a new body up here. In terms of working that out, 
we [Public Health Division] ended up doing more than perhaps we would 
necessarily have done previously […]’. 
 
 
As the interviewee above reveals, the shift in the location of responsibility for 
obesity policy reflected a largely ad hoc response to public bodies reform under 
the Coalition government. While this could be viewed as a pragmatic response 
to institutional change at the UK level, it was also a crucial decision to make, as 
the codified rules and norms embedded in the institutional logic of the FSA were 






7.3.4 Informal practices of governance: The Food Implementation Group 
[FIG] 
 
During the third FIG meeting in June 2011, participants agreed that negotiations 
would take place to collectively agree action on the reformulation of HFSS 
products. In terms of rules and norms, FIG was described in meeting notes as 
a flexible institutional setting, designed to facilitate informal policy discussions. 
For example, the remit of FIG is framed by government officials at the first 
meeting as a ‘blank canvas’ to negotiate policies ‘hand in hand with the food 
industry’. This notion of joint problem solving was reiterated in subsequent FIG 
meetings, with circulated papers underlining a “collaborative approach” that 
would not be “constrained by the letter of the text” of the Route Map. This 
interactive approach to decision making was also put forward as an explicit 
rationale by interviewees involved in partnership. For example: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘We didn’t set the agenda. What we hoped was 
to agree the agenda with people around the table; to say, what could we 
work on? What are areas could we explore?  
 
The quotation above captures the notion of FIG as a space that was not 
structured by pre-defined agenda, but open to discursive challenge. In other 
words, the ‘rules of the game’ were to be recursively defined through an 
interactive process, in which agreement was achieved via consensus. In terms 
of institutional design, this forum might therefore be interpreted as having 
borrowed decision making procedures from the Food Network. Indeed, as one 
civil servant interviewee reflected, ‘in practice, it was the same sort of thing. It 
was a less organised version of the Responsibility Deal’. This view supports the 
idea (discussed above), that the operationalization of partnership created 
overlaps that restructured policy space at the devolved level. However, this shift 
from the formal codified patterns of rules and norms within the FSA to the fluid 
informal practices of FIG, directs attention to the opportunities of this informal 




7.3.5 Food industry strategies: temporal aspects of venue shifting 
 
Meeting minutes produced for the third FIG meeting communicated the focus of 
the ‘Scottish approach’ to obesity policy on reformulation of HFSS products. The 
minutes note collective agreement among FIG members, that the FSA calorie 
reduction programme would be ‘reinvigorated’. While representatives of trade 
bodies (which included multiple officials from both the FDF and SFDF) 
rhetorically committed to this framework at the meeting, it is clear that this would 
have implications for the market strategies of individual companies. Put simply, 
compliance with this meta-regulatory framework of targets would require 
companies to formulate region-specific HFSS products or extend standards 
across all four UK administrations. The former had no obvious economic 
rationale, as the following policy based interviewees describe: 
 
Senior civil servant: ‘If you look at the market, Scotland’s got a 
population of five million […] so the vast bulk of the UK population is in 
England; the vast bulk of the market share is in England. So, in any 
business you would look at the market share, obviously you’re going to 
make decisions that are focused on market share’. 
 
Public health advocate: ‘I think the word that is never used is costly, 
which is actually probably the thing that’s much more in play. So, they 
[companies] go on about how technically it [reformulation] is really 
difficult. I think a lot of these things are not that difficult if you are 
prepared to take a lower profit on them, which, of course, is absolutely 
not what companies are incentivized to do’. 
 
The above extracts underline the meta-regulation through performance 
standards as a source of costs for companies operating across multiple 
jurisdictions. While the latter mechanism of cross-border standards can be a 
source of strategic advantage for multinational corporations in reducing 
regulatory costs (Börzel and Risse 2010; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Vogel and 
Kagan 2004), most of the time, standards are a source of costs for companies 
that implement them (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). In this case, it is clear from 
backstage policy discussions within the Food Network, that proposals for 
regulatory standards (such as the 5 billion calorie reduction target discussed in 
Chapter 6) were framed as a barrier for market strategies to increase sales of 
HFSS products (and generate higher profits). As such, industry actors had a 
rationale – explicit in emails between FDF and Department of Health officials – 
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for political strategies that could be used to achieve policy influence in 
preventing unwelcome regulatory standards. The timing of policy developments 
at the UK level was crucial to this strategy, as concurrent policy discussions 
over the drafting of a pledge on calorie reduction creates temporal opportunities 
for industry actors to transfer practices from the Food Network to FIG. 
 
At its core, this political activity used temporal discourses (Dussauge Laguna 
2012; see also Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2009) to prevent unwelcome regulatory 
standards. This involved the FDF and BRC taking on the role of boundary 
spanners (or intermediaries) across partnerships, with the aim of proscribing 
certain courses of action through functional overlaps between the policy 
approaches of UK and Scottish governments. In other words, trade bodies were 
able to move across levels of governance by virtue of their shared membership 
of both the Food Network and FIG. This provided opportunities to transfer 
practices that could be used to restructure the rules of the game to align with 
the market strategies of industry actors. As detailed below, the multi-level 
strategies of industry actors centred on discursively reinforcing the non-
negotiable constraints on divergence from the Responsibility Deal. 
 
While industry actors agreed to take forward action on calorie reduction, this 
normative commitment was replaced with temporal discourses that framed 
negotiations as intrinsically constrained by the timing of policy discussions 
within the Food Network. This rhetoric was a consistent feature of FIG meetings, 
illustrated in the following extracts from meeting minutes: 
 
FIG 4 [September 2011]: ‘Industry had concerns about the idea of 
targets being set in Scotland which did not apply in England, especially 
when the Responsibility Deal was understood to be looking at saturated 
fat in 2012 at the earliest with an anticipated flexible approach’. 
 
FIG 5 [December 2011]: ‘There was a keen sense from industry 
members that the Scottish draft papers were pushing too hard and were 
out of step with the Responsibility Deal timings and approach. FIG 
industry members reiterated that they wished to see a ‘menu of options’ 
approach, rather than one that was targets-driven, giving companies the 
space to develop reformulation approaches […]’. 
 
As the extracts above illustrate, the timing of policy discussions was used by 
industry actors to influence policy through emphasising the collective action 
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problems associated with policy divergence. This was explicit in the reason-
giving of the FDF at FIG 4 (see above), which argued that draft FSA 
recommendations ‘would act as a barrier to engaging their membership’. Given 
that the FIG was scripted as a ‘blank canvas’ to promote a collaborative 
approach to policy making, decision makers agreed to ‘revisit the tone and 
presentation’ of draft standards. Yet email correspondence between civil 
servants in the days after the meeting underline a frustration with this industry 
tactic. For example: 
 
‘I have revised the wording on the recommendation and added a bit of 
background […] hopefully this means that they will get on with it. I 
checked the RD DH talks about reformulation […] so playing games RE 
the saturated fat reduction being later for DH: it’s all the same, as I said 
at the meeting […]’. 
 
Yet while trade bodies opposed the meta-regulation of performance standards, 
FSA reformulation targets were retained in a draft paper that set out the 
institutional framework of a future partnership between the Scottish government 
and food industry. The paper, titled Supporting Healthy Choices (Scottish 
Government 2013a), was circulated between industry actors for feedback in 
June 2013. This document set out mandated targets for HFSS product 
reformulation, which included a five percent reduction in the sugar content of 
sugar-sweetened beverages and reductions in the portion sizes and saturated 
fat content of chocolate confectionary (Scottish Government 2013b). This had 
followed a roundtable event held in the previous month, at which industry 
participants – including PepsiCo, McDonalds, and Mars – reiterated their 
opposition to reformulation targets. More broadly, industry actors framed the 
draft framework as excessively restricting the legitimate activities of food 
companies. For example: 
 
‘You cannot seriously expect food manufacturers and retailers to ignore 
consumer demand for HFSS products. They have a duty to shareholders 
to run a business and make a profit’ 
 
‘[…] you seem to be asking turkeys to vote for Xmas – why would they 




In addition to the feedback received at this roundtable meeting, written 
responses submitted by trade bodies to the draft paper illustrate industry 
strategies to transfer practices from the Food Network to the institutional design 
of partnership in Scotland. As outlined in previous chapters, the cooperative 
logic of the Responsibility Deal was instrumentalized by industry actors to 
weaken or block proposals for sectoral performance standards and reporting 
mechanisms. The aim of this political strategy was to transfer the complex 
undergrowth of informal standards from the Responsibility Deal to partnership 
approaches in Scotland. Trade bodies were particularly important in 
constructing a coherent industry position in their submissions to the draft paper. 
Table 1 comparatively summarises responses from the Scottish associations of 
the FDF and BRC. The extracts in Table 1 illustrate temporal discourses that 
frame policy divergence from the monitoring and reporting standards of the 
Responsibility Deal as a barrier to industry participation. 
 
Table 7.1 Illustrative examples of industry feedback relating to draft 
reformulation targets 
 
Scottish FDF […] member companies need reassurance that there will not be an 
undue burden with respect to monitoring before signing up […] if 
an element of self-reporting is required, we would request that as 
far as possible the Scottish government works with the 
Responsibility Deal secretariat to align monitoring requirements 
 
[…] linking to the approach taken under the Responsibility Deal, 
we would suggest that as opposed to set timelines, companies 
commit to reformulation and outline the timeframe it will take them 
to undertake this. This provides transparency, enabling the 
Scottish government to take a view on the scale of commitment, 
but allows companies flexibility […] 
Scottish Retail 
Consortium 
One lesson that should be learned from our experiences of the 
Responsibility Deal is ensuring that there is a monitoring 
framework in place which is workable, accessible and does not 
place an undue burden on signatories […] the level of support 
could be greater if the criteria or approach was more aligned with 
the work retailers are already committed to as part of the 
Responsibility Deal 
 
all the comments SRC/BRC raised at the three meetings we had 
on the reformulation strategy in 2012 remain relevant […] we have 
serious concerns with the targets proposed in the strategy […]  
 
The reformulation strategy as currently proposed will not be 
supported by retailers […] 
Source: FOI request for documents relating to consultations with industry 
actors over the Supporting Healthy Choices paper 
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This strategic action appears to have exercised significant influence over the 
drafting process, with the performance standards displaced in the final draft of 
the Supporting Healthy Choices (SHC) strategy paper released in May 2014. In 
its place, there appeared a commitment to: 
 
‘invite all food industry businesses across manufacture, retail and 
catering to work towards reducing calories, fats, salts, and added 
sugars’. 
 
This translation from meta-regulative framework to noncommittal industry self-
regulation, suggests that industry actors were able to transfer norms and rules 
from the Food Network that institutionalised a corporate veto (Hawkins & Holden 
2016) on decision making. Indeed, there are clear similarities with the 
weakening of calorie reduction targets. Although an FOI request for 
communications relating to policy formulation was exempted under Section 35 
of the Act (on the basis that certain discussions between Ministers and industry 
actors should take place behind closed doors), interview data suggests that civil 
servants had limited scope to influence the behaviour of industry actors. For 
example:  
 
Senior civil servant: ‘I think we did get a bit of pushback [with industry] 
saying: ‘well, we’re doing most of this under the Responsibility Deal, so 
do we really need to sign up to Supporting Healthy Choices given that 
we’re applying the Responsibility Deal on a UK-wide basis’. 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘[…] your power to influence [industry] is 
somewhat muted when you are looking at doing something specific in 
Scotland […] where we’ve faced challenges, is that the Responsibility 
Deal was already doing it’. 
 
Like the interview data that refer to timing of policy developments as 
restructuring policy space, the extracts above reinforce the widespread 
perception that the political context constrained scope for policy divergence. In 
addition, it is also clear that the scope for introducing a meta-regulative 
framework of performance standards was challenged by a shift from the codified 
rules embedded in the FSA, to the ad hoc informal practices of partnership. The 
consequence of this shift, was that regulatory standards became uncoupled 
from the institutional setting within which they had originally been developed. 
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As the following interviewee describes, this dislocation created opportunities for 
industry actors to block unwelcome performance standards: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘So looking across the piece [sic] in Supporting 
Healthy Choices, when you actually look at the document that went out 
to consultation and what ended up being the final document – what we 
started with and what we finished with – are actually quite different 
documents. And a lot of that is due, not necessarily to the evidence base 
being insufficient – or not particularly strong in certain areas – but 
actually our experience once we started talking to industry on where we 
could get buy-in. Where you can set a document in terms of it being 
challenging, but also on how far you can push at that door’. 
 
The extract above captures informal practices of decision making, giving 
industry actors the opportunity to shape and re-shape the rules of the game. As 
the above quotation underlines, proposals were contingent on buy-in from 
industry actors (regardless of the evidence base). The implicit argument being 
made, is that collaborative decision making created opportunities to block 
policies that were perceived by industry actors to be challenging. 
 
All this suggests that policy divergence was constrained by political strategies 
of industry actors, which related to the transfer of practices between UK and 
devolved administrations. This involved the transfer of informal procedural 
norms that included industry actors as rule makers. Yet while the timing of policy 
developments provided an opportunity for trade bodies to block proposals for 
performance standards, it is important to note that dimensions of the political 
context appear to have facilitated this transfer. Although trade bodies performed 
the role of boundary spanners between the UK and devolved level, the transfer 
of informal rules reflected a political context in which partnership ideas have 
become institutionalised as a central component of the ‘Scottish approach’. In 
addition, the interview data supports the idea that the timing of political 
developments was a key factor in accounting for the lack of policy divergence. 
While it is difficult to disentangle the perceptions of civil servant interviewees 
from the framing of policy discussions by industry actors, it seems clear that 
temporal aspects are widely perceived by civil servant interviewees to have 
restructured policy space at the devolved level. However, the lack of divergence 
between the UK and Scottish government’s approaches to partnerships may 
also be understood as constrained by both the political strategies of industry 
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actors, and the challenges of regulating industry actors for whom the Scottish 
market is marginal relative to the rest of the UK. As this section argues, industry 
actors were able to exploit the timing of policy developments to block regulatory 
standards that threatened their market strategies. However, the final section of 
this chapter demonstrates the adaptation of industry strategies to a new political 
topography, in which interactions between the Scottish government and 
industry actors became highly confrontational over proposals for an external 
standard on the marketing of HFSS products. 
7.4 Scottish government proposals for a voluntary standard on 
responsible marketing 
 
In April 2013, the Scottish government commissioned the British Standards 
Institute (BSI) to develop a Publicly Available Specification (PAS) on 
responsible marketing of food and drink, as an innovative policy solution to the 
reserved issue of broadcast regulation. However, exploratory discussions that 
policy makers had expected to produce consensus over a voluntary standard 
resulted in industry actors unilaterally exiting from negotiation. This section 
examines the positions adopted by industry actors on PAS, illustrating the shift 
in strategic action from rhetorical commitment to engagement with the Scottish 
government to confrontation with policy makers. The key difference between 
policy discussions in PAS and the FIG was that industry actors were unable to 
exploit temporal opportunities for venue shifting (Fooks et al. 2017). While multi-
level lobbying activities had used policy developments within the RD to block 
mandated reformulation targets in Scotland, this option was not available in the 
case of marketing practices. Before examining the development of PAS, it is 
useful to consider the regulatory landscape in statutory and self-regulatory 
codes relating to marketing and promotion. 
 
7.4.1 The regulatory landscape on food and drink marketing 
 
During the first exploratory workshop in April 2013, officials from the Scottish 
government set out proposals for a PAS on responsible marketing of food and 
drink, which included greater restrictions on price promotions, sport 
sponsorship, and strengthened restrictions on broadcast and non-broadcast 
media advertising. As the proposal notes, the policy aim of PAS was to 
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‘complement, and not replace existing regulation on controls over marketing of 
food and drink products. The regulatory and self-regulatory codes which are 
relevant to marketing and advertising practices - detailed in a PAS document 
drafted by the BSI and circulated to officials from the Public Health Division of 
the Scottish government – are the Code of Advertising Practice (CAP), 
Broadcasting Code of Advertising Practice (BCAP), and Ofcom restrictions. The 
remainder of this section provides a brief overview of the relevance of each of 
these codes to proposals for a PAS. 
 
Broadcast advertising is regulated through a hybrid of regulatory and self-
regulatory codes that apply to scheduling restrictions and content rules. In terms 
of statutory rules, in 2003 the UK government asked Ofcom (the 
communications regulator) to review rules on television advertising to children. 
This lead to the publication of an Ofcom report (Ofcom 2004) that concluded 
scheduling restrictions to tackle childhood obesity would be justified. Following 
on from this, Ofcom announced scheduling restrictions in November 2006 ‘to 
reduce significantly the exposure of children under 16 to unhealthy advertising, 
as a means of reducing opportunities to persuade children to demand and 
consume unhealthy products’ (Ofcom 2007) This included a ban on HFSS 
product advertisements or sponsorship in children’s programming, and the use 
of licensed characters or celebrities in advertising aimed at pre-school or 
primary-aged children. In 2004, Ofcom delegated the day-to-day regulation of 
broadcast advertising content to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). The 
ASA, a self-regulatory body with representatives from the advertising industry, 
introduced certain restrictions on the use of advertising techniques through its 
BCAP. This included the phased implementation of restrictions on HFSS 
advertising in children’s programming, such as prohibiting HFSS marketing on 
dedicated children’s channels. 
 
In contrast, non-broadcast advertising is regulated through the CAP, an industry 
self-regulatory code implemented by the ASA. This includes both paid-for 
space: for example, viral ads and advergames, and paid-for search listings; and 
non-paid for space, such as social media (for example, twitter). Yet as a recent 
review of the UK policy landscape (Garde, Davies, and Landon 2017) illustrates, 
the complexity of this landscape creates regulatory underlaps that can be 
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exploited by the processed food and beverage industry. For example, the CAP 
does not apply to traditional channels of non-broadcast media, such as 
packaging and sponsorship (Garde, Davies, and Landon 2017). Although a 
2015 review of the CAP led to the extension of restrictions to non-broadcast 
media (aligning CAP and BCAP codes), the interest of Scottish policy makers 
in the PAS reflected an awareness of gaps in the regulatory landscape that the 
ASA had not addressed in its 2010 review of non-broadcast restrictions. For 
instance, a circulated FAQ noted that a PAS would include all marketing on food 
and drink such as: food packaging, in-store promotions, digital marketing, and 
sport and cultural event sponsorship. The aim of the PAS was also to extend 
regulation of broadcast media, revising Ofcom restrictions on marketing for 
HFSS products on children’s channels (or programmes ‘of particular appeal’ to 
children aged 4 – 15 years) with proposals to limit HFSS marketing for all age 
groups before 9pm. All this suggests a policy commitment within the SNP 
government to shift towards more stringent regulation of industry marketing 
practices. The following sub-sections focus on exploratory discussions between 
the Scottish government, BSI and industry actors, unpacking the interaction 
between policy ideas and interests. This draws on empirical data from an FOI 
request submitted to the Scottish government for documents relevant to the 
development of a PAS, in addition to interviews with civil servants and public 
health advocates involved in its development. 
 
7.4.2 Technical standards as a policy instrument 
 
The acceleration of global trade through international and regional agreements 
has resulted in the concurrent rise of technical standards as a policy instrument 
to support market liberalisation (Vogel 1995). Alongside the emergence of 
transnational non-state certification schemes (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004; Bartley 2003), such as Fairtrade and the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) (Bell and Hindmoor 2012), technical standards have become an 
increasingly important form of ‘soft law’ related to transnational business 
governance (Eberlein et al. 2014). The technical work of standardization is 
coordinated by the International Organization for Standards (ISO), founded in 
1946 to facilitate global trade. Membership of ISO is open to national standards 
bodies (such as the BSI), with the technical work of standard development 
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delegated to a network of technical committees and working groups. As Mattli 
and Büthe (Mattli and Büthe 2003) observe, the globalization of product markets 
has converted the ISO from a peripheral to privileged position in global 
economic governance. While these standards are non-binding, ISO-created 
rules have a privileged status in trade law (Roht-Arriaza 2003), with the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) recognising ISO standards 
(Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Notably, the ISO 14001 on environmental 
management systems requires that participants assess their environmental 
performance, set out quantifiable targets, and submit to a system of audits that 
incentivise compliance with their management systems (Prakash & Potoski 
2006). 
 
Moreover, the process of developing an ISO standard is often triggered by a 
specific industry based on pragmatic evaluations of regulatory and market 
conditions (Mattli & Büthe 2003). The reasons for the proliferation of standards 
vary, but often relate to attempts to avoid state regulation (Levy and Prakash 
2003; Héritier and Eckert 2008), as a response to reputational concerns 
stemming from societal and political pressures on corporate behaviour (Thauer 
2014; Koenig-Archibugi 2004), and as a mechanism for regulatory 
harmonization that lowers nontariff trade barriers (Prakash & Potoski 2006). In 
other words, industry actors will participate in technical standards where 
standardization is perceived to facilitate market and political strategies. As 
Prakash and Potoski (2006) argue in their evaluation of ISO 14001, high levels 
of standard implementation precluded a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental 
regulation. While empirical data supports a ratcheting up of social and 
environmental standards in certain policy areas (Vogel & Kagan 2004), industry 
actors must have incentives to participate in the provision of public goods 
(Börzel & Risse 2010). In contrast, exploratory policy discussions around a PAS 
were marked by fundamental conflicts between food industry interests and 
public health goals. The following sub-sections draw on empirical material in 
unpacking interactions between the Scottish government, BSI and food industry 
actors in exploratory discussions over technical standards regulating the 
marketing of processed food and beverages. 
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7.4.3 Food standards: exploring a PAS  
 
This sub-section discusses technical standards in relation to the regulatory 
landscape in Scotland. It first discusses PAS as an idea that fits within the 
boundaries between reserved and devolved Scottish policy, while providing 
scope for a distinct regulatory approach to food and drink marketing. It then 
explores accountability as a concept that helps to explain the scope for 
divergence between Coalition and SNP government approaches. 
 
The decision of the Scottish government to explore a PAS was widely held by 
interviewees working in public health advocacy as an innovative idea related to 
the SNP government’s approach to public health. For example: 
 
‘My sense was that the Scottish government were willing and interested 
to grasp the issues, particularly marketing to children. The context being 
childhood obesity was a particularly acute problem for society and the 
economy. I also have the sense that the civil servants are very engaged 
with, and alert, to discussions about what kind of approaches might 
work. So, the proposal to see if there might be a way to develop a British 
standard, which food companies could adhere to.’ 
 
As the above extract illustrates, interviewees believed that proposals to develop 
a PAS reflected the willingness within the SNP government to pursue a more 
interventionist approach. What is interesting about the experimentation of civil 
servants with new ideas is the inability of the Scottish government to pursue 
legislative measures on broadcast marketing. As the following interviewee, a 
public health advocate with experience of the PAS process, explains: 
 
‘I think the actual policy was quite strong. When it came out [Supporting 
Healthy Choices draft], it looked like there was going to be action on a 
lot of these areas and it was quite explicit about going further on 
marketing to children and adults. I think the issue was what Scotland 
was actually able to do secondary to the UK [government]. So when 
Michael Matheson was the Minister (for Public Health), there were lots 
of discussions about whether or not they could go any further on 
broadcast advertising. I think the view was that it was a UK [government] 
competence and so it wasn’t possible. That was when I think the Scottish 
government were trying to look at more innovative approaches to taking 
action on non-broadcast media, and that’s when they came up with the 
idea of a British standard.’ 
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The above extract highlights the fact that policy responsibility for broadcast 
media is reserved to Westminster (under the Scotland Act 1998), which helps 
to explain the interest of Scottish policy makers in a non-binding standard. In 
relation to the approach of the SNP government to public health issues, there 
are evident similarities between PAS and MUP as policy instruments that 
reconfigure the boundaries between devolved and reserved issues. As Holden 
and Hawkins (2013) highlight, the decision to pursue MUP was in part structured 
by the fact that taxation is a reserved competence. 
 
Overall, the interview extracts reflected the widely held view that officials within 
the SNP government were comfortable with initiating and facilitating a regulative 
framework (Sørensen & Torfing 2009) that institutionalised a distinctive 
approach to food and obesity policy. The data also illustrates the 
conceptualisation of PAS as providing the scope to diverge from the approach 
to public health under the Coalition government. This view of a ‘Scottish 
approach’ to public health policy was evidence in many interviews with civil 
servants. For example: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘I think from the outset, our Ministers felt that 
the Responsibility Deal was a very bad move both ideologically as well 
as on a practical level. We just didn’t think it was going to achieve 
anything. In terms of ideology, the Responsibility Deal basically asked 
the industry to regulate itself. It was just not something that Ministers 
were happy about. So, I think from that perspective, as civil servants, we 
were driven to look at options that didn’t just put the responsibility square 
with industry, but made it more of a government demand […] PAS was 
still a voluntary arrangement. But, I guess the one big difference is that 
we were actually stating what we wanted specifically from industry.’ 
 
In explaining the rationale for the PAS, this interviewee contrasts the ideological 
positions of UK and devolved governments. This is interesting in two aspects. 
First, the quotation is illustrative of the openly critical way in which interviewees 
referred to industry self-regulation in the absence of the continued role of the 
state. Second, it underlines the perception that officials tasked with facilitating 
industry self-regulation had failed to achieve this aim. As the interviewee 
describes, civil servants were encouraged to explore ideas that committed the 
government to mobilizing and steering industry actors. This reflects a tacit 
assumption that the Coalition government had resisted an interventionist 
approach to accountability, opting for a ‘light touch’ approach to monitoring. 
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Overall, this suggests that the Scottish government was committed to meta-
governing the marketing activities of the processed food and beverage industry 
more effectively than within the RD. Indeed, the narrative of a distinctive 
Scottish approach to obesity policy is evident in the SHC policy statement, 
which argued that while ‘Scotland benefits from the Responsibility Deal [sic] […] 
our poor dietary health warrants further action’ (Scottish Government 2014). 
The following sub-section explores the scope of PAS for meaningful policy 




If the institutional design and decision processes of the Responsibility Deal 
reveal what Curtin (2007) terms a ‘complex undergrowth’ of accountability 
mechanisms at the meta-governance level (Bache et al. 2015), then a technical 
standard promised a more coherent approach. As part of formal policy 
announcements, the Scottish government depicted the PAS as ‘a halfway 
house between voluntary self-regulation and legislation’ (Scottish government 
2013). While this distinction provides a useful framing device, it is useful to 
conceptualise the Scottish government as taking on a meta-governance role 
(Dommett & Flinders 2015). More specifically, it can be conceptualised as a 
form of delegated governance whereby the Scottish government relied on the 
UK national standards body to develop regulatory standards. This is a critical 
point. The delegation of functions to the BSI also operationalized a logic of 
decision making codified in formal rules (Tatenhove et al 2006). In contrast to 
fuzzy accountability mechanisms under the Coalition government (Bache et al 
2015), the procedural logic of the standardization process embedded a distinct 
conceptualisation of accountability. 
 
Having suggested that industry actors exploited institutional ambiguity (Hajer & 
Versteeg 2005) to weaken accountability mechanisms in the Responsibility 
Deal, this sub-section unpacks the accountability mechanisms that underpin a 
PAS. More specifically, this focuses on requirement, performance and process 




As described above, the interest of policy makers in the PAS reflected an 
awareness of gaps in the regulatory landscape that could potentially be 
mitigated through a system of specification, performance and process 
standards. These different types of standards are captured in the BSI definition 
of a specification as relating to ‘detailed requirements, to be satisfied by a 
product […] and the procedures for checking conformity to these requirements’. 
A requirement focuses on prevention by controlling processes that give rise to 
harmful practices (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2010). This would include draft 
commitments in the PAS document to extend HFSS restrictions and restrictions 
on sport and cultural event sponsorship. Second, performance standards 
require a specified outcome related to a regulatory goal (Coglianese & 
Mendelson 2010), such as draft proposals to limit the display of HFSS products 
at the point of sale and require packaging to include front of pack traffic light 
labelling. By contrast, process standards specify procedural rules (Koenig-
Archibugi 2004). In this instance, the PAS draft required participants to adopt 
the FSA nutrient profiling model and traffic light labelling as thresholds to 
classify HFSS products. In contrast to the flexibility of account-giving in the 
Responsibility Deal, producing a complex undergrowth of individual standard-
setting and self-certified information reporting, the draft PAS document set out 
ex ante standards that would limit the scope for internal standards. Indeed, as 
the BSI document circulated to participants at the first workshop underlined, the 
PAS would be ‘not open to interpretation’ with ‘clear and unambiguous 
qualification criteria’ applied to marketing activity. 
 
Secondly, there also appeared to be scope for divergence in certification 
standards, which refer to how compliance with requirement, performance, and 
process standards is monitored and certified (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Drawing 
on the BSI document above, it is detailed that the PAS will provide an 
‘objectively verifiable’ standard that ‘provide for independent third party 
certification’, in addition to the market-driven logic (Cashore 2002) of consumer 
demand (a second party) for responsible marketing activities (Koenig-Archibugi 
and Macdonald 2013). As discussed in the previous chapter, this external 
standard of certification diverged from the ‘light touch’ approach of the 
Responsibility Deal, embodied in the commitment of the DH not to ‘provide any 
detailed analysis or commentary’ on information reporting. 
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All this suggests that, in delegating functions to the BSI, Scottish policy makers 
were comfortable in pursuing a more interventionist approach to accountability 
in the form of verifiable standards and external certification. However, as the 
following section illustrates, the expectation of a negotiated solution was 
vehemently opposed by industry actors leading to a break down in 
communications between the Scottish government and BSI.  
 
7.4.4 The politics of PAS 
 
A feature of the Coalition government’s approach to institutional design was the 
sequencing of decision processes in the Responsibility Deal. While the launch 
document is overt in framing promotion activities as a priority of the Food 
Network, it was noticeably absent as an agenda item of high-level steering 
group meetings until July 2013. As the following interviewee reflects, the 
rationale for avoiding this issue was straightforward: 
 
‘Why was it [promotions] at the bottom? Pragmatism, to be absolutely 
honest. We all knew promotions was going to be difficult. Everybody 
knew it would be difficult […] I thought if we built up collaborations and 
trust and built momentum then that would provide a better platform in 
order to have some more difficult conversations. So it was absolutely: 
‘let’s pick some things that we [the Food network] can do, and then we 
will move on to more difficult areas. That’s why it was at the bottom of 
the list.’ 
 
This extract is indicative of a widespread recognition of the barriers to 
negotiated self-regulation, in which many reflected that industry actors were 
reluctant to engage in policy discussions around marketing standards. For 
example: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘I think some areas were just impossible to make 
any progress [such as] food marketing and promotions. If you look at the 
Minister’s comments towards the end, it’s clear that companies wouldn’t 
really engage in any discussion about such a contentious issue. So, no 
progress was made there at all […] while there were efforts to get a 
pledge, companies just wouldn’t agree to any kind of pledge at all 
because they didn’t want to commit to action in that area. I just felt like 
it was endless.’ 
 
  [My emphasis] 
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The quotations above provide an illustration of the barriers faced by policy 
makers in Scotland to policy divergence that many interviewees believed to 
have exposed the limits of partnership. In the first extract, the interviewee 
describes the belief that building momentum through policy areas in which 
industry interests and those of public health were more likely to align, would 
lead to short term material interests being replaced with a belief that reaching 
compromise is ‘the right thing to do’ (Suchman 1995). In other words, the 
interviewee did not appear to believe that it was possible to initiate negotiations 
in such a commercially sensitive area without building a virtuous cycle of 
legitimacy (Ansell and Gash 2008; Benjamin 2002). In the second extract, the 
interviewee describes the vehement opposition of industry actors to 
negotiations on marketing practices, implicitly referring to the power of industry 
actors to exploit their position as rule-makers to veto (Tsebelis 2002) any 
attempt to reach a collectively binding decision. As this sub-section explores, 
the failure to initiate even a dialogue with food industry actors reflects the limits 
of consensus-oriented decision processes in policy areas where profit motive 
and public health diverge substantially. Indeed, the delegation of policy 
functions to the BSI reflected an awareness among Scottish policy makers that 
industry self-regulation in this area was likely to achieve little in the way of 
compromise or concession. To paraphrase the civil servant interviewee above, 
a PAS was viewed as a more effective policy solution than asking ‘industry to 
regulate itself’. 
 
It is important to highlight that the procedural approach of the BSI constitutes a 
distinct, and densely institutionalized context, in which negotiations take place. 
In contrast to the collaborative approach of the Responsibility Deal in which 
industry actors participated in rule-altering practices (Börzel 2011), the process 
of drafting technical standards takes place in a rule-directed institutional setting. 
To summarize, BSI decision processes are practically identical to the 
negotiation of ISO standards. The first phase involves approving the technical 
scope of a future standard. Following this, a steering group reaches a 
negotiated agreement on the substantive content of a draft standard, which is 
then published for expert review and public consultation (Mattli & Büthe 2003). 
The steering group then scrutinizes proposed revisions to the draft standard. 
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Crucially, this institutional process is structured by procedural rules that require 
a draft to be approved by consensus
10
 among participants. For instance, the 
adoption of an ISO standard requires that a substantial majority must approve 
the draft for it to be published as an official standard (Roht-Arriaza 2003). This 
suggests that the standard development process is consultative, but embedded 
in agreed-upon decision rules and procedures that formally preclude rule-
altering practices (Tatenhove et al 2006). For industry actors that had previously 
exerted influence over decision processes and policy outcomes as rule-makers, 
this densely institutionalized context provided less opportunities for policy 
influence. As a result, strategic action shifted from the justification of demands 
in terms of norms of ‘corporate citizenship’ and ‘good governance’, to 
confrontational negotiating strategies. 
 
Following on from this last point, the beginning of the negotiation process was 
characterized by reluctant acquiescence from industry actors to attend meetings 
in April and September 2013. At the first meeting, a BSI presentation set out the 
PAS and standard development process. In addition, officials from the Public 
Health Division of the Scottish government justified the PAS as a proportionate 
policy response to the burden of diet-related ill health. In a press release, the 
Minister for Public Health, Michael Matheson, described the first workshop as 
the ‘start of a long process’ that would ‘help the food industry play a leading role 
in being part of the solution’. However, despite the attendance of trade 
associations such as the British Soft Drinks Association (BSDA), the Food and 
Drink Federation (FDF), and British Retail Consortium (BRC), the tone of 
internal correspondence between Scottish government officials was rather more 
circumspect. For example, in an email about the workshop it is noted that ‘there 
was almost universal agreement that Scotland had a serious public health 
problem and that inaction was not an option’. However, the email also details 
that ‘a few were strongly opposed to any suggestion which would lead to a 
reduction in sales of HFSS products’. As the following extract from email 
correspondence between officials within the Public Health Division observes: 
                                                
10
 BSI guidelines on standard development define consensus as characterized by 
‘general acceptance and application of a Standard within its intended sphere of 
influence. This entails trying to ensure that the interests of all those likely to be affected 




‘Some food industry and advertising bodies are opposed to the goal of 
reducing HFSS food purchases but feel obliged to engage because the 
PAS is voluntary and not doing so might look poor for them. These 
groups may choose to adopt a policy of constructive opposition, i.e. to 
engage but oppose the substance of the PAS in committee.’ 
 
However, as negotiations around the PAS continued, it is apparent that industry 
voiced strong reservations about this approach. This is particularly evident in 
the notes of a meeting between the Scottish government and ASA to address 
concerns that the PAS would ‘duplicate the provisions governing the advertising 
of food’, leading to the ‘creation of a separate and contradictory standard’ that 
would ‘lead to confusion among Scottish consumers and industry’. Despite the 
efforts of Scottish policy makers to persuade the ASA to participate in the 
standard development process, the organization ‘did not believe it fruitful to 
engage with the PAS process’. 
 
Furthermore, tension between industry interests and the PAS was visible at the 
second steering group meeting in September 2013. As the following interviewee 
involved in the process reflected: 
 
Public health advocate; ‘There was a series of stakeholder meetings that 
were planned I recall, two that actually took place. The first one [April 
2013] was a scoping exercise to test enthusiasm in the room for taking 
it forward. What was interesting was that all the parties evinced, with one 
or two exceptions, enthusiasm to do something about this. When we 
came to the second meeting, at which there had been some preparatory 
work done, I could feel the food industry just beginning to sit back from 
the table and disengage. Clause by clause, comment by comment. And 
I remember at the end of the day seeing [representatives of] FDF, ASDA, 
and Tesco in a little huddle, and I thought to myself, ‘It’s dead now, isn’t 
it”. 
 
These kinds of descriptions of a performative opposition to the PAS were 
evident across the interview data. For example, as the following interviewee 
reflects, the disposition of industry actors to engagement posed a significant 
challenge for constructive policy discussions: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘We never really got any traction with it. We 
had two big meetings. The first to introduce the idea of it, and then the 
second meeting was really to take this forward. And it was quite a tough 
meeting. There was a lot of opposition from certain parties and basically 
 205 
non-interest in it from other parties at that second meeting. And it just 
never got beyond that nice idea.’ 
 
The tension between industry preferences and the PAS, which is directly 
referred to in the extracts above, reached an impasse with the issuing of a letter 
dated 2 October to the BSI co-signed from the SFDF, FDF, SRC, AA, and British 
Soft Drinks Association (BSDA). As the following extract illustrates, this 
reflected a shift towards a confrontational style of lobbying: 
 
‘[…] it is with regret that we now find ourselves in the position of being 
unable to support the PAS 2500 and therefore the work of the BSI in 
developing the standard. There are a number of reasons why we have 
reached this conclusion 
 
First, following both the workshop event in April and the first Steering 
Group meeting on 17
th
 September it has become clear to us that the BSI 
process is not the appropriate vehicle to deliver the outcomes which the 
Scottish government hopes to achieve through the draft specification. A 
PAS is, by definition, a rigid set of requirements and to be a signatory 
would force a fundamental change in the way in which manufacturers 
and retailers advertise, promote and sell a wide range of products, the 
economic impact of which should not be underestimated 
 
[…] as is clear from the draft specification and from the discussion at the 
Steering Group, much of what is included in the PAS is simply 
unworkable […] given widespread concerns regarding its rigidity, 
workability, fairness and the high risk of unintended consequences in its 
implementation, we feel that we can no longer remain  




This text provided a ‘definition of the situation’ that communicated the corporate 
veto of negotiations, in which the public health aims of the PAS is framed as 
conflicting with core market strategies. While this made explicit what many 
interviewees implicitly felt about its progress, it is worth noting that the decision 
to exit negotiations signalled a more confrontational style of political lobbying 
from the trade associations of processed food and beverage companies. This 
suggests that industry actors had adapted their strategic action in response to 




This adaptation of corporate political strategy appears to relate to strategic 
calculations related to the policy timing of the PAS, and its procedural 
sequencing. First, the political timing precluded industry actors from exploiting 
temporal opportunities to transfer ideas and practices across institutional 
settings. While the timing of policy developments in the Food Network had been 
strategically used to weaken target-based reformulation of HFSS products, this 
was not an option for the food industry given the first-mover position of the 
Scottish government. Second, the timing of the veto decision appears to relate 
to an awareness of the potential for path dependent ‘lock-in’ (Mahoney 2000), 
resulting from the rule-directed and codified norms of standards development. 
As Mattli and Büthe (2003) observe in their case study of ISO standards, 
decision processes make it progressively more difficult to alter proposals as it 
moves from informal planning and working group stages to technical 
committees. In this case, the timing of the letter appeared to exploit the ‘window’ 
of opportunity that existed between the Steering Group meeting in September, 
and a second phase of expert review and public consultation scheduled by the 
BSI to take place in October. Moreover, this logic is reflected in the consultation 
response of the SRC (a co-signatory of the withdrawal letter) to the Supporting 
Healthy Choices document (see Figure 2), submitted to the Scottish 
government on 3
rd
 October. With regard to price promotion, it noted: 
 
‘[…] all members have grave concerns about some of the technical 
details of this commitment […] there is a fear that this flexibility [of 
voluntary commitments] could give way for greater prescription. This 
suspicion was strengthened when we received the first copy of the BSI 
standard. 
 
Now we have seen the first draft version of the BSI standard on 
responsible marketing of food and drink, we have strong concerns about 
the future of some of the commitments covered in ‘Supporting Healthy 
Choices: Draft Framework for Voluntary Action”. 
 
As outlined above, temporal aspects help explain the collective decision to 
unilaterally exit from negotiations. Yet, it is important to emphasise that the 
technical and opaque nature of the PAS meant that decision processes were 
neglected by the media, remaining hardly visible to the public (Papadopoulos 
2003). As I explored in Chapter 6, the low visibility of decision making creates 
‘hidden actions’ (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007) that industry actors can exploit 
without the reputational risk entailed in having to justify sectoral interests to the 
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public (Ulbert and Risse 2005). In this case, it is evident that industry withdrawal 
from the PAS was shielded from public scrutiny, with media interest limited to 
trade publications, such as The Grocer11 and Food Navigator. Thus, non-
participation clearly represented a preferable ‘outside option’ (Holzinger 2001) 
to a technical standard that threatened the market strategies of food companies. 
 
As might be expected, the exit of all trade associations from negotiations 
triggered talks between the Scottish government and BSI that ended in the 
termination of its contract in November 2013. Email correspondence between 
Scottish policy makers during this period underlines the barriers to persuade 
industry actors to engage in the process. For instance, an email circulated within 
the Public Health Division on 3
 
October suggests ‘it was apparent that - even 
before the letter arrived – holding onto those we did have was going to be a 
challenge’. The sentiment in this email are reinforced by the following 
interviewee involved in the PAS process: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant; ‘I don’t think it was the letter as such, because 
the letter just confirmed the view that we had coming out of that second 
meeting, which was that it was going to be really difficult. We’d struggled 
to gain participation in that meeting from industry […] in terms of a 
positive outcome it wasn’t there […] It just seemed like putting a square 
peg in a round hole, really. And I think at that point I was told that the 




As the above quotation illustrates, policy makers appeared unable to see a 
realistic way to persuade industry actors to participate in the PAS process. 
Moreover, the interviewee emphasises that even the BSI – an organisation with 
a track record of successfully negotiating with industry – could not initiate 
meaningful policy discussions with food industry actors. This highlights the limits 
of consensus-oriented decision-making in policy areas that threaten the market 
strategies of food companies. Like the above civil servant, other interviewees 
referred to the meta-regulation of marketing practices as a particularly 
antagonistic policy issues for industry actors. For example: 
                                                
11
 Email correspondence point to industry actors having leaked the withdrawal letter 
The Grocer, which then pressed the Scottish government for comment on the PAS 
process on 3 October. 
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Public health advocate: ‘The Scottish government still want to take 
action in this area, but I think the main issue seems to be how they can 
actually go further than the rest of the UK […] a lot of organisations 
weren’t willing to engage in discussions and just wouldn’t really take part 
in it’. 
 
Public health advocate: ‘The British Standards Institute were quite 
bullish. The question had been asked, “what if you can’t get consensus?” 
and they said: “that’s never happened…oh it’s happened once before”. 
Well, this was obviously the second occasion that it wasn’t possible to 
gain consensus. So, what did I take from that? That this is one of the 
trickiest issues, and it is the greatest challenge to businesses in terms 
of their [commercial] freedoms and profits. And to try and move towards 
any kind of self-restraint around marketing is probably impossible’. 
 
In other words, the interview accounts presented in this section point to the limits 
of partnership in addressing marketing activities as a structural driver of ill health 
(Freudenberg 2012). The failure to develop a PAS on marketing, as the 
following interviewee points out, underlines a fundamental tension between 
food industry and public health interests that warrants a reconsideration of the 
self-regulatory approaches: 
 
Mid-ranking civil servant: ‘If you think about it from the food industry’s 
perspective, they exist to sell as much as possible. Promotion is a 
valuable vehicle for allowing them to do that. Then, unless your business 
is one that allows you to shift to a healthier product, then there’s really 
no commercial benefit for you to sign up to this […] there’s very little real 
interest for companies to do that unless they’re being pushed’. 
 
The argument being made here is distinct from the narrative that emerges from 
the Responsibility Deal, in which the RDFN Secretariat struggled to 
operationalize accountability mechanisms or shape policy decisions to achieve 
public health aims. In contrast, the Scottish government appeared committed to 
pursuing a divergent approach to the regulation of marketing activities, 
delegating policy functions to the BSI to develop an external certification that 
limited the discretion of the food industry. However, the acceptance of Scottish 
policy makers of the need for a more interventionist approach illustrates the 
limits of partnership as a policy instrument in addressing key drivers of diet-
related ill health. As I have argued in this section, trade associations acted to 
block policy divergence through unilateral withdrawal from policy discussions, 
demonstrating the power of industry actors to undermine the effectiveness of 
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policy making. As many of the interview accounts presented here imply, there 
are clear limits in the type of policies that partnership can, or should, be 
expected to achieve where fundamental conflicts exist between food industry 




This chapter has explored the operationalization of partnerships at the devolved 
level, and examines the role played by food industry actors in constructing 
barriers to policy divergence. The central claim of this chapter is that corporate 
strategies were a key barrier in constraining divergence from the institutional 
design and practices of the RD. This claim is structured into two key arguments. 
First, industry actors subverted proposals for mandated reformulation targets 
through venue shifting. Second, proposals for a self-regulatory code on 
marketing practices was explicitly opposed by industry actors, leading to the 
unilateral withdrawal from exploratory policy discussions. The findings 
presented here suggest that there are limits to what partnership working can 
achieve for public health where this diverges from the market strategies of food 
companies. 
 
The first section of the chapter describes the policy landscape in Scotland, 
following the 2010 general election. This provides an overview of the impact of 
public bodies reform at the devolved level, highlighting the ‘institutional void’ that 
was created following the transfer of policy functions from the FSA. This argues 
that, in responding to this void, the SNP government transferred policy functions 
to the Public Health Division in 2010. The second section of the chapter 
provides an account of partnership working, which helps to explain the role of 
industry actors in transferring practices from the RD. This begins by detailing 
rhetorical commitments made by the SNP government to addressing the wider 
social and economic determinants of obesity. However, this analysis 
demonstrates that partnership working was viewed by policy makers as 
constitutive of the political context in Scotland. The section then explores how 
obesity policy was taken forward following the institutional dislocation of the 
FSA. As the analysis highlights, the SNP government appeared committed to 
mandated performance standards that had the potential to lead to meaningful 
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divergence with policies implemented under the RD. Yet, despite the framing of 
partnership working by government as a ‘blank canvas’, this ignores the way in 
which the institutional and political context in England determined policy 
approaches in Scotland. Moreover, this analysis shows that the political 
strategies of industry actors played an important role in transferring practices 
from the RDFN. The venue shifting strategies of industry actors are 
demonstrated through tracing negotiations over HFSS product reformulation. 
The third section reviews exploratory discussions over proposals for a self-
regulatory code of responsible marketing. The section begins by describing 
PAS, and argues that this regulatory instrument represented an innovative 
potential solution to a policy issue reserved to Westminster. Yet, it is evident 
that industry actors shifted to a confrontational style of lobbying, in which the 
BSI failed to initiate even a dialogue with food companies about the potential for 
a technical standard on marketing. The account presented here suggests that 
limited policy divergence between UK and Scottish government approaches to 
partnership working may be understood as constrained by both the political 
strategies of industry actors, but also the challenges of regulating food 
companies for whom the Scottish market is marginal relative to the rest of the 
UK. This suggests that there exist clear limits to partnership working over issues 
in which the economic interests of food companies appear fundamentally in 


















Chapter 8. Conclusion: The politics of partnership and their implications 




This concluding chapter begins by providing an overview of the thesis and its 
relevance to understanding and conceptualising partnership as a distinctive 
mode of governance. The second section outlines the value added of the thesis 
to both political science and public health literatures, and argues that theories 
developed within the political sciences help to unpack the ‘black box’ of 
partnerships between governments and commercial sector actors. I argue that 
the tools of governance framework used in this thesis has the potential to 
complement the existing critical public health literature that has studied 
partnership working from an evaluation perspective (Knai et al. 2015; Durand et 
al. 2015; Petticrew et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2016; Kraak et al. 2014). In addition 
to the value added for critical public health, empirical research on health 
governance may prove conceptually useful for governance theorists in 
problematising the claims of the first generation of network governance 
research. The final section provides some brief reflections about future areas of 
conceptual and methodological research, making the case that a governance 
lens can help to problematise institutionalised ideas about partnerships with 
commercial sector actors. 
 
8.2 Overview of the thesis 
 
The thesis began by considering the emergence of partnership as a preferred 
governance tool of subnational, national, and transnational institutions and 
actors. It highlighted the proliferation of global health partnerships from the late 
1990s (Buse & Harmer 2007) as an expression of a broader shift in political 
decision-making towards the inclusion of commercial sector actors in the 
formulation and implementation of public policy (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 begins with a narrative review of the 
academic literature exploring partnership. This began by describing the 
conceptual development of global health governance (GHG) as an analytical 
framework to explore the impact of globalisation on health, which focused on 
the market and political strategies of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). 
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Moreover, it describes how the concept of unhealthy commodity industries has 
been used by public health scholars to question the presumption in favour of 
partnership with commercial actors, notably the alcohol and food industries. 
However, it is argued that public health research exploring the corporate 
activities of unhealthy commodity industries have given limited attention to 
recent developments within the political sciences. While scholars have focused 
on the input legitimacy and output effectiveness, this chapter suggests that what 
has been missing is a focus on the ‘black box’ of political decision-making. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter focuses on three inter-related meso-
level theories developed within sub-fields of political science: (1) theories of 
network governance, and specifically the concepts of metagovernance and 
multi-level governance; (2) accountability; (3) deliberative policy analysis. 
 
In particular, this literature review illustrates the overlap between normative 
claims made in the first generation of network governance research, and the 
explicit claims made in policy statements about what partnerships could attain 
for public health in UK and Scottish contexts. The empirical findings of the thesis 
therefore examine and challenge the discourse and assumptions of both 
governance theorists and the policy claims of the Conservatives and later 
Coalition government. This overview describes the widespread view among 
governance theorists that networks offer an effective and efficient substitute for 
the state (Offe, 2009). This is disaggregated into three key assumptions. First, 
that the participation of non-state actors (notably the commercial sector) 
enhances capacity through resources and knowledge. Second, that the 
inclusion of non-state actors in policy formulation promotes compliance with 
rules, as those that bear the costs of compliance are involved in the negotiating 
process (Börzel and Panke 2007). Third, it is expected that non-state actors will 
approach decisional procedures with a commitment to negotiated solutions, and 
display an inclination for compromise-seeking (Papadopoulos & Warin 2007). 
Taking these assumptions as its starting point, the thesis focused on two related 
aspects of the policy and practice of partnership. First, it examined the extent to 
which discourses, visible in the academic literature on governance networks, 
were reproduced in government policy statements. The second, and more 
substantive, focus of the thesis, was to explore the relationship between the 
discursive construction of partnership and the actual practices that 
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characterised this mode of governance in the UK and Scottish context. In other 
words, the aim of the thesis was to develop a theoretically informed empirical 
account of partnership working in UK obesity policy, that critically assesses 
idealised normative models of partnership (Swyngedouw 2005). 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach of the thesis, and focuses on 
the use of an interpretive approach to studying policy, key informant interviews, 
and analysis of documents. This chapter is structured into three sections that 
explore: the methodological approach of the thesis and its empirical focus; 
practical details of fieldwork; and a reflexive account of doing interpretive 
research. Taken together, this provides a rationale for interpretive policy 
analysis, and explores conceptual and methodological debates about ways of 
doing interpretive analysis. Having described the interpretive turn in policy 
analysis, the chapter outlines the practicalities of interviewing before reviewing 
the methodological literature on interviewing ‘elites’. This analysis 
problematises structural conceptualisations of power, and instead argues that 
temporal aspects help to conceptualise the exercise of power within the 
interview space. Drawing on my own experiences of interviewing, this 
demonstrates that interviewees used time boundaries to reshape the focus of 
interview questions and/or demarcate some topic as not-for-discussion. 
Similarly, a practical and reflexive account is presented for documentary 
analysis. This begins with an outline of the data generation process, describing 
the use of FOI to access documents related to partnership working and email 
correspondence between industry actors and public officials. The section then 
focuses on the use of frame analysis, and demonstrates how this framework 
was used to conceptualise frames as policy stories and frames as practices. 
 
In terms of structure, three findings chapters focused on the RD (Chapters 4 – 
6), while the final empirical chapter examined partnership working in Scotland 
(Chapter 7). This decision was informed by the research design and data 
generated from fieldwork (as discussed in the introduction to this thesis). 
 
Chapter 4 explored the role of ideas in policy making, tracing the 
institutionalisation of partnership as the preferred governance tool for UK 
governments over the past two decades. This chapter draws on ideational 
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theories of policy change to help examine the translation of partnership as a 
policy idea, tracing this idea as it moved from the stakeholder capitalism of New 
Labour to market accountability under the Conservatives. The central argument 
presented here, is that the epistemic structure of this policy idea was 
transformed, in which third way concepts were substituted with a market logic 
of public accountability. The chapter first illustrates the modernising agenda of 
New Labour, detailing the institutionalisation of the FSA and the overarching 
idea of a third way between state-centric interventionism and neoliberal 
individualism. It highlights how third way ideas were embodied in partnerships 
with the food industry, underpinned by the notion of corporate stakeholding. This 
section also details the policy functions and remit of the FSA, demonstrating its 
mandated approach to industry self-regulation via the salt reduction program. 
Having established this background political context, the second and third 
sections of the chapter examine how partnership was reworked by the 
Conservatives. This is demonstrated by process tracing the transformation of 
ideational meanings over two key reports produced by the Conservative party 
in opposition [2008 – 2010]. This account highlights the malleability of 
partnership as a policy idea, in which the Conservatives worked to construct it 
as market-oriented while also retaining ‘common-sense’ meanings of 
partnership working as cooperative and equal. This section also captures the 
tension between the public health functions of the FSA and the preference of 
the Conservatives for health governance to be reserved to the core executive, 
illustrated with reference to FSA advocacy of traffic light labelling. The third 
section of the chapter examines the use of MoG to transfer policy functions from 
the FSA, and demonstrates how this was justified with reference to broader 
commitments to reduce the size and volume of ‘quangos’. Chapter 4 represents 
a crucial stage in the thesis. It argues that the malleability of partnership was 
used by the Conservatives (as an opposition party in 2010) to construct a policy 
idea that displaced responsibility from government, and framed obesity as an 
issue that should be displaced to the market. The chapter therefore identifies 
key discourses that are key to understanding the institutional design and 
decision-making practices of the RD. The added value of this chapter is that it 
demonstrates the political contingency of partnership, illustrating how this idea 
may be transformed and translated. 
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Chapter 5 explores accountability within the RD. The substantive focus of this 
chapter was the gap between the institutional design and operationalization of 
accountability mechanisms. This uses (de)politicization as a bridging concept 
between the meso-level theory of meta-governance and micro-level 
accountability processes, as a lens to explore the use of hands-off 
metagovernance tools to displace responsibility from the state. The findings 
suggest that network framing and institutional design were used as tools to 
depoliticise accountability, in which the shift to informal political spaces reflected 
explicit depoliticising processes intended to limit government responsibility for 
accountability. However, this process of governmental depoliticization did not 
lead to politicization in the market or public sphere. Instead, the shift in decision-
making to informal spaces resulted in a paradoxical politics, in which the low 
visibility of the Responsibility Deal undermined attempts to politicise corporate 
practices. More specifically, the findings highlight the assumption that decision-
making processes would attract media interest, which would subsequently 
create market incentives for high regulatory standards. Yet, it is clear from the 
interview data that there existed no reputational risk for industry actors that did 
not participate. Although this finding may seem unsurprising, it is crucial in 
problematising the idea that partnerships between the state and non-state 
actors unambiguously offer a substitute for traditional forms of regulation. In 
contrast, the analysis presented in Chapter Five challenges the assumption that 
partnership with commercial sector actors offers ‘more progress, more quickly, 
and with less cost than legislation’ (DH 2011: 2). 
 
Chapter 6 builds further on the account presented in Chapter 5, examining 
decisional processes within the Food Network of the Responsibility Deal using 
two in-depth empirical case studies. First, it describes the ad hoc procedural 
rules and informal working practices of this working group, which framed 
decision-making as a deliberative process of negotiation between state and 
non-state actors. Consequently, this positioned non-state actors as both rule-
takers and rule-makers, involving industry actors in policy formulation and 
implementation. While partnership documents framed the co-formulation of 
policies as a mechanism to develop shared priorities, the findings presented in 
Chapter 6 demonstrate that industry actors exploited opportunities to shape the 
rules of the game to redraft policy commitments in ways aligned with their 
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economic interests. This chapter draws on Koppell’s (2005) concept of ‘multiple 
accountabilities disorder’ and Goffman’s (1959) famous distinction between 
frontstage and backstage to explore the operationalization of informal 
governance, using two empirical case studies. The first case study examines 
the negotiation of procedural rules, reconstructing decision-making processes 
through drafts of a ‘collective pledge’.  This focuses on drafts of the Calorie 
Reduction pledge, as a priority area for the Food Network, and outlines 
conflictual decisional processes between DH officials and industry actors. The 
findings of this reconstruction demonstrate visible conflict between the Food 
Network Secretariat and trade associations over the language and scope of self-
regulatory commitments, illustrated empirically through teasing apart the draft 
processes. From this, it is clear that industry actors were able to exploit 
opportunities for policy influence, which resulted in substantive and far-reaching 
recontextualization of draft commitments that displaced responsibility from the 
food industry to consumers.  
 
The chapter then offers an account of negotiations over the drafting of a 
monitoring framework. While the government, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
divested itself of responsibility for enforcing industry compliance, the 
expectation was that companies would publish annual performance reports that 
provided reliable information about compliance. Yet, the data presented in this 
case study similarly underline the policy influence of industry actors in blocking 
proposals for reporting of quantitative data. The detailed empirical analysis of 
decision-making across both case studies problematizes assumptions of 
partnership working as collaborative and consensus-oriented. In contrast to the 
expectation that negotiations would lead industry actors to seek reasoned 
consensus, analysis of decisional procedures reveals that communicative 
action was characterised by bargaining processes between DH officials and 
industry representatives. Taking place in the ‘back stage’ of email 
correspondence, the negotiated outcome of bargaining reflected the 
preferences of industry actors for flexible codes of conduct and non-committal 
information reporting. Empirically, the chapter illustrates how commercial sector 
actors can exploit informal spaces of governance to shape the rules of the game 
to align with their economic interests. Conceptually, it demonstrates the 
importance of tracing institutional practices and the useful analytical metaphor 
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of front and back stages of policy making in conceptualising how actors engage 
with their institutional context.  
 
Between them, the data presented in Chapters Five and Six challenge key 
assumptions of both the scholarly literature on governance networks, and the 
discourses within policy statements released under the Coalition government. 
While it may seem self-evident that partnerships between government and 
commercial sector actors might be incapable of effectively resolving tensions 
between public health and economic objectives, the thesis helps explain how 
institutional design and informal governance arrangements created new political 
spaces in which industry actors exercised influence over the rules of the game. 
It is important to recognise that corporate political strategies depended on the 
transfer of responsibility to industry actors, as part of an attempt by government 
to depoliticise public health policy making. Accordingly, while the policy agenda 
of the government was successfully eroded by industry actors, it is also clear 
that the food (and alcohol) industry were discursively constructed as legitimate 
actors that should have an influence on policy making. A core focus of the thesis 
is, therefore, the complex interplay between informal institutional arrangements 
and the concrete actions of industry actors. 
 
The final empirical chapter explores the institutionalisation of partnership at the 
devolved level in Scotland, focusing on how the SNP government responded to 
institutional change implemented by the Coalition government following the 
2010 general election. This chapter uses the narrative of policy divergence 
popular in health policy accounts of political devolution, as a lens to explore 
obesity policy. The first section explores the ‘institutional void’ that emerged 
following the transfer of policy functions from the FSA, as part of the Coalition 
government’s public bodies reform. This account highlights the institutional 
dislocation that followed the breakdown of the FSA, in which the Scottish 
government closed this void by establishing an independent food standards 
body. These temporal dimensions are crucial to understanding partnership 
working at the devolved level, in which political decision making at the UK level 
operated to restructure policy space at the devolved level. This is evident in the 
data from interviews with policy makers in Scotland, who viewed the RD as 
shaping the institutional design of partnership working between government and 
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the food industry. Thus, despite the framing of partnership by the government 
as a ‘blank canvas’, it is evident that the institutional and political context in 
England shaped partnership working in Scotland. Moreover, the findings 
presented in this chapter demonstrate that industry actors played an important 
role in transferring practices from the RDFN. The venue shifting strategies of 
industry actors, illustrated though process tracing of negotiations over HFSS 
product reformulation, underline the role of trade associations as boundary 
spanners between multiple levels of governance. The chapter concludes by 
providing an account of exploratory discussions over PAS. It describes the 
parameters of this regulatory instrument, and argues that it represented an 
innovative potential solution to a policy issue reserved to Westminster. 
However, the section outlines the failure to initiative even a dialogue with food 
companies over a self-regulatory code. This highlights a shift by industry to a 
confrontational style of lobbying, leading to their withdrawal from negotiations 
at an early stage in the PAS process. The account presented in this section 
suggests that policy divergence in marketing practices was constrained by both 
the political strategies of industry actors, but also the challenges of regulating 
food companies for whom the Scottish market is marginal relative to the rest of 
the UK. Overall, this suggests that there are likely to be clear limits to 
partnership working over issues in which the economic interests of food 
companies appear fundamentally in tension with public health aims. 
 
8.3 The wider significance of the thesis 
 
This thesis was motivated by an interest in the role of corporations in the setting 
and implementation of policy, in which commercial sector actors take on 
governance functions that used to come under the formal authority of the state 
(Börzel 2011). As described above, the empirical findings illustrate the policy 
influence of the commercial sector, facilitated by the institutional design of 
partnerships in UK obesity policy that positioned food industry actors as rule 
makers and co-producers of policies. The aim of the thesis is to attempt to 
unpack how the food industry optimise their policy influence through partnership 
with government, drawing on meso-level governance theories as a lens to 
conceptualise the interplay between ideas, interests, and institutions. In 
researching corporations using theories developed in the political sciences, it is 
 219 
hoped that the relevance of the thesis will extend beyond the public health 
literature and provide a paradigm case of the limits of governance networks in 
addressing the commercial drivers of health.  
 
As stated in Chapter 2, empirical research of unhealthy commodity industries is 
surprisingly limited in the political science literature. As Börzel (2011) argues, 
there is more research on successful network governance arrangements than 
there is on failure. This selection bias in empirical research appears to reflect a 
wider neglect of business power by political scientists. Seminal works by 
Lindblom (1977) and Galbraith (1977) focused attention on the structural power 
of business. As Galbraith observes in The Age of Uncertainty:  
 
‘The institution that most changes our lives we least understand or, more 
correctly, seek to misunderstand. That is the modern corporation. Week 
by week, month by month, year by year, it exercises a greater influence 






Hacker and Pierson (2002) suggest that the growing interest of political 
scientists with institutions resulted in insufficient attention among political 
scientists over how corporate political influence is exerted. As Culpepper (2011: 
185) argues in his work on business power and democratic politics, scholarship 
on this issue is ‘currently more neglected than it has been for the last half 
century’. A sentiment shared by other political scientists researching the role of 
business, such as Fuchs (2005), Vogel (2003) and Bell (2012). Yet, the findings 
of this thesis suggest that the political science literature would have much to 
gain from empirical research that challenges the discourses and assumptions 
of networks as effective modes of governance. In this regard, the thesis 
contributes to the scholarship on governance networks through its 
problematisation of the idea that partnerships between government and 
commercial sector actors offer a substitute for traditional forms of state 
intervention. The added value for public health is that governance theories offer 
a framework for conceptualizing the political agency of unhealthy commodity 
industries. This emphasis on practices and institutional design provides a 
particularly useful framework for describing and analysing the institutionally-
 220 
situated actions of state and non-state actors. As the findings of Chapters Four 
to Seven highlight, core assumptions of the network governance literature are 
confounded by the political strategies of unhealthy commodity industries to 
oppose policies that impose costs or threaten profit maximization. The analysis 
developed here suggests that fundamental tensions between public policy and 
economic interests preclude the type of collaborative networks that have been 
conceptualised within the political science literature as effective and legitimate 
solutions to complex policy problems (Mayntz 2002). Despite the proliferation 
of partnerships between governments and unhealthy commodity industries in 
global and public health, and the challenge this constitutes for legitimate public 
health aims, this has remained a conceptual and empirical ‘blind spot’ for this 
literature. Sørensen and Torfing (2014) suggest that a second generation of 
research has expanded beyond a theoretical and empirical interest in networks 
as an ideal-type mode of governance (alongside hierarchies and markets), to 
focus on the implications of this mode of governance. For example, its 
implications for democratic legitimacy (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Papadopoulos, 
2003; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009), depoliticization (Fawcett and Wood, 2017), 
and the use metagovernance tools (Bailey and Wood, 2017; Bell and Park, 
2006; Temmerman et al., 2015). However, while the governance paradigm is 
becoming increasingly sensitive to central aspects of democratic theory, a core 
challenge remains to explore the centrality of corporate actors for this mode of 
governance. 
 
Second, the thesis makes a conceptual contribution to the public health 
literature by developing a framework that helps explain the complexity of policy 
making within collaborative governance. As described in Chapter Two, this 
research focuses on the meso-level concepts of metagovernance and multi-
level governance that link to micro-level accountability and decisional 
processes. Empirically, I show the added value of both the metagovernance and 
multi-level concept to shed light into the ‘black box’ of governance. First, 
metagovernance provides a conceptual tool to explore how governments 
operationalize ideas, and analyse the continued role of the state in the 
discursive framing and institutional design of partnership. This provides a 
framework to explore the means through which government claims about 
partnership working are not actualized in practice. Second, the concept of multi-
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level governance offers crucial insights into temporal aspects of decision-
making and how non-state actors move across traditional spheres of political 
authority (Skelcher 2005). Put simply, the governance lens provides an 
analytical toolkit that is suited to researching complex institutional practices, in 
which government and commercial sector actors formulate policy in a 
collaborative manner. This added value is demonstrated across the findings 
chapters: Chapter 4 reflects on how partnership is mediated ideationally through 
policy discourses, and illustrates how this policy idea is transformed as it moves 
between political actors. A focus on processes of institutionalisation can help to 
generate questions for empirical research that critically assess the malleability 
of partnership and its implications for what it can attain for public health; Chapter 
5 demonstrates the conceptual usefulness of metagovernance in unpacking 
accountability. The analysis presented in this chapter underlines governmental 
strategies to displace responsibility for public health, exploring how institutional 
design and framing can be used as tools by governments. The added value for 
public health research, is that this conceptual framework helps to unpack the 
role of government in partnership working; Chapter 6 employs the analytical 
metaphor of a front and back stage of policy making to trace the activities of 
food industry actors.  This metaphor helps to explain where and when industry 
actors have attempted to influence political decision-making, both of which are 
pressing questions for scholars interested in corporate political strategies; 
Chapter 7 illustrates how industry actors exploit opportunities created by 
functional overlaps across different levels of governance, a central dimension 
of public health studies of corporate activities. In summary, this thesis very 
clearly demonstrates the added value of political science in conceptualizing the 
institutional practices of partnership and their impact on public health. 
 
Moreover, it provides a useful analytical framework to examine policy making 
processes that are not adequately captured in theories of regulatory capture 
(Stigler, 1971), which focus on the ‘capture’ of regulatory agencies by interest 
groups through subverting the regulatory process. For example, Carpenter and 
Moss (2013) observe myriad strategies of political influence, exemplified by the 
revolving door dynamic between regulatory agencies and private sector. 
Indeed, the theory of regulatory capture has been used by public health scholars 
to conceptualise the policy influence of unhealthy commodity industries 
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(McCambridge et al 2013; Miller and Harkins 2010). For instance, Mindell and 
colleagues (2012: 3) characterise the Responsibility Deal as the denouement 
of corporate capture, ‘in which committees dominated by industry agree 
programmes ostensibly intended to tackle the health problems arising from the 
products they manufacture or distribute’. Yet, the concept of capture might be 
intrinsically problematic for informal governance based on cooperation and 
partnership in networks, in which unhealthy commodity industries are explicitly 
framed as legitimate stakeholders in collaborative policy making. In this regard, 
the idea of partnership having been ‘captured’ by industry actors appears to 
preclude exploring the purposeful action of governments in operationalizing this 
mode of governance, and how industry actors adapt corporate strategies to 
maximise their policy influence in this type of institutional context. The 
conceptual analysis and data presented in this thesis marks an attempt to move 
beyond the notion of ‘capture’, exploring how corporate influence is exercised 
in discursive and participatory decision-making processes that allow industry 
actors to exploit weaknesses in institutional design and use their status as co-
producers to shape the ‘rules of the game’. In other words, there is need for 
research that improves our understanding of unhealthy commodity industries as 
key stakeholders in informal governance, and the implications for public health 
policy. The conceptual argument of this thesis is that the political science 
literature provides a toolkit to unpack the interactions between governments and 
corporations, in which policy formulation is coordinated within and across public 




The findings presented in this research suggest that food industry actors 
exerted influence on policy positions in partnership. Yet, it is plausible that the 
case studies utilised to empirically demonstrate the micro-political processes of 
corporate political strategies, under-estimate the extent and scale of this policy 
influence. First, the account developed in Chapter 6 demonstrates that the ‘rules 
of the game’ were shaped in the back stage of negotiations. However, it is 
important to note that this chapter reconstructs the drafting of the calorie 
reduction pledge, which was one of 6 voluntary commitments negotiated 
between DH officials and food industry actors. The PIRU evaluation of the 
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RDFN found little evidence that negotiated agreements in the additional 5 
pledges were effective (Knai et al 2015), which suggests that industry actors 
exploited opportunities for policy influence in related policy areas (notably salt 
reduction and front-of pack labelling). Second, this case study of informal 
governance is based on a sample of email correspondence between FDF 
representatives and policy makers over a two-year period. While the analysis of 
these documents support the idea that the FDF was a powerful actor in shaping 
policy commitments, it should be noted that the rationale for narrowing FOI 
requests to this actor was determined by the time-consuming nature of this 
method of data generation (as outlined in Chapter 3). As such, it seems likely 
that FOI requests for interactions between policy makers and other industry 
actors would generate data on back stage decision-making processes that are 
not captured in this research. Third, in tracing email correspondence, this 
research examines an important dimension of informal governance, but does 
not capture other back stage practices. The following interviewee, for example, 
reflects on the informal interactions s/he observed in their role as a public health 
advocate: 
 
Public health advocate: ‘[…] you can spend half an hour in the queue 
waiting to get through security into Westminster [..] you would stand 
there and have a look to see who else is there. I would frequently see 
the [senior representative from trade association] in the queue and [their] 
job was to be in parliament a lot. And then you have other examples 
where senior members of big food companies turn up to meetings, going 
up to the main civil servant, giving them a kiss on both cheeks, you know 
– you witness that and think ‘OK, there’s something going on there’. 
Does that equal [industry] capture? You just sort of think, ‘these people 
are making a very, very conscious effort to be close to these people’. 
 
 
As the above quotation hints, the back stage includes informal relationships that 
help to build interpersonal relationships and exert ‘soft power’ (Blomqvist 2016). 
Yet, in order to observe the politics du couloir (Wodak 2009: 4), researchers 
must negotiate access to arenas where informal interactions take place (Gains 
2011). Negotiating this access is likely to be particularly difficult for decision-
making between policy makers and commercial sector actors, which helps 




Finally, it is worth noting that several policy makers directly involved in the PG 
and RDFN declined to participate in this research. As Chapter 3 outlined, the 
low response rate to interview requests from DH officials appeared to stem from 
perceptions of the RD as a policy failure. Although interviews with individuals 
involved in the RD would have produced additional insights into decision-
making processes, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that the data 
generated would have further strengthened its key findings. 
 
8.5 Key contributions and future research 
 
The thesis has made a distinctive contribution to the public health and political 
science literature by analysing the ‘black box’ of partnerships charged with 
encouraging food industry self-regulation to address obesity policy concerns in 
England and Scotland between 2010 – 2015. The argument has been that 
corporate interests have optimised their policy influence through informal 
governance, and blocked attempts by government to more effectively regulate 
their activities. The conclusion is, perhaps unsurprisingly, that partnerships 
between government and food industry actors should raise serious concerns 
about what they can be expected to attain for public health. The findings 
presented focus on the UK context and do not attempt to make claims about the 
operationalization of partnerships in other political contexts. However, it is 
evident that the RD is considered by many scholars and advocates within the 
public health community as an exemplar of voluntary agreements between 
government and industry. For example, and as discussed in the introduction, 
Moodie et al (2013: 675) refer to the Responsibility Deal as embodying the type 
of self-regulation that has become ‘the default approach of many governments 
and the UN’. The remainder of this sub-section outlines what I feel to be key 
contributions of the thesis to understanding this partnership. 
 
1. Ideas  
 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest that partnership embodies an idea 
that implies an attempt to democratize policy making through the inclusion of 
affected non-state actors in decision-making, and is synonymous with political 
‘feel good’ standards of contemporary governance, such as transparency, 
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accountability, participation, and deliberation (Busuioc 2013). As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the discursive representation of this idea in policy documents 
explicitly links partnership working to a logic of collaboration and a shared 
interest in realising public health aims. Indeed, the very idea of a responsibility 
deal implies a form of governance in which negotiated interaction between 
governments and stakeholders can overcome adversarial modes of policy 
making (Ansell & Gash 2008). The empirical findings of this thesis reiterate 
criticisms of these assumptions that have already been made in the public 
health literature (e.g. Hawkes and Buse 2011), challenging the ‘feel good’ factor 
of partnership. More specifically, that political actors frame collaboration with 
the food industry in ways that promote particular aspects of partnership, 
promoting some elements and discarding others. This is described in Chapter 
Four, which traced how the Conservative party reconfigured this idea, replacing 
third way discourses with the terminology of market-driven accountability. The 
argument here is that the vague, aspirational language of partnership provides 
a malleable discourse that can be reconciled with different reform priorities. 
Thus, while this concept is discursively constructed as a legitimate and effective 
mode of governance (Buse & Hamer 2004), it is important to recognise that 
partnership has a conceptual flexibility that political actors can use to influence 
and reform public health policy according to differing interpretations of the role 
and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. As described in this thesis, 
partnership was used by the Coalition government to divest itself of policy 
responsibility and displace this issue to the market. The key point here is that 
this malleability of partnership may be used by actors to operationalize 
partnerships that are unable to effectively address tensions between the 




The thesis also explored the operationalization of partnership ideas, focusing 
on the complexities of informal governance and its impact on accountability and 
decision-making processes. Describing these micro-political interactions also 
helps highlight wider dynamics of policy making that are likely to have 
implications in other political contexts. Following the structure of the thesis, this 
differentiates between the quiet politics of partnership, and the potential 
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spillovers of partnership working for other jurisdictions. First, a key finding of this 
thesis is the low political salience of partnership, and corresponding low visibility 
of partnership in media reporting. This point is crucial, as it highlights the 
accountability vacuum that emerges in modes of governance that are not easily 
accessible to external scrutiny (Papadopoulos 2003). While the RD transformed 
into an interesting narrative following the publication of the PIRU evaluation, the 
media largely neglected the operational routines and policy output of the RDFN. 
This suggests that market accountability is not achieved by simply displacing 
responsibility from government, and indeed may work to undermine public 
accountability. 
 
In addition, and as discussed in Chapters 5 - 6, the displacement of political 
decision-making to informal spaces of governance afforded an opportunity for 
industry actors to exert policy influence in the absence of public attention. This 
does not suggest that accountability mechanisms based on reputational risk can 
never produce public goods. For example, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
sustainability certification operates (in principle) according to a market-driven 
logic based on the expectation that consumers will demand environmentally 
sustainable products (Bernstein & Cashore 2002). This certification scheme 
has, however, been spearheaded by a coalition of environmental NGOs that 
create reputational risk through high-profile media campaigns (Cashore et al 
2007). As Bartley (2003) observes, a key driver of forest certification was the 
sustained pressure exerted through social movement campaigns that targeted 
deforestation practices and scrutinised corporate environmental responsibility. 
The point here is that NGOs played a crucial role in industry commitments to 
certification initiatives. Yet, the strong market incentives of FSC certification 
(Chan and Pattberg, 2008) can be contrasted with markedly less effective 
accountability regimes in obesity policy. On one hand, this reflects the 
remarkable path-breaking change in forest governance (Bartley, 2014). On the 
other, it highlights the barriers to politicising corporate practices and the 
necessary agenda-setting function of NGOs.  As Chapter 5 demonstrates, 
informal governance may operate to undermine market accountability, 
particularly if governments use partnership with commercial sector actors to 
divest themselves of responsibility for public health policy making. Second, the 
thesis argues that the operationalization of ideas at the UK level may restructure 
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or reduce policy space at the sub-national level (Skelcher 2005), in which 
functional overlaps allow industry actors to operate across levels of governance. 
While this research focuses on policy divergence following UK devolution, future 
research might explore interdependencies across jurisdictions and how this may 
form the basis of corporate political strategies to block or avoid unwelcome 
regulation.  
 
3. Interests  
 
A key finding of this thesis is that food industry actors were able to exploit 
informal spaces of governance to optimise their policy influence. As such, it is 
unsurprising that unhealthy commodity industries have promoted partnerships 
as a governance tool to address the contribution of tobacco use, unhealthy diet, 
and harmful alcohol consumption to the global burden of non-communicable 
diseases (Gilmore et al. 2011; Moodie et al. 2013). The empirical findings of this 
thesis illustrate how industry actors have exploited opportunities for policy 
influence, exploring the use of back stage negotiations to shape the rules of the 
game and avoid unwelcome regulatory standards. Moreover, Chapter Seven 
examines the highly confrontational methods that industry actors used to veto 
proposals for external certification of marketing practices, and the use of 
temporal venue shopping strategies to block divergence from informal 
governance practices. All this suggests that partnership between government 
and unhealthy commodity industries provide industry actors with the means to 
shape the rules of the game in ways that align with their economic interests. 
 
A central focus of this thesis is that the governance and critical public health 
literatures have much to gain from each other. This research project has pointed 
out the overlap between assumptions of governance theorists and policy claims 
about partnerships, but also demonstrates the added value of conceptual tools 
developed in the political sciences. However, as with any research project, the 
interpretive process of describing and analysing this policy issues raises 
multiple questions and mini-theories that could be explored in future research. 
This could involve examining how partnership working may have changed over 
the past 5 years, or food industry engagement with the Treasury following the 
implementation of SDIL. This research also raised the issue of the mediatization 
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of policy making and its impact on public accountability, which future research 
could explore in greater depth. More broadly, and as argued in Chapter 2, what 
is missing from the public health literature is a focus on the ‘black box’ of political 
practices that constitute partnership. This thesis argues that the political 
sciences provide analytical frameworks to conceptualize health governance, 
focusing on the processes through which commercial sector actors influence 
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Appendix II: Generic examples of interview schedules for interviewees based 
in UK and/or Scotland 
 
 













































































Appendix IV: Examples of documents generated using FOI requests 
 

































Extract from FOI documents relating to communications between FDF 











































































Appendix V: Examples of partnership documents: 
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